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Battle of Rennell Island

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: World War II

   Battle of Rennell Island
   Part of the Pacific Theatre of World War II
   USS Chicago low in the water on the morning of January 30, 1943 due to
   torpedo damage inflicted the night before.

     Date   January 29, 1943 – January 30, 1943
   Location Rennell Island, Solomon Islands
    Result  Japanese victory
   Combatants
   United States
   Australia Japan
   Commanders
   William Halsey, Jr.,
   Robert C. Giffen Isoroku Yamamoto,
   Junichi Kusaka
   Strength
   1 fleet carrier,
   2 escort carriers,
   6 cruisers,
   8 destroyers,
   14 fighter aircraft 32 bomber aircraft
   Casualties
   1 cruiser sunk,
   1 destroyer heavily damaged,
   85 killed 12 aircraft destroyed,
   60–84 killed
                                Guadalcanal campaign
   Tulagi – Savo I. – Tenaru – Eastern Solomons – Edson's Ridge –
   Cape Esperance – Henderson Field – Santa Cruz Is. – Naval Guadalcanal –
   Tassafaronga – Ke – Rennell I.
                              Solomon Islands campaign
   1st Tulagi – Guadalcanal – Blackett Strait – Cartwheel – Death of
   Yamamoto – New Georgia – Kula Gulf – Kolombangara – Vella Gulf –
   Horaniu – Vella Lavella – Naval Vella Lavella – Treasury Is. – Choiseul
   – Empress Augusta Bay – Cape St. George – Green Is. – 2nd Rabaul –
   Bougainville

   The Battle of Rennell Island (Japanese: レンネル島沖海戦) took place on January
   29–30, 1943, and was the last major naval engagement between the United
   States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during the lengthy Battle of
   Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands campaign during World War II. The
   battle took place in the South Pacific between Rennell Island and
   Guadalcanal in the southern Solomon Islands.

   In the battle, Japanese naval land-based torpedo bombers, seeking to
   provide protection for the impending evacuation of Japanese forces from
   Guadalcanal, made several attacks over two days on United States'
   (U.S.) warships operating as a task force south of Guadalcanal. In
   addition to approaching Guadalcanal with the objective of engaging any
   Japanese ships that might come into range, the U.S. task force was
   protecting an Allied transport ship convoy that was carrying
   replacement troops to Guadalcanal. As a result of the Japanese air
   attacks on the task force, one U.S. heavy cruiser was sunk, a destroyer
   was heavily damaged, and the rest of the U.S. task force was forced to
   retreat from the southern Solomons area. Due, in part, to their success
   in turning back the U.S. task force in this battle, the Japanese were
   successful in evacuating their remaining troops from Guadalcanal by
   February 7, 1943, leaving Guadalcanal in Allied hands and ending the
   battle for the island.

Background

   On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on
   Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The
   landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as
   bases to threaten the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and
   to use them as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of
   isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the
   Allied New Guinea and New Britain campaigns. The landings initiated the
   six-month-long Battle of Guadalcanal.

   The last major attempt by the Japanese to drive Allied forces from
   Guadalcanal and Tulagi was defeated during the decisive Naval Battle of
   Guadalcanal in early November, 1942. Thereafter, the Japanese Navy was
   only able to deliver subsistence supplies and a few replacement troops
   to Japanese Army forces on Guadalcanal. Due to the threat from Allied
   aircraft based at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, plus nearby U.S.
   aircraft carriers, the Japanese delivered these supplies at night,
   usually by destroyer or submarine, in operations the Allies called the
   " Tokyo Express." However, these supplies and replacements weren't
   enough to sustain Japanese troops on the island, who, by December 7,
   1942, were losing about 50 men each day from malnutrition, disease, and
   Allied ground or air attacks. On December 12, the Japanese Navy
   proposed that Guadalcanal be abandoned. In spite of opposition from
   Japanese Army leaders, who still hoped that Guadalcanal could
   eventually be retaken from the Allies, Japan's Imperial General
   Headquarters, with approval from the Japanese Emperor, on December 31,
   1942, agreed to the evacuation of all Japanese forces from the island
   and establishment of a new line of defense for the Solomons on New
   Georgia.
   South Pacific area in 1942–1943. The U.S. troop convoy and warship task
   forces heading towards Guadalcanal (upper center) on January 29, 1943
   originated at the major Allied bases at Espiritu Santo and Efate
   (center right) and Noumea (lower right). Headquarters for Japanese
   land-based aircraft in the Solomons area was at Rabaul (upper left).
   Enlarge
   South Pacific area in 1942–1943. The U.S. troop convoy and warship task
   forces heading towards Guadalcanal (upper centre) on January 29, 1943
   originated at the major Allied bases at Espiritu Santo and Efate
   (centre right) and Noumea (lower right). Headquarters for Japanese
   land-based aircraft in the Solomons area was at Rabaul (upper left).

