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Algerian Civil War

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: Military History and War

                  Algerian Civil War
   A June 1997 suicide bombing of a bus.

     Date   1991 to 2002
   Location Algeria
    Result  Victory for Algerian government
                      Combatants
   Algerian government  Islamic Armed Movement (MIA)
                        Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
                        Islamic Salvation Army (AIS)
                        others...
                      Commanders
   Ali Kafi
   Liamine Zéroual
   Abdelaziz Bouteflika MIA: Abdelkader Chebouti
                        GIA: Antar Zouabri et al.
                        AIS: Madani Mezrag
                       Strength
   140,000 (1994)
   124,000 (in 2001)    2,000 (1992)
                        40,000 (1994)
                        10,000 (1996)
                        300-1,000 (2005)
                      Casualties
   ~150,000 - 200,000 dead

   The Algerian Civil War was an armed conflict between the Algerian
   government and various Islamist rebel groups which began in 1991. It is
   estimated to have cost between 150,000 and 200,000 lives. The conflict
   effectively ended with a government victory, following the surrender of
   the Islamic Salvation Army and the 2002 defeat of the Armed Islamic
   Group. However, low-level fighting still continues in some areas.

   The conflict began in December 1991, when the government cancelled
   elections after the first round results had shown that the Islamic
   Salvation Front (FIS) party would win, citing fears that the FIS would
   end democracy. After the FIS was banned and thousands of its members
   arrested, Islamist guerrillas rapidly emerged and began an armed
   campaign against the government and its supporters. They formed
   themselves into several armed groups, principally the Islamic Armed
   Movement (MIA), based in the mountains, and the Armed Islamic Group
   (GIA), based in the towns. The guerrillas initially targeted the army
   and police, but some groups soon started attacking civilians. In 1994,
   as negotiations between the government and the FIS's imprisoned
   leadership reached their height, the GIA declared war on the FIS and
   its supporters, while the MIA and various smaller groups regrouped,
   becoming the FIS-loyalist Islamic Salvation Army (AIS).

   Soon after, the talks collapsed, and new elections were held—won by the
   army's candidate, General Liamine Zéroual. Conflict between the GIA and
   AIS intensified. Over the next few years, the GIA began a series of
   massacres targeting entire neighborhoods or villages; some evidence
   also suggests the involvement of government forces. These massacres
   peaked in 1997 around the parliamentary elections, which were won by a
   newly created pro-Army party, the National Democratic Rally (RND). The
   AIS, under attack from both sides, opted for a unilateral ceasefire
   with the government in 1997, while the GIA was torn apart by splits as
   various subdivisions objected to its new massacre policy. In 1999,
   following the election of a new president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a new
   law gave amnesty to most guerrillas, motivating large numbers to
   "repent" (as it was termed) and return to normal life. The violence
   declined substantially, with effective victory for the government. The
   remnants of the GIA proper were hunted down over the next two years,
   and had practically disappeared by 2002.

   However, a splinter group of the GIA, the Salafist Group for Preaching
   and Combat (GSPC), initially based on the fringes of Kabylie, had
   formed in 1998 to dissociate itself from the massacres. However,
   despite its former repudiation of attacking non-combatants, targeting
   only army and police, they "...eventually returned to killing
   civilians" and in October of 2003, publicly endorsed Al-Qaeda. The GSPC
   rejected the amnesty and has continued to fight, although many
   individual members have surrendered. While as of 2006, its
   comparatively sparse activities - mainly in mountainous parts of the
   east - are the only remaining fighting in Algeria, a complete end to
   the violence is not yet in sight.

Liberalization: prelude to war

   By the end of 1987, the single-party socialist dictatorship under which
   Algeria had fared relatively well since the 1960s no longer seemed
   viable. The government had relied heavily on high oil prices, and when,
   in 1986, oil prices went from $30 to $10 a barrel, the planned economy
   came under severe strain, with shortages and unemployment rife. In
   October 1988 (" Black October"), massive demonstrations against
   President Chadli Bendjedid took place throughout Algerian cities, with
   an Islamist element prominent among the demonstrators. The army fired
   on the demonstrators, leaving some dead and shocking many.

