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Battle of Cannae

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                                 Battle of Cannae
   Part of the Second Punic War
   Hannibal's route of invasion.

     Date   August 2, 216 BC
   Location Cannae, Italy
    Result  Decisive Carthaginian victory
                                    Combatants
   Carthage                 Roman Republic
                                    Commanders
   Hannibal                 Lucius Aemilius Paullus†,
                            Gaius Terentius Varro
                                     Strength
   40,000 heavy infantry,
   6,000 light infantry,
   8,000 cavalry            86,400–87,000 men (sixteen Roman and Allied legions)
                                    Casualties
   16,700 killed or wounded 50,000–60,000 killed,
                            10,000 captured
   Second Punic War
   Saguntum – Lilybaeum – Ticinus – Trebia – Cissa – Lake Trasimene –
   Ebro River – Cannae – 1st Nola – Dertosa – 2nd Nola – Cornus –
   3rd Nola – 1st Capua – Silarus – 1st Herdonia – Syracuse –
   Upper Baetis – 2nd Capua – 2nd Herdonia – Numistro – Asculum –
   Tarentum – Baecula – Grumentum – Metaurus – Ilipa – Crotona – Utica –
   Bagbrades – Cirta – Po Valley – Great Plains – Zama
               Punic Wars
   First – Mercenary – Second – Third

   The Battle of Cannae was a major battle of the Second Punic War, taking
   place on August 2, 216 BC near the town of Cannae in Apulia in
   southeast Italy. The Carthaginian army under Hannibal destroyed a
   numerically superior Roman army under command of the consuls Lucius
   Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro. Following the Battle of
   Cannae, Capua and several other Italian city-states defected from the
   Roman Republic. Although the battle failed to decide the outcome of the
   war in favour of Carthage, it is today regarded as one of the greatest
   tactical feats in military history.

   Having recovered from their previous losses at Trebia ( 218 BC) and
   Trasimene ( 217 BC), the Romans decided to confront Hannibal at Cannae,
   with roughly 87,000 Roman and Allied troops. With their right wing
   positioned near the Aufidus river, the Romans placed their cavalry on
   their flanks and massed their heavy infantry in an exceptionally deep
   formation in the centre. To counter this, Hannibal utilized the
   double-envelopment tactic. He drew up his least reliable infantry in
   the centre, with the flanks composed of Carthaginian cavalry. Before
   engaging the Romans, however, his lines adopted a crescent shape —
   advancing his centre with his veteran troops placed at the wings in
   echelon formation. Upon the onset of the battle, the Carthaginian
   centre withdrew before the advance of the numerically superior Romans.
   While Hannibal's centre line yielded, the Romans had unknowingly driven
   themselves into a large arc — whereupon the Carthaginian infantry and
   cavalry (positioned on the flanks) encircled the main body of Roman
   infantry. Surrounded and attacked on all sides with no means of escape,
   the Roman army was subsequently cut to pieces. An estimated
   60,000–70,000 Romans were killed or captured at Cannae (including the
   consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus and eighty Roman senators). In terms of
   the number of lives lost within a single day, Cannae is among the
   costliest battles in all of recorded human history.

Strategic background

   Battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae.
   Enlarge
   Battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae.

   Shortly after the start of the Second Punic War, the Carthaginian
   general Hannibal had boldly crossed into Italy by traversing the Alps
   during the winter, and had quickly won two major victories over the
   Romans at Trebbia and at Lake Trasimene. After suffering these losses,
   the Romans appointed Fabius Maximus as dictator to deal with the
   threat. Fabius set about fighting a war of attrition against Hannibal,
   cutting off his supply lines and refusing to engage in pitched battle.
   These tactics proved unpopular with the Romans. As the Roman people
   recovered from the shock of Hannibal’s initial victories, they began to
   question the wisdom of the Fabian strategy which had given the
   Carthaginian army the chance to regroup. Fabius’s strategy was
   especially frustrating to the majority of the people who were eager to
   see a quick conclusion to the war. It was also widely feared that if
   Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, Rome's allies might
   believe Rome was incapable of protecting them, and defect to the
   Carthaginians.

