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Battle of Midway

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                    Battle of Midway
   Part of the Pacific Theatre of World War II
   SBDs approach the burning Mikuma (Center).
   U.S. Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bomber at Midway

     Date   June 4– June 7, 1942
   Location near Midway Island
    Result  Decisive American victory
                       Combatants
   United States

                                                       Empire of Japan

                       Commanders
   Chester W. Nimitz,
   Frank J. Fletcher,
   Raymond A. Spruance     Isoroku Yamamoto,
                           Chuichi Nagumo,
                           Tamon Yamaguchi †
                        Strength
   3 carriers,
   ~50 support ships,
   233 carrier aircraft,
   127 land-based aircraft 4 carriers,
                           7 battleships,
                           ~150 support ships,
                           248 carrier aircraft,
                           16 floatplanes
                       Casualties
   1 carrier sunk,
   1 destroyer sunk,
   307 killed              4 carriers sunk,
                           1 cruiser sunk,
                           3,057 killed
   Pacific campaigns 1941-42
   Pearl Harbour – Thailand – Malaya – Wake – Hong Kong – Philippines –
   Dutch East Indies – New Guinea – Singapore – Australia – Indian Ocean –
   Doolittle Raid – Solomons – Coral Sea – Midway
                              Pacific Ocean campaign
   Pearl Harbour – Wake Island – Doolittle Raid – Midway – Aleutian
   Islands – Guadalcanal – Solomon Islands – Gilbert and Marshall Islands
   – Marianas and Palau – Volcano and Ryūkyū Islands

   The Battle of Midway was a pivotal naval battle in the Pacific Theatre
   of World War II. It took place from June 4 to June 7, 1942,
   approximately one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea, and six
   months after the Empire of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour that had led
   to a state of war between the United States of America and Japan.
   During the battle, the United States Navy defeated a Japanese attack
   against Midway Atoll (located northwest of Hawai’i) and destroyed four
   Japanese aircraft carriers and a heavy cruiser while losing a carrier
   and a destroyer.

   The battle was a crushing defeat for the Japanese and is widely
   regarded as the most important naval battle of World War II. The battle
   permanently weakened the Japanese Navy, particularly the loss of over
   200 naval aviators. Strategically, the U.S. Navy was able to seize the
   initiative in the Pacific and go on the offensive.

   The Japanese plan of attack, which included a secondary attack against
   the Aleutian Islands by a smaller fleet, was an attempt by the Japanese
   to lure America's few remaining carriers into a trap and sink them. The
   Japanese also intended to occupy Midway Atoll to extend Japan's
   defensive perimeter further from its home islands. This operation was
   considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa, as
   well as the invasion of Hawai’i.

   Had the Japanese captured Midway, the northeastern Pacific Rim would
   have been essentially defenseless. Success also would have removed the
   last capital ships in the U.S. Pacific Fleet, ensuring Japanese naval
   supremacy in the Pacific until perhaps late 1943. Thus, the Midway
   operation, like the attack on Pearl Harbour that had plunged the United
   States into war, was not part of a campaign for the conquest of the
   United States itself, but was aimed at its elimination as a strategic
   Pacific power, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its
   Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was also hoped that another
   defeat would force the Americans to the negotiating table to terminate
   the Pacific War.

Strategic context

   Japan had been highly successful in rapidly securing its initial war
   aims, including the reduction of the Philippines, the capture of Malaya
   and Singapore, and the securing of the vital resource areas in Java,
   Borneo, and Indonesia. As such, preliminary planning for a second phase
   of operations commenced as early as January 1942. However, due to
   strategic differences between the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy, as
   well as infighting between the Navy's GHQ and Admiral Yamamoto's
   Combined Fleet, the formulation of effective strategy was hampered, and
   the follow-on strategy was not finalized until April 1942. At that
   time, Admiral Yamamoto succeeded in winning a bureaucratic struggle
   that placed his operational concept — that of further operations in the
   Central Pacific — ahead of the other contending plans. These included
   operations either directly or indirectly aimed at Australia, as well as
   into the Indian Ocean. In the end, Yamamoto's barely-veiled threat to
   resign unless he got his way succeeded in carrying his agenda forward.