   The president's response was to make moves towards reform. In 1989, he
   brought in a new constitution which disestablished the ruling party,
   the National Liberation Front (FLN), and made no mention of socialism,
   while promising "freedom of expression, association, and assembly". By
   the end of the year, a variety of political parties were being
   established and recognized by the government—among them, the Islamic
   Salvation Front (FIS).

   The FIS incorporated a broad spectrum of Islamist opinion, exemplified
   by its two leaders. Its president, Abbassi Madani, a professor and
   ex-independence fighter, represented a relatively moderate religious
   conservatism and symbolically connected the party to the Algerian War
   of Independence, the traditionally emphasized source of the ruling
   FLN's legitimacy; he expressed tepid support for the concept of
   democracy and rejected the idea that it could override the sharia. The
   vice-president, Ali Belhadj, a younger and less educated Algiers
   preacher who had already played a significant role in the October
   demonstrations, made aggressively radical speeches that rallied
   dissatisfied lower-class youth and alarmed non-Islamists with his
   clear-cut rejection of democracy and what they considered his
   repressive views on women. In February 1989, for example, Belhadj
   stated:

          There is no democracy because the only source of power is Allah
          through the Koran, and not the people. If the people vote
          against the law of God, this is nothing other than blasphemy. In
          this case, it is necessary to kill the non-believers for the
          good reason that they wish to substitute their authority for
          that of God.

   The FIS rapidly became by far the biggest Islamist party, with a huge
   following concentrated especially in large urban areas. In 1990 they
   swept the local elections with 54% of votes cast. The Gulf War further
   energized the party, as it outdid the government in gestures opposing
   Desert Storm.

   In May 1991, the FIS called for a general strike to protest the
   government's redrawing of electoral districts, which it saw as a form
   of gerrymandering. The strike itself was a failure, but the huge
   demonstrations the FIS organized in Algiers were effective; the FIS was
   persuaded in June to call the strike off by the promise of fair
   parliamentary elections. Shortly afterwards, the increasingly alarmed
   government arrested Madani and Belhadj, along with a number of
   lower-ranking members. The party, however, remained legal, and passed
   to the effective leadership of Abdelkader Hachani.

   The rise of the party continued. It eventually agreed to participate in
   the next elections, after expelling dissenters, such as Said Mekhloufi,
   who advocated direct action against the government. In late November,
   armed Islamists connected to the extremist Takfir wal Hijra attacked a
   border post at Guemmar, foreshadowing the conflict to come; otherwise,
   an uneasy calm prevailed. On December 26, the FIS handily won the first
   round of parliamentary elections; with 48% of the overall popular vote,
   they won 188 of the 232 seats decided and an FIS government seemed
   inevitable.

Elections cancelled: a guerrilla war begins

   The army saw this outcome as unacceptable. The FIS had made open
   threats against the ruling pouvoir, condemning them as unpatriotic and
   pro-French, as well as financially corrupt. Additionally, FIS
   leadership was at best divided on the desirability of democracy, and
   some expressed fears that a FIS government would be, as U.S. Assistant
   Secretary of State Edward Djerejian put it, "one man, one vote, one
   time."

   On January 11, 1992, the army cancelled the electoral process, forcing
   President Chadli Bendjedid to resign and bringing in the exiled
   independence fighter Mohammed Boudiaf to serve as a new president. So
   many FIS members were arrested—5,000 by the army's account, 30,000
   according to FIS, and including Abdelkader Hachani—that the jails had
   insufficient space to hold them in; camps were set up for them in the
   Sahara desert, and bearded men feared to leave their houses lest they
   be arrested as FIS sympathizers. A state of emergency was declared, and
   many ordinary constitutional rights were suspended. Any protests that
   occurred were suppressed, and human rights organizations, such as
   Amnesty International, reported frequent government use of torture and
   holding of suspects without charge or trial. The government officially
   dissolved the FIS on March 4.