   Unimpressed with Fabian's strategy, the Roman Senate did not renew his
   dictatorial powers at the end of his term, and command was given back
   to the consuls Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Gaius Flaminius. In 216 BC
   elections resumed with Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius
   Paullus elected as consuls and given command of a newly raised army of
   unprecedented size in order to counter Hannibal. Polybius writes:


   Battle of Cannae

   The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had
   never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting of five thousand
   men besides allies. […] Most of their wars are decided by one Consul
   and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all
   four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so great was
    the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not
                 only four but eight legions into the field


   Battle of Cannae

                - Polybius, The Histories of Polybius

   These eight legions, along with an estimated 2,400 Roman cavalry,
   formed the nucleus of this massive new army. As each legion was
   accompanied by an equal number of allied troops and an additional 4,000
   allied cavalry, the total strength of the army which faced Hannibal
   could not have been much less than 90,000. Some estimates place the
   Roman forces at about 100,000 men, although historical evidence for
   such a large force is questionable.

Prelude

   In the spring of 216 BC, Hannibal took the initiative and seized the
   large supply depot at Cannae in the Apulian plain. He thus placed
   himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply. As
   Polybius notes, the capture of Cannae "caused great commotion in the
   Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in
   it that distressed them, but the fact that it commanded the surrounding
   district". The consuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched
   southward in search of the Carthaginian general. After two days’ march,
   they found him on the left bank of the Aufidus River and encamped six
   miles away. Ordinarily each of the two Consuls would command their own
   portion of the army, but since the two armies were combined into one,
   the Roman law required them to alternate their command on a daily
   basis.

   A Carthaginian officer named Gisgo commented on how much larger the
   Roman army was. Hannibal replied, "another thing that has escaped your
   notice, Gisgo, is even more amazing - that although there are so many
   of them, there is not one among them called Gisgo."

   Consul Varro, who was in command on the first day, is presented in our
   sources as a man of reckless nature and hubris, and was determined to
   defeat Hannibal. While the Romans were approaching Cannae, a small
   portion of Hannibal's forces ambushed the Roman army. Varro
   successfully repelled the Carthaginian attack and continued on his way
   to Cannae. This victory, though essentially a mere skirmish with no
   lasting strategic value, greatly bolstered confidence in the Roman
   army, perhaps to overconfidence on Varro's part. Paullus, however, was
   opposed to the engagement as it was taking shape. Unlike Varro, he was
   prudent and cautious, and he believed it was foolish to fight on open
   ground, despite the Romans' numerical strength. This was especially
   true, since Hannibal held the advantage in cavalry (both in quality and
   numerical terms). Despite these misgivings, Paullus thought it unwise
   to withdraw the army after the initial success and camped two-thirds of
   the army east of the Aufidus river and sent the remainder of his men to
   fortify a position on the opposite side. The purpose of this second
   camp was to cover the foraging parties from the main camp and harass
   those of the enemy.

   The two armies stayed in their respective locations for two days.
   During the second of these two days ( August 1), Hannibal, well aware
   that Varro would be in command the following day, left his camp and
   offered battle. Paullus, however, refused. When his request was
   rejected, Hannibal, recognizing the importance of the Aufidus' water to
   the Roman troops, sent his cavalry to the smaller Roman camp to harass
   water-bearing soldiers that were found outside the camp fortifications.
   According to Polybius, Hannibal's cavalry boldly rode up to the edge of
   the Roman encampment, causing havoc and thoroughly disrupting the
   supply of water to the Roman camp. Enraged by this foray, Varro assumed
   command on August 2, marshaled his forces, and crossed back over the
   Aufidus to do battle.

Battle

Forces

   The combined forces of the two consuls totaled 70,000 infantry, 2,400
   Roman cavalry and 4,000 allied horse (involved in the actual battle)
   and, in the two fortified camps, 2,600 heavily-armed men, 7,400
   lightly-armed men (a total of 10,000), so that the total strength the
   Romans brought to the field amounted to approximately 86,400 men.
   Opposing them was a Carthaginian army composed of roughly 40,000 heavy
   infantry, 6,000 light infantry, and 8,000 cavalry in the battle itself,
   irrespective of detachments. The Carthaginian army was built around a
   core of around 8,000 Carthaginian hoplites with Roman armor but
   fighting in the Macedonian phalanx. There were another 8,000
   Iberian/Celt-Iberian heavy infantry in the main battle line. The rest
   of Hannibal's troops were superb Celtic warriors from the Po Valley.
   These soldiers used their superior size and strength to fight on even
   terms with the more disciplined Roman legions.