   Yamamoto's primary strategic concern was the elimination of America's
   remaining carrier forces. This concern was exacerbated by the "
   Doolittle Raid" on Tokyo ( April 18, 1942) by U.S. Army B-25's staging
   off the carrier Hornet. The raid, while militarily negligible, was a
   severe psychological shock to the Japanese, and proved the existence of
   a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands. Sinking
   America's aircraft carriers and seizing Midway, the only other
   strategic island besides Hawaii in the East Pacific, was the only means
   of nullifying this threat. Yamamoto reasoned that an operation against
   the main carrier base at Pearl Harbour would induce them to fight.
   However, given the strength of American land-based airpower on Hawaii,
   he judged that the powerful American base could not be attacked
   directly. Instead, he selected the atoll of Midway, which lay at the
   extreme northwest end of the Hawai’ian Island chain, some 1300 miles
   (2100 km) from Oahu. Midway itself was not especially important in the
   larger scheme of Japan's intentions; however, the Japanese felt that
   the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbour
   and would therefore strongly defend it.

The plan

   A picture of Midway Atoll, taken several months before the battle.
   Enlarge
   A picture of Midway Atoll, taken several months before the battle.

   As was typical of many Japanese naval plans during the Second World
   War, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's battle plan was quite complex.
   Additionally, his designs were predicated on optimistic intelligence
   information suggesting that Enterprise and Hornet, forming Task Force
   16, were the only carriers available to the U.S. Pacific forces at the
   time. Lexington had been sunk and Yorktown had been severely mauled
   (and was believed sunk) at the Battle of the Coral Sea just a month
   earlier. Likewise, the Japanese believed that Saratoga was undergoing
   repairs on the West Coast after taking torpedo damage. As such, the
   Japanese believed that they would have at most two American fleet
   carriers to deal with at the point of attack.

Yamamoto's decisive battle

   More important, however, was Yamamoto's belief that the Americans had
   been demoralized by their frequent defeats during the preceding six
   months. Yamamoto felt that deception would be required to lure the U.S.
   Fleet into a fatally compromising situation. As such, he dispersed his
   forces such that their full extent (particularly his battleships) would
   be unlikely to be discovered by the Americans prior to the decisive
   battle. Unfortunately for the Japanese, their emphasis on stealth and
   dispersal meant that none of their formations was mutually supporting.
   Critically, Yamamoto's supporting Main Body of battleships and cruisers
   would trail Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's carrier Striking Force by
   several hundred miles. Japan's heavy surface forces were intended to
   destroy whatever part of the U.S. Fleet might come to Midway's relief,
   once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight
   gun duel to be fought. However, their distance from Nagumo's carriers
   would have grave implications during the battle, as most of the
   battleships could have provided valuable anti-aircraft coverage instead
   of being reserved for a surface duel that would never be fought.

Aleutian diversion

   Likewise, the Japanese operations aimed at the Aleutian Islands
   (Operation AL) removed yet more ships from the force that would strike
   at Midway. However, whereas prior histories of the battle have often
   characterized the Aleutians operation as a feint designed to draw
   American forces northwards, recent scholarship on the battle has shown
   that Operation AL was no such thing. In fact, according to the original
   Japanese battle plan, Operation AL was designed to be launched
   simultaneously with the initiation of operations against Midway itself.
   However, a 1-day delay in the sailing of Nagumo's task force had the
   effect of initiating Operation AL a day before its counterpart. In any
   event, Operation AL was a misguided expenditure of offensive assets
   that could have been better used in the south.

The military forces

U.S. intelligence

   U.S. naval intelligence (in cooperation with the British and Dutch) had
   been reading parts of the primary Imperial Japanese Navy communications
   system ( JN-25, an enciphered code) for some time, and had made
   considerable progress on the latest version, which had been issued just
   before the attack on Pearl Harbour. The abundance of radio intelligence
   harvested from the Japanese Navy’s "wild-goose chase" of the Doolittle
   Raid task force further compromised JN-25.

   Thus, by early May 1942, the Americans knew that the Japanese were
   preparing to launch a massive offensive against an objective
   (identified as "AF" in early June), and could hope to ambush them.
   Through analysis of other evidence, Station Hypo, Nimitz's
   cryptanalytic unit at Pearl Harbour, was convinced that "AF" was
   Midway. On the other hand, Nimitz's superior in Washington, Admiral
   Ernest King and the Navy's signals intelligence unit, OP-20-G, believed
   AF to be in the Aleutian Islands.