   Of the few FIS activists that remained free, many took this as a
   declaration of war. Throughout much of the country, remaining FIS
   activists, along with some Islamists too radical for FIS, took to the
   hills with whatever weapons were available and became guerrilla
   fighters. Their first attacks on the security forces (not counting the
   Guemmar incident) began barely a week after the coup, and soldiers and
   policemen rapidly became targets. As in previous wars, the guerrillas
   were almost exclusively based in the mountains of northern Algeria,
   where the forest and scrub cover were well-suited to guerrilla warfare,
   and in certain areas of the cities; the very sparsely populated but
   oil-rich Sahara would remain mostly peaceful for almost the entire
   duration of the conflict. This meant that the government's principal
   source of money—oil exporting—was largely unaffected.

   The tense situation was compounded by the economy, which collapsed even
   further that year, as almost all of the longstanding subsidies on food
   were eliminated. The hopes many placed in the seemingly untainted
   figure of Boudiaf were soon dashed when he fell to a bullet from one of
   his own security guards in late June. Soon afterwards, Abbassi Madani
   and Ali Belhadj were sentenced to 12 years in prison.

   By August 26, it had become apparent that some guerrillas were
   beginning to target civilians as well as government figures: the
   bombing of the Algiers airport claimed 9 lives and injured 128 people.
   The FIS condemned the bombing along with the other major parties, but
   the FIS's influence over the guerrillas turned out to be limited.

   The initial fighting appears to have been led by the small extremist
   group Takfir wal Hijra and associated ex-Afghan fighters. However, the
   first major armed movement to emerge, starting almost immediately after
   the coup, was the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA). It was led by the
   ex-soldier Abdelkader Chebouti, a longstanding Islamist who had kept
   his distance from the FIS during the electoral process. In February
   1992, ex-soldier, ex-Afghan fighter, and former FIS head of security
   Said Mekhloufi founded the Movement for an Islamic State (MEI). The
   various groups arranged several meetings to attempt to unite their
   forces, accepting the overall leadership of Chebouti in theory. At the
   last of these, at Tamesguida on September 1, Chebouti expressed his
   concern about the movement's lack of discipline, in particular worrying
   that the Algiers airport attack, which he had not approved, could
   alienate supporters. Takfir wal Hijra and the Afghans (led by
   Noureddine Seddiki) responded by agreeing to join the MIA. However, the
   meeting was broken up by an assault from the security forces, provoking
   suspicions which prevented any further meetings.

   The FIS itself established an underground network, with clandestine
   newspapers and even an MIA-linked radio station, and began issuing
   official statements from abroad starting in late 1992. However, at this
   stage the opinions of the guerrilla movements on the FIS were mixed;
   while many supported FIS, a significant faction, led by the "Afghans",
   regarded party political activity as inherently un-Islamic, and
   therefore rejected FIS statements.

   In January 1993, Abdelhak Layada declared his group independent of
   Chebouti's. The new faction was called the Armed Islamic Group (GIA,
   from French Groupe Islamique Armé). It became particularly prominent
   around Algiers and its suburbs, in urban environments. It took a
   hardline position, opposed to both the government and the FIS,
   affirming that "political pluralism is equivalent to sedition" and
   issuing death threats against several FIS and MIA leaders. It was far
   less selective than the MIA, which insisted on ideological training; as
   a result, it was regularly infiltrated by the security forces,
   resulting in a rapid leadership turnover as successive heads were
   killed.

   In 1993, the divisions within the guerrilla movement became more
   distinct. The MIA and MEI, concentrated in the maquis, attempted to
   develop a military strategy against the state, typically targeting the
   security services and sabotaging or bombing state institutions. From
   its inception on, however, the GIA, concentrated in urban areas, called
   for and implemented the killing of anyone supporting the authorities,
   including government employees such as teachers and civil servants. It
   assassinated journalists and intellectuals (such as Tahar Djaout),
   saying that "The journalists who fight against Islamism through the pen
   will perish by the sword.". It soon stepped up its attacks by targeting
   civilians who refused to live by their prohibitions, and later in 1993
   began killing foreigners, declaring that "anyone who exceeds that
   period [a one-month deadline] will be responsible for his own sudden
   death." After a few conspicuous killings, virtually all foreigners left
   the country; indeed, (often illegal) Algerian emigration too rose
   substantially, as people sought a way out. At the same time, the number
   of visas granted to Algerians by other countries began to drop
   substantially.