Tactical deployment

   The conventional deployment for armies of the time was to place
   infantry in the center and deploy the cavalry in two flanking "wings".
   The Romans followed this convention fairly closely, but chose extra
   depth rather than breadth for their infantry, hoping to use this
   concentration of forces to quickly break through the center of
   Hannibal's line. Varro knew how the Roman infantry had managed to
   penetrate Hannibal’s centre during the Battle of the Trebia, and he
   planned to recreate this on an even greater scale. The principes were
   stationed immediately behind the hastati, ready to push forward at
   first contact to ensure the Romans presented a unified front. As
   Polybius wrote, "the maniples were nearer each other, or the intervals
   were decreased… and the maniples showed more depth than front". Even
   though they outnumbered the Carthaginians, this depth-oriented
   deployment meant that the Roman lines had a front of roughly equal size
   to their numerically inferior opponents.
   Initial deployment and Roman attack.
   Enlarge
   Initial deployment and Roman attack.

   To Varro, Hannibal seemed to have little room to maneuver and no means
   of retreat as he was deployed with the Aufidus River to his rear. Varro
   believed that when pressed hard by the Romans’ superior numbers, the
   Carthaginians would fall back onto the river, and with no room to
   maneuver, would be cut down in panic. Bearing in mind the fact that
   Hannibal’s two previous victories had been largely decided by his
   trickery and ruse, Varro had sought an open battlefield. The field at
   Cannae was indeed clear, with no possibility of hidden troops being
   brought to bear as an ambush.

   Hannibal, on the other hand, had deployed his forces based on the
   particular fighting qualities of each unit, taking into consideration
   both their strengths and weaknesses in devising his strategy. He placed
   his lowest quality infantry ( Iberians, Gauls and Celtiberians) in the
   middle, alternating the two across the front line to strengthen it.
   Hannibal's better infantry (Libyan- Phoenician mercenaries) were
   positioned just inside his cavalry on the wings at the very edge of his
   infantry line.

   It is a common misconception that Hannibal's African troops carried
   pikes (a theory put forward by historian Peter Connolly). The Libyan
   troops in fact carried spears "shorter than the Roman Triarii". Their
   advantage was not that they had pikes, it was that these infantry were
   expertly battle hardened, remained cohesive, and attacked the Roman
   flanks.

   Hasdrubal led the Iberian and Celtiberian cavalry on the left (south
   near the Aufidus river) of the Carthaginian army. Hasdrubal was given
   about 6,500 cavalry as opposed to Hanno's 3,500 Numidians. Hasdrubal's
   force was able to quickly destroy the Roman cavalry (on the south),
   pass the Roman's infantry rear, and reach the Roman allied cavalry
   while they where engaged with Hanno's Numidians. Once the Roman's
   allied cavalry was destroyed Hanno and Hasdrubal were able to lead both
   cavalries into the Roman infantry's rear.

   Hannibal intended that his cavalry, comprised mainly of medium Hispanic
   cavalry and Numidian light horse, and positioned on the flanks, defeat
   the weaker Roman cavalry and swing around to attack the Roman infantry
   from the rear as it pressed upon Hannibal’s weakened centre. His
   veteran African troops would then press in from the flanks at the
   crucial moment, and encircle the overextended Roman army.

   Hannibal was unconcerned about his position against the Aufidus River;
   in fact, it played a major factor in his strategy. By anchoring his
   army on the river, Hannibal prevented one of his flanks from being
   overlapped by the larger, more numerous Romans. Furthermore, because
   the Romans were in front of the hill leading to Cannae and hemmed in on
   their right flank by the Aufidus River, their left flank was the only
   viable means of retreat. In addition, the Carthaginian forces had
   maneuvered so that the Romans would face east, while they would face
   west. Not only would the morning sunlight shine on the Romans, but the
   southeasterly winds would blow sand and dust into the faces of the
   Romans as they approached the battlefield. It was Hannibal’s unique
   deployment of his army, based on his perception and understanding of
   the capabilities of his troops, that would prove to be the defining
   factors in his victory at Cannae.