   An ingenious suggestion by Hypo's commander, Commander Joseph J.
   Rochefort, gave Admiral Nimitz confirmation of AF's identity. By secure
   undersea cable, Rochefort asked the Midway base commander to radio a
   message back to Pearl Harbour stating that drinking water was running
   low due to a breakdown of the water plant — and to use a cipher known
   to have been compromised by the Japanese. Soon after, a deciphered
   intercept stated "AF" had fresh-water problems, and that the attack
   force should plan accordingly. "AF" was therefore confirmed to be
   Midway. Further information from JN-25 decrypts came in slowly, partly
   as a result of the hurried nature of Japanese preparations, and it was
   not until the very last minute that CINCPAC Admiral Chester Nimitz had
   enough information to put together an ambush for the Midway attack
   force. For his intelligence coup in confirming the true objective of
   the coming Japanese attack, Commander Rochefort was posthumously
   awarded the Distinguished Service Medal in 1985 (after being cheated of
   it at the time due to navy politics), and later the Presidential Medal
   of Freedom in 1986.

Prelude to battle

U.S. forces

   USS Yorktown at Pearl Harbor days before the battle.
   Enlarge
   USS Yorktown at Pearl Harbour days before the battle.

   In order to do battle with an enemy force anticipated to be composed of
   4-5 carriers, Nimitz needed every available U.S. flight deck. He
   already had Vice Admiral William Halsey's two-carrier task force at
   hand — but Halsey himself was stricken with psoriasis, and had to be
   replaced with Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Halsey's escort
   commander). Nimitz also hurriedly called back Rear Admiral Frank Jack
   Fletcher's task force from the South West Pacific Area. They reached
   Pearl Harbour just in time to provision and re-sortie. USS Saratoga was
   still under repair and Yorktown (CV-5) herself had been severely
   damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea, but Pearl Harbour Naval
   Shipyard worked around the clock to patch up the carrier. Though
   several months of repairs was estimated for the Yorktown, 72 hours at
   Puget Sound Naval Shipyard was enough to restore it to a battle-worthy
   (if still compromised) aircraft carrier. Her flight deck was patched,
   whole sections of internal beams were cut out and replaced, and several
   new squadrons (drawn from carrier Saratoga) were put aboard her.
   Admiral Nimitz showed total disregard for established procedure in
   getting his third and last available carrier ready for battle — repairs
   continued even as Yorktown sortied, work crews from the repair ship
   Vestal, herself still damaged from the raid on Pearl Harbor six months
   earlier, still aboard. Just three days after pulling into drydock at
   Pearl Harbour, the ship was again under steam, as its band played "
   California, Here I Come".

Japanese forces

   Meanwhile, as a result of their participation in the Battle of the
   Coral Sea, the Japanese aircraft carrier Zuikaku was in port in Kure
   (near Hiroshima), waiting for an air group to be brought to her to
   replace her destroyed planes. The heavily damaged Shōkaku was awaiting
   further repairs; she had suffered three bomb hits at Coral Sea and
   required months in drydock. Despite the likely availability of
   sufficient aircraft between the two ships to re-equip Zuikaku with a
   composite air group, the Japanese made no serious attempt to get her
   into the forthcoming battle. Consequently, instead of bringing six
   heavy carriers into battle, Admiral Nagumo would now only have four.

   Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle also fell
   into disarray. A picket line of Japanese submarines was late getting
   into position (thanks in part to Yamamoto's haste), which let the
   American carriers proceed to their assembly point northeast of Midway
   (known as "Point Luck") without being detected. A second attempt to use
   4-engine reconnaissance seaplanes to scout Pearl Harbour prior to the
   battle (and thereby detect the absence or presence of the American
   carriers), known as "Operation K" , was also thwarted when Japanese
   submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the
   refueling point — a hitherto deserted bay off of French Frigate Shoals
   — was occupied by American warships (because the Japanese had carried
   out an identical mission in March). Thus, Japan was deprived of any
   knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately
   before the battle. Japanese radio intercepts also noticed an increase
   in both American submarine activity and U.S. message traffic. This
   information was in the hands of both Nagumo and Yamamoto prior to the
   battle. However, Japanese operational plans were not changed in
   reaction to these disquieting omens. Nimitz, by contrast, had a very
   good idea of where Nagumo would appear, thanks to his superior signals
   intelligence.