Failed negotiations and guerrilla infighting

   The violence continued throughout 1994, although the economy began to
   improve during this time; following negotiations with the IMF, the
   government succeeded in rescheduling debt repayments, providing it with
   a substantial financial windfall, and further obtained some 40 billion
   francs from the international community to back its economic
   liberalization. As it became obvious that the fighting would continue
   for some time, General Liamine Zéroual was named new president of the
   High Council of State; he was considered to belong to the dialoguiste
   (pro-negotiation) rather than éradicateur ( eradicator) faction of the
   army. Soon after taking office, he began negotiations with the
   imprisoned FIS leadership, releasing some prisoners by way of
   encouragement. The talks split the political spectrum; the largest
   political parties, especially the socialist FLN and Kabyle socialist
   FFS, continued to call for compromise, while other forces—most notably
   the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), but including smaller
   leftist and feminist groups such as the ultra-secularist RCD—sided with
   the "eradicators". A few shadowy pro-government paramilitaries, such as
   the Organisation of Young Free Algerians (OJAL), emerged and began
   attacking civilian Islamist supporters. On March 10, 1994, over 1000
   (mainly Islamist) prisoners escaped Tazoult prison in what appeared to
   be a major coup for the guerrillas; later, conspiracy theorists would
   suggest that this had been staged to allow the security forces to
   infiltrate the GIA.

   Meanwhile, under Cherif Gousmi (its leader since March), the GIA became
   the most high-profile guerrilla army in 1994. In May, the FIS suffered
   an apparent blow as several of its leaders that were not jailed, along
   with the MEI's Said Makhloufi, joined the GIA; since the GIA had been
   issuing death threats against them since November 1993, this came as a
   surprise to many observers, who interpreted it either as the result of
   intra-FIS competition or as an attempt to change the GIA's course from
   within. On August 26, the GIA even declared a caliphate, or Islamic
   government, for Algeria, with Gousmi as " Commander of the Faithful".
   However, the very next day, Said Mekhloufi announced his withdrawal
   from the GIA, claiming that the GIA had deviated from Islam and that
   this caliphate was an effort by ex-FIS leader Mohammed Said to take
   over the GIA. The GIA continued attacks on its usual targets, notably
   assassinating artists, such as Cheb Hasni, and in late August added a
   new practice to its activities: threatening insufficiently Islamist
   schools with arson.

   FIS-loyal guerrillas, threatened with marginalization, attempted to
   unite their forces. In July 1994, the MIA, together with the remainder
   of the MEI and a variety of smaller groups, united as the Islamic
   Salvation Army (a term that had previously sometimes been used as a
   general label for pro-FIS guerrillas), declaring their allegiance to
   FIS and thus strengthening FIS's hand in the negotiations. By the end
   of 1994, they controlled over half the guerrillas of the east and west,
   but barely 20% in the centre, near the capital, which was where the GIA
   were mainly based. They issued communiqués condemning the GIA's
   indiscriminate targeting of women, journalists and other civilians "not
   involved in the repression", and attacked the GIA's school arson
   campaign.

   At the end of October, the government announced the failure of its
   negotiations with the FIS. Instead, Zéroual embarked on a new plan: he
   scheduled presidential elections for 1995, while promoting
   "eradicationists" such as Lamari within the army and organizing
   "self-defense militias" in villages to fight the guerrillas. The end of
   1994 saw a noticeable upsurge in violence. Over 1994, Algeria's
   isolation deepened; most foreign press agencies, such as Reuters, left
   the country this year, while the Moroccan border closed and the main
   foreign airlines cancelled all routes. The resulting gap in news
   coverage was further worsened by a government order in June banning
   Algerian media from reporting any terrorism-related news not covered in
   official press releases.