Events

   As the armies advanced on one another, Hannibal gradually extended the
   centre of his line, as Polybius describes: "After thus drawing up his
   whole army in a straight line, he took the central companies of
   Hispanics and Celts and advanced with them, keeping the rest of them in
   contact with these companies, but gradually falling off, so as to
   produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the flanking companies
   growing thinner as it was prolonged, his object being to employ the
   Africans as a reserve force and to begin the action with the Hispanics
   and Celts." Polybius describes the weak Carthaginian centre as deployed
   in a crescent, curving out toward the Romans in the middle with the
   African troops on their flanks in echelon formation. It is believed
   that the purpose of this formation was to break the forward momentum of
   the Roman infantry, and delay its advance before other developments
   allowed Hannibal to deploy his African infantry most effectively.
   However, some historians have called this account fanciful, and claim
   that it represents either the natural curvature that occurs when a
   broad front of infantry marches forward, or the bending back of the
   Carthaginian center from the shock action of meeting the heavily massed
   Roman centre.
   Destruction of the Roman army.
   Enlarge
   Destruction of the Roman army.

   When the battle was joined, the cavalry engaged in a fierce exchange on
   the flanks. Polybius describes the scene, writing that "When the
   Hispanic and Celtic horses on the left wing came into collision with
   the Roman cavalry, the struggle that ensued was truly barbaric.". Here,
   the Carthaginian cavalry quickly overpowered the inferior Romans on the
   right flank and routed them. A portion of the Carthaginian cavalry then
   detached itself from the Carthaginian left flank and made a wide
   circling pivot to the Roman right-flank, where it fell upon the rear of
   the Roman cavalry. The Roman cavalry was immediately dispersed as the
   Carthaginians fell upon them and began "cutting them down mercilessly".

   While the Carthaginians were in the process of defeating the Roman
   cavalry, the mass of infantry on both sides advanced towards each other
   in the centre of the field. As the Romans advanced, the wind from the
   East blew dust in their faces and obscured their vision. While the wind
   itself was not a major factor, the dust that both armies created would
   have been potentially debilitating to sight. This, combined with the
   lack of proper hydration due to Hannibal's attack on the Roman
   encampment during the previous day, would have affected the individual
   performance of the Roman troops.

   Hannibal stood with his men in the weak centre and held them to a
   controlled retreat. The crescent of Hispanic and Gallic troops buckled
   inwards as they gradually withdrew. Knowing the superiority of the
   Roman infantry, Hannibal had instructed his infantry to withdraw
   deliberately, thus creating an even tighter semicircle around the
   attacking Roman forces. By doing so, he had turned the strength of the
   Roman infantry into a weakness. Furthermore, while the front ranks were
   gradually advancing forward, the bulk of the Roman troops began to lose
   their cohesion, as they began crowding themselves into the growing gap.
   Soon they were so compact together that they had little space to wield
   their weapons. In passing so far forward in their desire to destroy the
   retreating and collapsing line of Hispanic and Gallic troops, the
   Romans had ignored the African troops that stood uncommitted on the
   projecting ends of this now reversed-crescent. This also gave the
   Carthaginian cavalry time to drive the Roman cavalry off on both flanks
   and attack the Roman centre in the rear. The Roman infantry, now
   stripped of both its flanks, formed a wedge that drove deeper and
   deeper into the Carthaginian semicircle, driving itself into an alley
   that was formed by the African Infantry stationed at the echelons. At
   this decisive point, Hannibal ordered his African Infantry to turn
   inwards and advance against the Roman flanks, creating an encirclement
   of the Roman infantry in one of the earliest examples of the pincer
   movement.

   When the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Romans in the rear, and the
   African flanking echelons had assailed them on their right and left,
   the advance of the Roman infantry was brought to an abrupt halt. The
   trapped Romans were enclosed in a pocket with no means of escape. The
   Carthaginians created a wall and began destroying the entrapped Romans.
   Polybius claims that, "as their outer ranks were continually cut down,
   and the survivors forced to pull back and huddle together, they were
   finally all killed where they stood." As Livy describes, "So many
   thousands of Romans were lying […] Some, whom their wounds, pinched by
   the morning cold, had roused, as they were rising up, covered with
   blood, from the midst of the heaps of slain, were overpowered by the
   enemy. Some were found with their heads plunged into the earth, which
   they had excavated; having thus, as it appeared, made pits for
   themselves, and having suffocated themselves." Nearly six hundred
   legionaries were slaughtered each minute until darkness brought an end
   to the bloodletting. Only 14,000 Roman troops managed to escape (most
   of whom had cut their way through to the nearby town of Canusium). At
   the end of the day, out of the original force of 87,000 Roman troops,
   only about one out of every ten men was still alive.