   The Japanese titled the evacuation effort of their forces from
   Guadalcanal Operation Ke (ケ号作戦) and planned to execute the operation
   beginning January 14, 1943. An important element in the operation's
   plan was an air superiority campaign set to begin on January 28, with
   the objective of inhibiting Allied aircraft or warships from disrupting
   the final stage of the Ke operation, which was the actual evacuation of
   all Japanese troops from Guadalcanal.

   Allied forces misinterpreted the Ke preparations as the beginning of
   another Japanese offensive to try to retake Guadalcanal. At this same
   time, Admiral William Halsey, Jr., overall commander of Allied forces
   involved in the battle for Guadalcanal, was under pressure from his
   superiors to complete the replacement of the U.S. 2nd Marine Division
   on Guadalcanal, which had been involved in the fighting since the
   initial landings in August, with fresh U.S. Army troops. Halsey hoped
   to take advantage of what he believed was an impending Japanese
   offensive to draw Japanese naval forces into a battle, while at the
   same time delivering the replacement army troops to Guadalcanal.
   Therefore, Halsey prepared and sent, on January 29, 1943, towards the
   southern Solomons area five warship task forces to cover the relief
   convoy and to engage any Japanese naval forces that came into range.
   These five task forces included two fleet carriers, two escort
   carriers, three battleships, 12 cruisers, and 25 destroyers.

   In front of this array of task forces was the troop convoy (Task Group
   (TG) 62.8), consisting of four transports and four destroyers. Ahead of
   the troop convoy, between Rennell Island and Guadalcanal, was a close
   support group called Task Force 18 (TF 18), under Rear Admiral Robert
   C. Giffen, which consisted of heavy cruisers Wichita, Chicago, and
   Louisville, light cruisers Montpelier, Cleveland, and Columbia, escort
   carriers Chenango and Suwanne, and eight destroyers. Admiral Giffen
   commanded TF 18 from Wichita. A fleet carrier task force, centered on
   U.S. carrier Enterprise, steamed about 250 miles behind TG 62.8 and TF
   18. The other fleet carrier and battleship task forces were about 150
   miles further back. Admiral Griffen, along with cruiser Wichita and the
   two escort carriers, had just arrived in the Pacific after
   participating in Operation Torch in the North African Campaign. Also,
   Chicago had just arrived back in the South Pacific, after completing
   repairs from damage suffered during the Battle of Savo Island, almost
   six-months before.

Battle

Prelude

   U.S. cruisers of Task Force 18 at sea en route to Guadalcanal on
   January 29, 1943, just hours prior to the Japanese night air attack off
   Rennell Island. Photographed from USS Wichita. USS Chicago is in the
   right center, with USS Louisville in the distance.
   Enlarge
   U.S. cruisers of Task Force 18 at sea en route to Guadalcanal on
   January 29, 1943, just hours prior to the Japanese night air attack off
   Rennell Island. Photographed from USS Wichita. USS Chicago is in the
   right centre, with USS Louisville in the distance.

   In addition to protecting the troop convoy, TF 18 was charged with
   rendezvousing with a force of four U.S. destroyers, stationed at
   Tulagi, at 21:00 on January 29 in order to conduct a sweep up " The
   Slot" north of Guadalcanal the next day to screen the unloading of the
   troop transports at Guadalcanal. However, the escort carriers were too
   slow (18 knots) to allow Giffen's force to make the scheduled
   rendezvous, so Giffen left the carriers behind with two destroyers at
   14:00 and pushed on ahead at 24 knots (44 km/h). Wary of the threat
   from Japanese submarines, which Allied intelligence indicated were
   likely in the area, Giffen arranged his cruisers and destroyers for
   anti-submarine defense, not expecting an air attack. The cruisers were
   aligned in two columns, spaced 2,500 yards apart. Wichita, Chicago, and
   Louisville, in that order, to starboard and Montpelier, Cleveland, and
   Columbia to port. The six destroyers were spread along a semicircle 2
   miles ahead of the cruiser columns.