   A few FIS leaders, notably Rabah Kebir, had escaped into exile abroad.
   Upon the invitation of the Rome-based Community of Sant’Egidio, in
   November 1994, they began negotiations in Rome with other opposition
   parties, both Islamist and secular (FLN, FFS, FIS, MDA, PT, JMC). They
   came out with a mutual agreement on January 14, 1995: the Sant'Egidio
   platform. This presented a set of principles: respect for human rights
   and multi-party democracy, rejection of army rule and dictatorship,
   recognition of Islam, Arab and Berber ethnic identity as essential
   aspects of Algeria's national identity, demand for the release of FIS
   leaders, and an end to extrajudicial killing and torture on all sides.
   To the surprise of many, even Ali Belhadj endorsed the agreement, which
   meant that the FIS had returned into the legal framework, alongside
   with the other opposition parties. However, a crucial signatory was
   missing: the government itself. As a result, the platform's effect was
   at best limited - though some argue that, in the words of Andrea
   Riccardi who brokered the negotiations for the Community of
   Sant’Egidio, “the platform made the Algerian military leave the cage of
   a solely military confrontation and forced them to react with a
   political act”, the 1995 presidential elections. The next few months
   saw the killing of some 100 Islamist prisoners in the Serkadji prison
   mutiny, and a major success for the security forces in battle at Ain
   Defla, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of guerrilla fighters.

   Cherif Gousmi was eventually succeeded by Djamel Zitouni as GIA head.
   Zitouni extended the GIA's attacks on civilians to French soil,
   beginning with the hijacking of Air France Flight 8969 at the end of
   December 1994 and continuing with several bombings and attempted
   bombings throughout 1995. In Algeria itself, he continued likewise,
   with car bombs and assassinations of musicians, sportsmen, and unveiled
   women, as well as the usual victims. Even at this stage, the seemingly
   counterproductive nature of many of its attacks led to speculation
   (encouraged by FIS members abroad) that the group had been infiltrated
   by Algerian secret services. The region south of Algiers, in
   particular, came to be dominated by the GIA, who called it the
   "liberated zone". Later, it would come to be known as the " Triangle of
   Death".

   Reports of battles between the AIS and GIA increased, and the GIA
   reiterated its death threats against FIS and AIS leaders, assassinating
   a co-founder of the FIS, Abdelbaki Sahraoui, in Paris. At this point,
   foreign sources estimated the total number of guerrillas to be about
   27,000.

Politics resume, militias emerge

   Following the breakdown of negotiations with the FIS, the government
   decided to hold presidential elections. On November 16, 1995, Liamine
   Zéroual was elected president with 60% of votes cast. The election,
   contested by many candidates, including the Islamists Mahfoud Nahnah
   (25%) and Noureddine Boukrouh (<4%) and the secularist Said Sadi (10%),
   but excluding FIS, enjoyed a high turnout (officially 75%, a number
   confirmed by most observers) despite the FIS, FFS and FLN's call for a
   boycott and the GIA's threats to kill anyone who voted (using the
   slogan "one vote, one bullet"). A high level of security was
   maintained, with massive mobilization during the period immediately
   leading up to election day. Foreign observers from the Arab League, the
   UN and the Organization of African Unity voiced no major reservations.
   While some cried foul, the elections were generally perceived by
   foreigners as quite free, and the results were considered reasonably
   plausible, given the limited choices available.

   The results reflected various popular opinions, ranging from support
   for secularism and opposition to Islamism to a desire for an end to the
   violence, regardless of politics. Hopes grew that Algerian politics
   would finally be normalized. Zéroual followed this up by pushing
   through a new constitution in 1996, substantially strengthening the
   power of the president and adding a second house that would be partly
   elected and partly appointed by the president. In November 1996, the
   text was passed by a national referendum; while the official turnout
   rate was 80%, this vote was unmonitored, and the claimed high turnout
   was considered by most to be implausible.