Casualties

   Although the true figure will probably never be known, Livy and
   Polybius variously claim that 47,000–60,000 Romans died with about
   3,000–4,500 taken prisoner. Among the dead were Lucius Aemilius Paullus
   himself, as well two consuls for the preceding year, two quaestors,
   twenty-nine out of the forty-eight military tribunes, and an additional
   eighty senators (at a time when the Roman Senate was comprised of no
   more than 300 men, this constituted 25–30% of the governing body).
   Another 10,000 from the two Roman camps and the neighboring villages
   surrendered on the following day (after further resistance cost even
   more fatalities). In all, perhaps more than 70,000 Romans of the
   original force of 87,000 were dead or captured — totaling more than 80%
   of the entire army. For their part, the Carthaginians suffered 16,700
   casualties (with the Celtiberians and Iberians accounting for the
   majority). The fatalities for the Carthaginians amounted to 6,000 men,
   of whom 4,000 were Celtiberians, 1,500 Iberians and Africans, and the
   remainder cavalry. The total casualty figure of the battle, therefore,
   exceeds 80,000 men.

   If true, this makes the Battle of Cannae one of the single bloodiest
   battles in all of recorded human history, in terms of the number of
   lives lost within a day. The total number of lives lost surpasses the
   number of servicemen killed in the Royal Air Force throughout World War
   I and World War II. More men were killed at Cannae than in all the four
   months of the Battle of Passchendaele, which is considered one of the
   bloodiest battles of World War I. So devastating were these losses,
   that the total number of casualties represents just under one third of
   the total number of American soldiers, sailors, and airmen killed in
   four years of fighting during the World War II. In fact, the losses
   suffered within a single day on the battlefield of Cannae (no larger
   than a few square miles), would not be equaled until the first day of
   fighting on the Somme in 1916 — which took place on a 25-mile front
   over 2,000 years later.

   More Romans were lost at Cannae then any other battle, and Cannae is
   second only to the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest when looking at the
   percentage of Romans killed.

Aftermath

   Hannibal counting the rings of the Roman knights killed during the
   battle, statue by Sébastien Slodzt, 1704, Louvre
   Enlarge
   Hannibal counting the rings of the Roman knights killed during the
   battle, statue by Sébastien Slodzt, 1704, Louvre


   Battle of Cannae

   Never before, while the City itself was still safe, had there been such
   excitement and panic within its walls. I shall not attempt to describe
    it, nor will I weaken the reality by going into details… it was not
    wound upon wound but multiplied disaster that was now announced. For
   according to the reports two consular armies and two consuls were lost;
   there was no longer any Roman camp, any general, any single soldier in
   existence; Apulia, Samnium, almost the whole of Italy lay at Hannibal's
   feet. Certainly there is no other nation that would not have succumbed
                     beneath such a weight of calamity.


   Battle of Cannae

                ― Livy, on the Roman Senate's reaction to the defeat

   For a brief period of time, the Romans were in complete disarray. Their
   best armies in the peninsula were destroyed, the few remnants severely
   demoralized, and the only remaining consul (Varro) completely
   discredited. It was a complete catastrophe for the Romans. As the story
   goes, Rome declared a national day of mourning, as there was not a
   single person in Rome who was not either related to or knew a person
   who had died. The Romans became so desperate that they resorted to
   human sacrifice, killing a few slaves and burying them in the forum of
   Rome (perhaps one of the last recorded instances of human sacrifices
   the Romans would perform, unless you count the public executions of
   defeated enemies dedicated to Mars as human sacrifice).