   Giffen's force was being tracked by Japanese submarines, who reported
   on Giffen's location and movement to their naval headquarter's units.
   Around mid-afternoon, based on the submarine's reports, 32 G4M "Betty"
   torpedo bombers stationed at Munda and Buka airfields in the Solomons,
   and probably, Rabaul, took-off carrying torpedoes to attack Giffen's
   force. One Betty turned-back with engine trouble, leaving 31 Betty's in
   the attack force.

Action on January 29

   Chart of Japanese air attack (dashed red line) on U.S. Task Force (TF)
   18 (solid black line) between Rennell Island and Guadalcanal on the
   evening of January 29, 1943. (Click on map for larger image and full
   description.)
   Enlarge
   Chart of Japanese air attack (dashed red line) on U.S. Task Force (TF)
   18 (solid black line) between Rennell Island and Guadalcanal on the
   evening of January 29, 1943. (Click on map for larger image and full
   description.)

   At sunset, as TF 18 headed northwest 50 miles north of Rennell Island
   and 100 miles south of Guadalcanal, several of Giffen's ships detected
   unidentified aircraft on radar 60 miles west of their formation. Having
   previously insisted on absolute radio silence, Giffen gave no orders
   about what to do about the unidentified contacts, or any orders at all,
   for that matter. With the setting of the sun, TF 18's combat air patrol
   ( CAP) from the two escort carriers returned to their ships for the
   night, leaving Giffen's ships without air cover.

   The radar contacts were, in fact, the approaching 31 Japanese Betty
   torpedo bombers, who circled around to the south of TF 18 so that they
   could attack from the east, with the black backdrop of the eastern sky
   behind them. The Bettys split into two groups, with the first group of
   16 bombers commencing their attacks on TF 18 at 19:19. In this attack,
   all of the first group of Betty's torpedoes missed and one of the
   bombers was shot down by anti-aircraft fire from Giffen's ships.

   Believing the attack was over, Giffen ordered his ships to cease
   zigzagging and to continue heading towards Guadalcanal on the same
   course and at the same speed. Meanwhile, other Japanese aircraft began
   dropping flares and floatlights to mark the course and speed of TF 18
   in order to assist with the impending attack by the second group of
   Bettys.

   At 19:38, the second group of Bettys attacked, planting two torpedoes
   in Chicago, causing heavy damage, and bringing the cruiser to a dead
   stop. One other torpedo hit Wichita, but didn't explode, and two of the
   Bettys were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. At 20:08, Giffen ordered
   his ships to reverse direction, to slow to 15 knots, and to cease
   firing their anti-aircraft guns, which succeeded in concealing his
   ships from the Japanese aircraft, who all departed the area by 23:35.
   In pitch darkness, Louisville managed to take the crippled Chicago
   under tow and slowly headed south, away from the battle area, escorted
   by the rest of TF 18.

Action on January 30

   USS Louisville (right) tows crippled USS Chicago on the morning of
   January 30, 1943.
   Enlarge
   USS Louisville (right) tows crippled USS Chicago on the morning of
   January 30, 1943.

   Halsey immediately took steps to try to protect the damaged Chicago,
   notifying the escort carriers to make sure they had a CAP in place at
   first light, ordering the Enterprise task force to approach and augment
   the escort carrier's CAP, and sending the fleet tug Navajo to take over
   the tow from Louisville, which was accomplished at 08:00. Between
   daybreak and 14:00, numerous Japanese scout aircraft approached TF 18.
   Although they were all chased away by the CAP, they were able to
   observe and report the position of Chicago. At 12:15, a force of 11
   Bettys launched to attack the damaged U.S. cruiser. The U.S. ships knew
   the Bettys were coming, due to a warning report from an Australian
   coastwatcher in the Solomon Islands, with an estimated arrival time of
   16:00. However, Halsey ordered the rest of the cruisers to leave
   Chicago behind and head for port at Efate, in the New Hebrides, which
   they did at 15:00, leaving behind six destroyers to protect Chicago and
   Navajo.