   The government's political moves were combined with a substantial
   increase in the pro-government militias' profile. "Self-defense
   militias", often called "Patriots" for short, consisting of trusted
   local citizens trained by the army and given government weapons, were
   founded in towns near areas where guerrillas were active, and were
   promoted on national TV . The program was received well in some parts
   of the country, but was less popular in others; it would be
   substantially increased over the next few years, particularly after the
   massacres of 1997.

   The election results were a setback for the armed groups, who saw a
   significant increase in desertions immediately following the elections.
   The FIS' Rabah Kebir responded to the apparent shift in popular mood by
   adopting a more conciliatory tone towards the government, but was
   condemned by some parts of the party and of the AIS. The GIA was shaken
   by internal dissension; shortly after the election, its leadership
   killed the FIS leaders who had joined the GIA, accusing them of
   attempting a takeover. This purge accelerated the disintegration of the
   GIA: Mustapha Kartali, Ali Benhadjar and Hassan Hattab's factions all
   refused to recognize Zitouni's leadership starting around late 1995,
   although they would not formally break away until later. In December,
   the GIA killed the AIS leader for central Algeria, Azzedine Baa, and in
   January pledged to fight the AIS as an enemy; particularly in the west,
   full-scale battles between them became common.

Massacres and reconciliation

   In July 1996, GIA leader Djamel Zitouni was killed by one of the
   breakaway ex-GIA factions and was succeeded by Antar Zouabri, who would
   prove an even bloodier leader.

   Parliamentary elections were held on June 5, 1997. They were dominated
   by the National Democratic Rally (RND), a new party created in early
   1997 for Zéroual's supporters, which got 156 out of 380 seats, followed
   mainly by the MSP (as Hamas had been required to rename itself) and the
   FLN at over 60 seats each. Views on this election were mixed; most
   major opposition parties filed complaints, and the success of the
   extremely new RND raised eyebrows. The RND, FLN and MSP formed a
   coalition government, with the RND's Ahmed Ouyahia as prime minister.
   There were hints of a softening towards FIS: Abdelkader Hachani was
   released, and Abbassi Madani moved to house arrest.
   Massacres of over 50 people in the years 1997 and 1998
   Enlarge
   Massacres of over 50 people in the years 1997 and 1998

   At this point, however, a new and vital problem emerged. Starting
   around April (the Thalit massacre), Algeria was wracked by massacres of
   intense brutality and unprecedented size; previous massacres had
   occurred in the conflict, but always on a substantially smaller scale.
   Typically targeting entire villages or neighborhoods and disregarding
   the age and sex of victims, GIA guerrillas killed tens, and sometimes
   hundreds, of civilians at a time. These massacres continued through the
   end of 1998, changing the nature of the political situation
   considerably. The areas south and east of Algiers, which had voted
   strongly for FIS in 1991, were hit particularly hard; the Rais and
   Bentalha massacres in particular shocked worldwide observers. Pregnant
   women were sliced open, children were hacked to pieces or dashed
   against walls, men's limbs were hacked off one by one, and, as the
   attackers retreated, they would kidnap young women to keep as sex
   slaves. Although this quotation by Nesroullah Yous, a survivor of
   Bentalha, may be an exaggeration, it expresses the apparent mood of the
   attackers:

          "We have the whole night to rape your women and children, drink
          your blood. Even if you escape today, we'll come back tomorrow
          to finish you off! We're here to send you to your God!"

   The GIA's responsibility for these massacres is undisputed; it claimed
   credit for both Rais and Bentalha (calling the killings an "offering to
   God" and the victims "impious" supporters of tyrants in a press
   release), and its policy of massacring civilians was cited by the
   Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat as one of the main reasons it
   split off from the GIA. At this stage, it had apparently adopted a
   takfirist ideology, believing that practically all Algerians not
   actively fighting the government were corrupt to the point of being
   kafirs, and could be killed righteously with impunity; an unconfirmed
   communiqué by Zouabri had stated that "except for those who are with
   us, all others are apostates and deserving of death." In some cases, it
   has been suggested that the GIA were motivated to commit a massacre by
   a village's joining the Patriot program, which they saw as evidence of
   disloyalty; in others, that rivalry with other groups (e.g., Mustapha
   Kartali's breakaway faction) played a part.