   Lucius Caecilius Metellus, a military tribune, is known to have so much
   despaired in the Roman cause, in the aftermath of the battle, as to
   suggest that everything was lost and called the other tribunes to sail
   overseas and hire themselves up into the service to some foreign
   prince. Afterwards, he was forced by his own example to swear an oath
   of allegiance to Rome for all time. Furthermore, the Roman survivors of
   Cannae were later reconstituted as two legions and assigned to Sicily
   for the remainder of the war as punishment for their humiliating loss.
   In addition to the physical loss of her army, Rome would suffer a
   symbolic defeat, one that was severely humiliating to her prestige.
   Hannibal had his men collect more than 200 gold rings from the corpses
   on the battlefield, and sent this collection to Carthage as proof of
   his victory; this collection was poured on the floor in front of the
   Carthaginian Senate, and was judged to be "three and a half measures".
   A gold ring was a token of membership in the upper classes of Roman
   society.

   Hannibal, having gained yet another victory (following the battles of
   Trebia and Lake Trasimene), had defeated the equivalent of eight
   consular armies. Within just three campaign seasons, Rome had lost a
   fifth of the entire population of citizens over seventeen years of age
   (nearly twelve percent of Rome’s available manpower). Furthermore, the
   morale effect of this victory was such that most of Southern Italy
   joined Hannibal's cause. After the Battle of Cannae, the Hellenistic
   southern provinces of Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, Uzentum, including the
   cities of Capua and Tarentum (two of the largest city-states in Italy)
   all revoked their allegiance to Rome and pledged their loyalty to
   Hannibal. As Polybius notes, "How much more serious was the defeat of
   Cannae, than those which preceded it can be seen by the behaviour of
   Rome’s allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained
   unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they
   despaired of Roman Power." During that same year, the Greek cities in
   Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political control, while
   the Macedonian king, Philip V, had pledged his support to Hannibal —
   thus initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome. Hannibal also
   secured an alliance with the newly appointed King Hieronymus of
   Syracuse, the most significant city in Sicily.

   Following the battle, Hannibal's officers wanted to march on Rome. Yet
   despite the tremendous material loss inflicted on the Romans, the
   defection of many allied cities, and the declaration of war by Philip
   and Hieronymus, Hannibal, lacking any siege equipment or the
   appropriate resources, refused to do so. This was much to the distress
   of Maharbal, one of his cavalry commanders, who is famously quoted as
   saying, "Truly the Gods have not bestowed all things upon the same
   person. Thou knowest indeed, Hannibal, how to conquer, but thou knowest
   not how to make use of your victory.". Instead, Hannibal sent a
   delegation led by Carthalo to negotiate a peace treaty with the Senate
   on moderate terms. Yet despite the multiple catastrophes Rome had
   suffered, the Roman Senate refused to parley. Instead, they simply
   re-doubled their efforts, declaring full mobilization of the male
   populations, while raising new legions recruited from landless peasants
   and even slaves. So firm were these measures, that the word “peace” was
   prohibited, mourning limited to only thirty days, and public tears
   restricted to women. The Romans, after experiencing this catastrophic
   defeat and losing other battles, had at this point learned their
   lesson. For the remainder of the war in Italy, they would no longer
   engage in pitched battles against Hannibal; instead they would utilize
   the strategies Fabius had taught them, which—as they had finally
   realized—were the only feasible means of driving Hannibal from Italy.

Historical significance

Effects on Roman military doctrine

   The Battle of Cannae played a major role in shaping the military
   structure and tactical organization of the Roman Republican army. At
   Cannae, the Roman infantry was formed in a formation not dissimilar
   from the Greek phalanx. This delivered them into Hannibal’s trap, since
   their inability to maneuver independently from the mass of the army
   made it impossible for them to prevent the encircling tactics employed
   by the Carthaginian cavalry. Furthermore, the strict laws according to
   the Roman state required that the high command alternate between the
   two consuls —thus restricting strategic flexibility. However, in the
   years following Cannae, striking reforms were introduced to address
   these deficiencies. First, the Romans "articulated the phalanx, then
   divided it into columns, and finally split it up into a great number of
   small tactical bodies that were capable, now of closing together in a
   compact impenetrable union, now of changing the pattern with consummate
   flexibility, of separating one from the other and turning in this or
   that direction.". For instance, at Ilipa and Zama, the principes were
   formed up well to the rear of the hastati — a deployment that allowed a
   greater degree of mobility and maneuverability. The culminating result
   of this change marked the transition from the traditional manipular
   system to the cohort under Gaius Marius, as the basic infantry unit of
   the Roman army.