The battle

Initial air attacks

   Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo launched his initial attack wave of 108
   aircraft at 04:30 on June 4. At the same time, the Japanese launched
   seven search aircraft (one of which was launched 30 minutes late), as
   well as combat air patrol (CAP) fighters. Japanese reconnaissance
   arrangements were flimsy, with too few aircraft to adequately cover the
   assigned search areas, and laboring under poor weather conditions to
   the northeast and east of the task force.

   At 06:20, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S.
   base on Midway. Midway-based Marine fighter pilots, flying Grumman F4F
   Wildcats and obsolete Brewster F2As, made a defense of Midway and
   suffered major losses. American anti-aircraft fire was accurate and
   intense, damaging many enemy aircraft. The Japanese strike leader,
   recognizing the island's strike aircraft had already departed, signaled
   Nagumo another mission would be necessary to neutralize the island's
   defenses before troops could be landed on the 7th.

   Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack, American bombers based
   on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet. These
   included six TBF Avengers in their first combat operation, and four
   B-26 Marauders (armed with torpedoes). The Japanese shrugged off these
   attacks with almost no losses, while destroying all but three of the
   American bombers.
   Hiryu under B-17 attack.
   Enlarge
   Hiryu under B-17 attack.

   Admiral Nagumo, in accordance with Japanese carrier operational
   practices of the time, had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These
   comprised two squadrons each of dive-bombers and torpedo bombers. The
   latter were armed with torpedoes for an antiship strike, should any
   American warships be located. The dive-bombers were, as yet, unarmed.
   As a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as the morning flight
   leader's recommendation regarding the need for a second strike, Admiral
   Nagumo at 07:15 ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with general
   purpose contact bombs for use on land targets. Re-arming had been
   underway for about 30 minutes, when at 07:40 a scout plane from the
   cruiser Tone signaled the discovery of a sizable American naval force
   to the east. Nagumo quickly reversed his re-arming order, and asked the
   scout plane to ascertain the composition of the American force.

   Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading
   Carrier Division 2 ( Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended Nagumo strike
   immediately with the forces at hand. Nagumo might have had an
   opportunity to immediately launch some or all of his reserve strike
   force to attack the American ships., but had to act quickly, as his
   Midway strike force would be returning shortly. They would be low on
   fuel, and carrying wounded crewmen, and would need to land promptly.
   Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least
   30–45 minutes to accomplish. Furthermore, by spotting and launching
   immediately, he would be committing some of his reserve strike aircraft
   to battle without proper antiship armament. Japanese carrier doctrine
   preferred fully constituted strikes, and in the absence of a
   confirmation of whether the American force contained carriers, Nagumo's
   reaction was cautious. In addition, the impending arrival of yet more
   American air strikes at 07:53 made Nagumo's window of decision quite
   short. In the end Nagumo made the fateful decision to wait for his
   first strike force to land, and then launch the reserve strike force
   (which would by then be properly armed).

Attacks on the Japanese fleet

   VT-6 TBDs on the USS Enterprise during the Battle of Midway.
   Enlarge
   VT-6 TBDs on the USS Enterprise during the Battle of Midway.

   Meanwhile, the Americans had already launched their carrier aircraft
   against the Japanese. Admiral Fletcher, in overall command on board
   Yorktown, and armed with PBY sighting reports from the early morning,
   ordered Spruance to launch against the Japanese as soon as was
   practical. At the urging of Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain Miles
   Browning, Spruance commenced launching from his carriers Enterprise and
   Hornet at 07:00. Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights,
   followed suit at 08:00 from Yorktown. However, American flight deck
   operations were not nearly as proficient as their enemy's at this point
   in the war, and the American squadrons were launched in piecemeal
   fashion, proceeding to the target in several different groups. This
   diminished the overall impact of the American attacks, and greatly
   increased their casualties.

   American carrier aircraft began attacking the Japanese carrier fleet at
   09:20, with first Torpedo Squadron 8 ( VT-8), followed by VT-6 (at
   09:40) attacking without fighter support. VT-8 was completely
   annihilated, and VT-6 nearly so, with no hits against the enemy to show
   for their efforts. The Japanese CAP ( Combat Air Patrol), flying the
   much faster Mitsubishi Zero fighter, made short work of the slow,
   under-armed American torpedo planes. However, despite their terrible
   sacrifices, the American torpedo planes indirectly achieved two
   important results. First, they kept the Japanese off balance, with no
   ability to prepare and launch their own counterstrike. Second, their
   attacks had pulled the Japanese combat air patrol out of position — not
   in terms of altitude (as has commonly been described), but by laterally
   distorting the CAP coverage over the Japanese fleet. The appearance of
   a third torpedo plane attack from the SE by VT-3 at 10:00 very quickly
   drew the majority of the Japanese CAP into the southeast quadrant of
   the fleet.