   However, in both Rais and Bentalha, survivors claimed that the army had
   arrived at the scene of the massacre while it was happening, but had
   stayed outside of the area, even in some cases preventing the villagers
   from fleeing their attackers. In many cases (e.g., Rais, Bentalha, Si
   Zerrouk and Beni-Messous), army barracks were stationed within a few
   hundred meters of the villages, yet did nothing to stop the killing. At
   Rais, some witnesses are reported to have recognized their attackers as
   local guerrillas and their sympathisers (in one case, according to Zazi
   Sadou, even an elected member of the FIS was seen among the attackers),
   although at Bentalha witnesses are reported to have said they
   recognised none of them as local guerrillas. In some cases, it has been
   suggested that the GIA were motivated to commit a massacre by a
   village's joining the Patriot program, which they saw as evidence of
   disloyalty; in others, that rivalry with other groups (e.g. Mustapha
   Kartali's breakaway faction) played a part. In some cases — the Guelb
   el-Kebir massacre and Sidi Hamed massacre — Algerian newspapers blamed
   the AIS, despite its denial of any involvement.

   However, according to reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights
   Watch army barracks were stationed within a few hundred meters of the
   villages, yet did nothing to stop the killings. At about the same time,
   a number of people claiming to be defectors from the Algerian security
   services (such as Habib Souaidia), having fled to Western countries,
   alleged that the security services had themselves committed some of the
   massacres. These and other details raised suspicions that the state was
   in some way collaborating with, or even controlling parts of, the GIA
   (particularly through infiltration by the secret services) - a theory
   popularised by Nesroullah Yous, and FIS itself. This suggestion
   provoked furious reactions from some quarters in Algeria, and has been
   rejected by many academics, though others regard it as plausible. On
   the other hand, some Algerians, such as Zazi Sadou, have collected
   testimonies by survivors that their attackers were unmasked and were
   recognised as local radicals - in one case even an elected member of
   the FIS. Robert D. Kaplan, writing in The Atlantic Monthly, dismissed
   insinuations of government involvement in the massacres; "To people who
   had been watching Algeria's evolution, the assumption that sinister
   complicities within the Algerian state were involved in the
   assassinations and massacres was libelous." However, as Dr Youcef
   Bouandel notes; "Regardless of the explanations one may have regarding
   the violence, the authorities credibility has been tarnished by its
   non-assistance to endangered civilian villagers being massacred in the
   vicinity of military barracks."

   The AIS, which at this point was engaged in an all-out war with the GIA
   as well as the government, found itself in an untenable position. The
   GIA seemed a more immediately pressing enemy, and AIS members expressed
   fears that the massacres—which it had condemned more than once—would be
   blamed on them. On September 21, 1997, the AIS' head, Madani Mezrag,
   ordered a unilateral and unconditional ceasefire starting October 1, in
   order to "unveil the enemy that hides behind these abominable
   massacres." The AIS thus largely took itself out of the political
   equation, reducing the fighting to a struggle between the government,
   the GIA, and the various splinter groups that were increasingly
   breaking away from the GIA. Ali Benhadjar's FIS-loyalist Islamic League
   for Da'wa and Jihad (LIDD), formed in February 1997, allied itself with
   the AIS and observed the same ceasefire. Over the next three years, the
   AIS would gradually negotiate an amnesty for its members.

GIA destroyed, GSPC continues

   After receiving much international pressure to act, the EU sent two
   delegations, one of them led by Mário Soares, to visit Algeria and
   investigate the massacres in the first half of 1998; their reports
   condemned the Islamist armed groups. Towns soon became safer, although
   massacres continued in rural areas. The GIA's policy of massacring
   civilians had already caused a split among its commanders, with some
   rejecting the policy; on September 14, 1998, this disagreement was
   formalized with the formation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and
   Combat (GSPC), based in the mountains west of Kabylie and led by Hassan
   Hattab.