   In addition, the necessity of a unified command was finally recognized.
   After various political experiments, Scipio Africanus was made
   general-in-chief of the Roman armies in Africa, and was assured the
   continued occupancy of this title for the duration of the war. This
   appointment may have violated the constitutional laws of the Roman
   Republic, but, as Hans Delbrück wrote, "effected an internal
   transformation that increased her military potentiality enormously"
   while foreshadowing the decline of the Republic's political
   institutions. Furthermore, the battle exposed the limits of a citizen-
   militia army. Following Cannae, the Roman army gradually developed into
   a professional force: the nucleus of Scipio's army at Zama was composed
   of veterans who had been fighting the Carthaginians in Hispania for
   nearly sixteen years, and had been molded into a superb fighting force.

Status in military history

   The Battle of Cannae is famous for Hannibal's tactics as much as it is
   for the role it played in Roman history. Not only did Hannibal inflict
   a defeat on the Roman Republic in a manner unrepeated for over a
   century until the lesser-known Battle of Arausio, but the battle itself
   has acquired a reputation within the field of military history. As the
   military historian, Theodore Ayrault Dodge, once wrote: "Few battles of
   ancient times are more marked by ability… than the battle of Cannae.
   The position was such as to place every advantage on Hannibal's side.
   The manner in which the far from perfect Hispanic and Gallic foot was
   advanced in a wedge in échelon… was first held there and then withdrawn
   step by step, until it had the reached the converse position… is a
   simple masterpiece of battle tactics. The advance at the proper moment
   of the African infantry, and its wheel right and left upon the flanks
   of the disordered and crowded Roman legionaries, is far beyond praise.
   The whole battle, from the Carthaginian standpoint, is a consummate
   piece of art, having no superior, few equal, examples in the history of
   war". As Will Durant wrote, "It was a supreme example of generalship,
   never bettered in history… and [it] set the lines of military tactics
   for 2,000 years".

   Hannibal's double envelopement at the Battle of Cannae is often viewed
   as one of the greatest battlefield maneuvers in history, and is cited
   as the first successful use of the pincer movement within the Western
   world, to be recorded in detail.

The "Cannae Model"

   Apart from it being one of the greatest defeats ever inflicted on Roman
   arms, the Battle of Cannae represents the archetypal battle of
   annihilation, a strategy that has rarely been successfully implemented
   in modern history. As Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of
   the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II, once wrote, "Every
   ground commander seeks the battle of annihilation; so far as conditions
   permit, he tries to duplicate in modern war the classic example of
   Cannae". Furthermore, the totality of Hannibal’s victory has made the
   name "Cannae" a byword for military success, and is today studied in
   detail in several military academies around the world. The notion that
   an entire army could be encircled and annihilated within a single
   stroke, led to a fascination among subsequent Western generals for
   centuries (including Frederick the Great and Helmuth von Moltke) who
   attempted to emulate its tactical paradigm of envelopment and re-create
   their own "Cannae". For instance, Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of
   the Coalition Forces in the Gulf War, studied Cannae and employed the
   principles Hannibal used, in his highly successful ground campaign
   against the Iraqi forces.

   Hans Delbrück's seminal study of the battle had a profound influence on
   subsequent German military theorists, in particular, the Chief of the
   German General Staff, Alfred Graf von Schlieffen (whose
   eponymously-titled " Schlieffen Plan" was inspired by Hannibal's double
   envelopment maneuver). Through his writings, Schlieffen taught that the
   "Cannae model" would continue to be applicable in maneuver warfare
   throughout the twentieth century: "A battle of annihilation can be
   carried out today according to the same plan devised by Hannibal in
   long forgotten times. The enemy front is not the goal of the principal
   attack. The mass of the troops and the reserves should not be
   concentrated against the enemy front; the essential is that the flanks
   be crushed. The wings should not be sought at the advanced points of
   the front but rather along the entire depth and extension of the enemy
   formation. The annihilation is completed through an attack against the
   enemy's rear… To bring about a decisive and annihilating victory
   requires an attack against the front and against one or both flanks…"
   Schlieffen later developed his own operational doctrine in a series of
   articles, many of which were later translated and published in a work
   entitled "Cannae".
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