   By chance, at the same time VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese, two
   separate formations (comprising three squadrons total) of American SBD
   Dauntless dive-bombers were approaching the Japanese fleet from the
   northeast and southwest. These formations, despite having had
   difficulty in locating the Japanese carriers had now — by sheer luck
   and some good decision-making on the part of their respective squadron
   commanders — arrived in a perfect position to attack the Japanese.
   Armed Japanese strike aircraft filled the hangar decks at the time of
   the fateful attack, fuel hoses snaking across the decks as refueling
   operations were hastily completed, and the constant change of ordnance
   meant that bombs and torpedoes were stacked around the hangars rather
   than being stowed safely in the magazines. The Japanese carriers were
   in an extraordinarily vulnerable position.

   However, contrary to some accounts of the battle, recent research has
   demonstrated that the Japanese were not prepared to launch a
   counterstrike against the Americans at the time they were decisively
   attacked. Due to the constant flight deck activity associated with
   combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour, the Japanese
   had never had an opportunity to spot their reserve strike force for
   launch. The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of
   the attack were either CAP fighters, or (in the case of Sōryū) strike
   fighters being spotted to augment the CAP. Regardless, the moment of
   opportunity was exploited for all it was worth by the American bomber
   pilots.

   Beginning at 10:22, Enterprise aircraft attacked carrier Kaga, with
   Akagi being struck four minutes later. To the north, Yorktown’s
   aircraft attacked Sōryū. Simultaneously, VT-3 was targeting Hiryū,
   although the American torpedo aircraft again scored no hits. The
   dive-bombers, however, had better fortune. Within six minutes, the SBDs
   made their attack runs and left all three of their targets heavily
   ablaze. Akagi was hit by just one bomb, which was sufficient; it
   penetrated to the upper hangar deck and exploded among the armed and
   fueled aircraft there. One extremely near miss also slanted in and
   exploded underwater, bending the flight deck upward with the resulting
   geyser and causing crucial rudder damage. Sōryū took three bomb hits in
   the hangar decks; Kaga took at least four and likely more. All three
   carriers were out of action, and would eventually be abandoned and
   scuttled.

   Subsequent to the air attacks, the American submarine Nautilus (SS-168)
   fired torpedoes at what her crew thought was the Sōryū, but which later
   research suggests was the Kaga. The Nautilus crew claimed that one
   torpedo hit the carrier, causing "flames". However, the surviving crew
   of the Kaga reported no torpedo hits after the air attack. Of the four
   fish fired, one failed to run, two ran erratically, and the fourth was
   a 'dud,' impacting amidships and breaking in half.

Japanese counterattacks

   USS Yorktown is hit by an aerial torpedo
   Enlarge
   USS Yorktown is hit by an aerial torpedo

   Hiryū, now the sole surviving Japanese flight deck, wasted little time
   in counterattacking. The first strike of Japanese dive-bombers badly
   damaged the Yorktown, yet her engineers patched her up so quickly that
   the second strike of torpedo bombers mistook her for an intact carrier.
   Despite Japanese hopes to even the battle by eliminating two carriers
   with two strikes, Yorktown absorbed both Japanese attacks, the second
   attack believing mistakenly that Yorktown had already been sunk and
   that they were attacking Enterprise. She was now out of the battle, but
   Task Force 16's two carriers had escaped undamaged as a result.
   (Yorktown would later be sunk, during salvage efforts, by torpedoes
   from a Japanese submarine on June 7. The same torpedo salvo would also
   sink the destroyer Hammann.) When American scout aircraft subsequently
   located Hiryū later in the afternoon, Enterprise launched a final
   strike of dive bombers against the last Japanese carrier that left her
   ablaze. Hornet's strike, launching late due to a communications error,
   concentrated on the remaining surface ships but failed to score any
   hits.