   At 15:40, Enterprise was 43 miles away from Chicago, with ten of her
   fighters forming a CAP over the damaged cruiser. At this time, four of
   the CAP fighters chased and shot-down a scout Betty bomber. At 15:54,
   radar on Enterprise detected the incoming flight of Bettys, and
   launched 10 more fighters to attack the Betty formation. The escort
   carriers, however, had difficulties in getting their aircraft launched,
   preventing them from joining in the attack on the Betty formation until
   the engagement was over.
   Japanese aerial attack (dotted red line) on Chicago (yellow dot) on the
   morning of January 30, 1943. Black arrows are U.S. carrier fighter
   aircraft.
   Enlarge
   Japanese aerial attack (dotted red line) on Chicago (yellow dot) on the
   morning of January 30, 1943. Black arrows are U.S. carrier fighter
   aircraft.

   At first the Bettys appeared to be trying to approach and attack
   Enterprise, but, turned towards Chicago after six Enterprise CAP
   fighters began to engage them. Four other CAP fighters chased the
   Bettys as they entered the anti-aircraft fire from Chicago's escorting
   destroyers. In all, eight of the attacking Bettys were shot down by the
   CAP fighters or by anti-aircraft fire, but most of the bombers were
   able to drop their torpedoes before crashing.

   One torpedo hit U.S. destroyer La Vallette in her forward engine room,
   killing 22 of her crew and causing heavy damage. Chicago was hit by
   four torpedoes, one forward of the bridge and three others in her
   engineering spaces. Chicago's captain, Ralph O. Davis, ordered the ship
   to be abandoned, and the cruiser sank, stern first, 20 minutes later.
   Navajo and the escorting destroyers rescued 1,049 survivors from
   Chicago's crew, but 62 of her crew "joined Chicago in death." A final
   attack force of Japanese Betty torpedo bombers failed to find the
   remaining U.S. ships. Navajo took La Vallette under tow, and all of the
   remaining ships of TF 18 were able to make it to port at Espiritu Santo
   without further incident.

Aftermath

   Japanese war art depicting the battle showing Betty bombers attacking
   burning U.S. warships.
   Enlarge
   Japanese war art depicting the battle showing Betty bombers attacking
   burning U.S. warships.

   The Japanese widely publicized the results of the engagement, claiming
   to have sunk a "battleship" and "three cruisers." The U.S., on the
   other hand, tried to conceal the loss of Chicago from the public for
   some time, with Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of Allied
   Pacific forces, threatening to "shoot" any of his staff who leaked the
   loss of Chicago to the press. Halsey and Nimitz blamed Giffen for the
   defeat and stated so in Giffen's official performance report for the
   period. The defeat and resulting recriminations do not appear to have
   affected Giffen's career too adversely; he continued to lead Allied
   battleship and cruiser task forces in the Pacific until 1944, and was
   later promoted to vice admiral.

   With Japanese air assets tied-up in the battle with TF 18, the Allied
   transports were able to complete their mission of replacing the 2nd
   Marine division on Guadalcanal over the last two days in January.
   During this time, the other Allied task forces, including the two fleet
   carrier task forces, took station in the Coral Sea, in anticipation of
   an expected Japanese offensive in the southern Solomons

   In reality, however, the Japanese were completing the secret evacuation
   of their remaining forces from Guadalcanal over three nights between
   February 2nd and 7th, 1943. With TF 18 forced to retreat, very few
   Allied naval forces were left in the immediate Guadalcanal area,
   allowing the Japanese to successfully retrieve all of their ground
   forces from under the "noses" of Allied forces, who weren't aware that
   the Japanese evacuation was happening until it was over. These
   evacuated ground forces would play an important part in future battles
   between the Japanese and the Allies in the critical Solomon Islands
   campaign.
   Retrieved from " http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Rennell_Island"
   This reference article is mainly selected from the English Wikipedia
   with only minor checks and changes (see www.wikipedia.org for details
   of authors and sources) and is available under the GNU Free
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