   On September 11, Zéroual surprised observers by announcing his
   resignation. New elections were arranged, and on April 15, 1999, the
   army-backed ex-independence-fighter Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected
   president with, according to the authorities, 74% of the votes. All the
   other candidates had withdrawn from the election shortly before, citing
   fraud concerns. Bouteflika continued negotiations with the AIS, and on
   June 5 the AIS agreed, in principle, to disband. Bouteflika followed up
   this success for the government by pardoning a number of Islamist
   prisoners convicted of minor offenses and pushing the Civil Harmony Act
   through parliament, a law allowing Islamist fighters not guilty of
   murder or rape to escape all prosecution if they turn themselves in.
   This law was finally approved by referendum on September 16, 1999, and
   a number of fighters, including Mustapha Kartali, took advantage of it
   to give themselves up and resume normal life—sometimes angering those
   who had suffered at the hands of the guerrillas. FIS leadership
   expressed dissatisfaction with the results, feeling that the AIS had
   stopped fighting without solving any of the issues; but their main
   voice outside of prison, Abdelkader Hachani, was assassinated on
   November 22. Violence declined, though not stopping altogether, and a
   sense of normality started returning to Algeria.

   The AIS fully disbanded after January 11, 2000, having negotiated a
   special amnesty with the government. The GIA, torn by splits and
   desertions and denounced by all sides even in the Islamist movement,
   was slowly destroyed by army operations over the next few years; by the
   time of Antar Zouabri's death in early 2002, it was effectively
   incapacitated. The government's efforts were given a boost in the
   aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks; United States sympathy for
   Algeria's government increased, and was expressed concretely through
   such actions as the freezing of GIA and GSPC assets and the supply of
   infrared goggles to the army.

   With the GIA's decline, the GSPC was left as the most active rebel
   group, with about 300 fighters in 2003. It continued a campaign of
   assassinations of police and army personnel in its area, and also
   managed to expand into the Sahara, where its southern division, led by
   Amari Saifi (nicknamed "Abderrezak el-Para", the "paratrooper"),
   kidnapped a number of German tourists in 2003, before being forced to
   flee to sparsely populated areas of Mali, and later Niger and Chad,
   where he was captured. By late 2003, the group's founder had been
   supplanted by the even more radical Nabil Sahraoui, who announced his
   open support for al-Qaeda, thus strengthening government ties between
   the U.S. and Algeria. He was reportedly killed shortly afterwards, and
   was succeeded by Abou Mossaab Abdelouadoud in 2004

   The release of FIS leaders Madani and Belhadj in 2003 had no observable
   effect on the situation, illustrating a newfound governmental
   confidence which would be deepened by the 2004 presidential election,
   in which Bouteflika was reelected by 85% with support from two major
   parties and one faction of the third major party. The vote was seen as
   confirming strong popular support for Bouteflika's policy towards the
   guerrillas and the successful termination of large-scale violence. In
   September 2005 a national referendum was held on an amnesty proposal by
   Bouteflika's government, similar to the 1999 law, to end legal
   proceedings against individuals who were no longer fighting, and to
   provide compensation to families of people killed by government forces;
   the proposal was declared to have won with 97% support (see Charter for
   Peace and National Reconciliation). The proposal was implemented by
   Presidential decree in February 2006; particularly controversial was
   its provision of immunity against prosecution to surrendered
   ex-guerrillas (for all but the worst crimes) and Army personnel (for
   any action "safeguarding the nation".) According to Algerian paper El
   Khabar, over 400 GSPC guerrillas surrendered under its terms; estimates
   of the GSPC's size in 2005 had ranged from 300 to 1000. The fighting
   continued to die down in 2006, and elements within the FLN suggested
   changing the constitution to allow Bouteflika to run for a third term.
   Retrieved from " http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_Civil_War"
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