   As darkness fell, both sides took stock, and made tentative plans for
   continuing the action. Admiral Spruance was now in tactical command of
   the American forces as Admiral Fletcher had been obliged to abandon the
   derelict Yorktown. Spruance knew that he had won a great victory, but
   he was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained at hand, and was
   determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. Consequently, he
   decided to retire east during the evening, so as to not run into a
   night action with Japanese surface forces that might still be in the
   area. In the early morning hours, he returned to the west to be in a
   position to cover Midway should an invasion develop in the morning.

   For his part, Yamamoto initially decided to continue the effort, and
   sent his remaining surface forces searching eastward for the American
   carriers. Simultaneously, a cruiser raiding force was detached to
   bombard the island that very night. Eventually, however, as the night
   waned without any sign of the Americans, the reality of the situation
   imposed its own logic, and at 02:55 Yamamoto ordered his various forces
   to retire to the west.

   While beating its retreat in close column at night, the Japanese
   cruiser bombardment force suffered a further trial. A sighting of the
   American submarine Tambor forced the cruiser formation to initiate
   radical evasive maneuvers. Mogami failed to adjust its course correctly
   for a column turn, and rammed the port quarter of her sistership
   Mikuma. Over the following two days, first Midway and then Spruance's
   carriers launched several successive strikes against the stragglers.
   Mikuma was eventually sent to the bottom, while Mogami managed to
   successfully fend off the bombers, and lived to fight another day. US
   Marine Captain Richard E. Fleming was posthumously awarded the Medal of
   Honour for his attack on the Mikuma, although contemporary research has
   revealed that neither Fleming's bomb nor his aircraft actually struck
   the ship itself.

Aftermath

   A rare image of a heavily damaged Japanese carrier, in this case the
   Hiryu.
   Enlarge
   A rare image of a heavily damaged Japanese carrier, in this case the
   Hiryu.

   After scoring a clear victory, American forces retired. Japan's loss of
   four fleet carriers ( Kaga, Akagi, Sōryū, and Hiryū) — leaving only
   Zuikaku and Shōkaku — stopped the expansion of the Japanese Empire in
   the Pacific.

   With the US Navy now having clawed its way back to a rough parity of
   fleet carriers, the Americans could contemplate taking to the offensive
   for the first time in the war. Shortly thereafter, the Americans would
   invade Guadalcanal, initiating the attritional struggle in the Solomon
   Islands that would permanently wreck the Japanese Navy and its elite
   naval air groups.

Impact

   Although the battle has often been called "the turning point of the
   Pacific", it clearly did not win the Pacific War overnight for the
   Americans. The Japanese navy continued to fight ferociously, and it
   would be many more months before the U.S. would move from a state of
   naval parity to that of increasingly clear supremacy. Nor, given the
   vast disparity in economic strength between the two combatants, is it
   even remotely likely that the Americans would have lost the war against
   Japan had they lost the battle. Thus, Midway was not "decisive" in the
   same sense that Salamis or Trafalgar was decisive. However, victory at
   Midway gave the U.S. the opportunity to seize the strategic initiative,
   inflicted irreparable damage on the Japanese carrier force, and
   shortened the war in the Pacific.

   Just two months later, the US took the offensive and attacked
   Guadalcanal, catching the Japanese off-balance. Given a defeat instead
   of a major victory at Midway, the US may not have struck at such an
   early date, or had the same degree of success. Securing Allied supply
   lines to Australia and the Indian Ocean in this time frame, along with
   the heavy attrition inflicted on the Japanese at Guadalcanal, had
   far-reaching effects on the length of the war (see Guadalcanal
   campaign, Aftermath and Historical Significance.) For example, the
   British defense of the Suez Canal against the Afrika Korps was
   resupplied and reinforced via Allied shipping lanes in the Indian
   Ocean.

   While Midway did not see the destruction of Japanese naval aviation, it
   did deal it a heavy blow. The pre-war Japanese training program
   produced pilots of exceptional quality, but at a painfully slow rate.
   This small group of elite aviators were combat hardened veterans. At
   Midway, the Japanese lost as many of these pilots in a single day as
   their pre-war training program produced in a year. In the subsequent
   battles around Guadalcanal in late 1942, such as Eastern Solomons and
   Santa Cruz, Japanese naval aviation was ground down by attrition.
   Although war-time Japanese training programs produced pilots, they were
   insufficiently trained as the war continued, an imbalance that became
   worse as increasingly potent US fighters became available that clearly
   outmatched Japanese aircraft. By mid-1943, the combination of the
   Battle of Midway and the losses in the Solomons had decimated Japanese
   naval aviation. Worse for the Japanese, their habit of leaving expert
   pilots in combat was detrimental to the training of their forces. The
   US Navy by contrast rotated its best aviators home on a regular basis
   to teach their young pilot candidates the techniques they would use to
   defeat the Empire of Japan.

   Even more important, though, was the irredeemable loss of four of
   Japan's fleet carriers. These ships would not be replaced, unit for
   unit, until early in 1945. In the same span of time, the U.S. Navy
   commissioned more than two dozen fleet and light fleet carriers, and
   numerous escort carriers. Thus, Midway permanently damaged the Japanese
   Navy's striking power, and measurably shortened the period during which
   the Japanese carrier force could fight on advantageous terms.
   The Mikuma shortly before sinking.
   Enlarge
   The Mikuma shortly before sinking.

   The importance of the Battle of Midway can also be assessed by
   considering the hypothetical scenario of an American defeat and the
   destruction of the US aircraft carrier fleet. By any analysis, a loss
   of that magnitude would have prolonged the war in the Pacific. With
   only two carriers ( Saratoga and Wasp) available, the U.S. would have
   been forced onto the defensive for at least the remainder of 1942. The
   Japanese could have continued their advance on the New Hebrides and cut
   off communication with Australia, and completed their conquest of New
   Guinea. Furthermore, a catastrophic failure at Midway might have
   resulted in the removal of key figures like Nimitz and Spruance from
   their positions. Offensive operations in the Pacific might have been
   delayed until as late as mid-1943, when Essex and Independence class
   carriers became available in appreciable numbers. A hypothetically
   longer Pacific war does raise the question of the role the Soviet Union
   would have played in Japan's demise, and whether the USSR would have
   gained a postwar presence in a partitioned Japan, similar to that of
   Germany. The actual implications of an American defeat are unknowable,
   but there is little question that losing at Midway would have narrowed
   U.S. options dramatically, at least in the short term.

Discovery

U.S. vessels

   Due to the extreme depth of the ocean in the area of the battle (more
   than 17,000 feet/5200 m), researching the battlefield has presented
   extraordinary difficulties. However, on May 19, 1998, Robert Ballard
   and a team of scientists & Midway veterans (including Japanese
   participants) located and photographed Yorktown. The ship was
   remarkably intact for a vessel that sank in 1942; much of the original
   equipment, and even the original paint scheme were still visible.

Japanese vessels

   Ballard's subsequent search for the Japanese carriers was ultimately
   unsuccessful. In September 1999, a joint expedition between Nauticos
   Corp. and the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office searched for the Japanese
   aircraft carriers. Using advanced renavigation techniques in
   conjunction with the ship's log of the submarine USS Nautilus, the
   expedition located a large piece of wreckage, which was subsequently
   identified as having come from the upper hangar deck of carrier Kaga.
   The main wreck, however, has yet to be located.

In film

   Struck by a torpedo from I-168, Hammann quickly sank.
   Enlarge
   Struck by a torpedo from I-168, Hammann quickly sank.

   The Battle of Midway has been featured in several motion pictures. The
   first film about the battle was directed by John Ford, who used colour
   motion picture from U.S. Navy of the actual battle, releasing an
   award-winning documentary called The Battle of Midway in 1942.
   Subsequently, the movie Midway, directed by Jack Smight, was released
   in 1976. This film generally portrayed the events fairly accurately,
   although it was criticized for suffering from several flaws (including
   a preposterous romance, the presence of American F4U Corsair fighters,
   which were not even operational yet), inaccurate warship models, and
   the promotion of Hypo's Commander Rochefort to Fleet Intelligence
   Officer).

   In addition, the 1976 movie vividly depicts Grumman F6F Hellcat carrier
   landings whereas the battle involved its predecessor, the Grumman F4F
   Wildcat, which strongly resembles the Hellcat but is distinguishable
   during landings due to the Wildcat's narrow-track landing gear. The
   Hellcat did not become operational until 1943.

Trivia

     * This major defeat for Japan came six months after the beginning of
       open warfare against the United States. That is almost exactly the
       maximum amount of time that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto predicted he
       would have the advantage over the enemy before the tide would turn
       in its favour.

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