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Battle of Smolensk (1943)

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: World War II

   Second Battle of Smolensk
   Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
   Soviet civilians in their ruined house in Smolensk.

     Date   7 August 1943 – 2 October 1943
   Location Smolensk region, USSR
    Result  Decisive Soviet victory
   Combatants
   Axis Soviet Union
   Commanders
   Günther von Kluge Andrei Yeremenko,
   Vasily Sokolovsky
   Strength
   850,000 men,
   8,800 guns,
   500 tanks,
   700 planes 1,253,000 men,
   20,640 guns,
   1,430 tanks,
   1,100 planes
   Casualties
   (Soviet est.)
   ~200,000–250,000 killed, wounded or captured 450,000 killed, wounded or
   captured
   Eastern Front
   Barbarossa – Finland – Leningrad and Baltics – Crimea and Caucasus –
   Moscow – 1st Rzhev-Vyazma – 2nd Kharkov – Stalingrad – Velikiye Luki –
   2nd Rzhev-Sychevka – Kursk – 2nd Smolensk – Dnieper – 2nd Kiev – Korsun
   – Hube's Pocket – Belorussia – Lvov-Sandomierz – Balkans – Hungary –
   Vistula-Oder – Königsberg – Berlin – Prague

   The second Battle of Smolensk ( 7 August 1943 – 2 October 1943), also
   known as Operation Suvorov, was a major World War II offensive by the
   Red Army in western Russia. Staged almost simultaneously with the
   Battle of the Dnieper, the offensive lasted 2 months and was led by
   Generals Andrei Yeremenko and Vasily Sokolovsky. It was aimed at
   clearing the German presence from the Smolensk and Bryansk regions.
   Smolensk had been under German occupation since the first Battle of
   Smolensk in 1941.

   Despite an impressive German defense, the Red Army was able to stage
   several breakthroughs, liberating several major cities including
   Smolensk and Roslavl. They moved into occupied Belorussia. However, the
   overall advance was quite modest and slow in the face of heavy German
   resistance, and the operation was therefore accomplished in three
   stages: August 7–20, August 21–September 6, and September 7–October 2.

   Although playing a major military role in its own right, the Smolensk
   Operation was also important for its effect on the Battle of the
   Dnieper. It has been estimated that as many as fifty-five German
   divisions were committed to counter the Smolensk Operation — divisions
   which would have been critical to prevent Soviet troops from crossing
   the Dnieper in the south. In the course of the operation the Red Army
   also definitively drove back German forces from the Smolensk land
   bridge, historically the most important approach for a western attack
   on Moscow.

Context of the offensive

   By the end of the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, the Wehrmacht had lost
   all hope of regaining the initiative on the Eastern Front. Losses were
   considerable and the whole army was less effective than before, as many
   of its experienced soldiers had fallen during the previous two years of
   fighting. This left the Wehrmacht capable of only reacting to Soviet
   moves.

   On the Soviet side, Stalin was determined to pursue the liberation of
   occupied territories from German control, a course of action that had
   started at the end of 1942 with Operation Uranus, which led to the
   liberation of Stalingrad. The Battle of the Dnieper was to achieve the
   liberation of the Ukraine and push the southern part of the front
   towards the west. However, in order to weaken the German defenses even
   further, the Smolensk operation was staged simultaneously, in a move
   that would also draw German reserves north, thereby weakening the
   German defense on the southern part of the front. Both operations were
   a part of the same strategic offensive plan, aiming to recover as much
   Soviet territory from German control as possible

   Thirty years later, Marshal Vasilevsky (Chief of the General Staff in
   1943) wrote in his memoirs:

     This plan, enormous both in regard of its daring and of forces
     committed to it, was executed through several operations: the
     Smolensk operation, …the Donbass [Operation], the left-bank Ukraine
     operation…

Geography

   Map of the Smolensk operation and related offensives
   Enlarge
   Map of the Smolensk operation and related offensives

   The territory on which the offensive was to be staged was a slightly
   hilly plain covered with ravines and possessing significant areas of
   swamps and forests that restricted military movement. Its most
   important hills reached heights of 250 to 270 meters (750–800 ft),
   sometimes even more, allowing for improved artillery defense. In 1943,
   the area was for the most part covered with pine and mixed forests and
   thick bushes.

   Numerous rivers also passed through the area, the most important of
   them being the Western Dvina, Dnieper, Desna, Volost' and Ugra rivers.
   None of these rivers were especially wide at 10 to 120 meters (30 to
   260 ft) respectively, nor deep at 40 to 250 cm (1 to 8 ft)
   respectively; but the surrounding wide, swamp-like areas proved
   difficult to cross, especially for mechanized troops. Moreover, like
   many south-flowing rivers in Europe, the Dnieper's western bank, which
   was held by German troops, was higher and steeper than the eastern.
   There were very few available bridges or ferries.

Transport infrastructure

   For the Soviet troops, the offensive was further complicated by a lack
   of adequate transport infrastructure in the area in which the offensive
   was to be staged. The road network was not well developed, and paved
   roads were rare. After rainfall, which was quite common during the
   Russian summer, most of them were turned into mud (a phenomenon known
   as rasputitsa), greatly slowing down any advance of mechanized troops,
   and raising logistical issues as well. As for railroads, the only major
   railroad axis available for Soviet troops was the Rzhev - Vyazma -
   Kirov line.

   On the other hand, the Wehrmacht controlled a much wider network of
   roads and railroads, centered on Smolensk and Roslavl. These two cities
   were important logistical centers, allowing quick supply and
   reinforcements for German troops. By far the most important railroads
   for German troops were the Smolensk - Bryansk axis and the Nevel -
   Orsha - Mogilev axis, linking German western troops with troops
   concentrated around Oryol.

German defense setup

   A set of German antitank devices set up in wooded hills, part of the
   extensive defences the Germans had created around Smolensk
   Enlarge
   A set of German antitank devices set up in wooded hills, part of the
   extensive defences the Germans had created around Smolensk

   The front had been more or less stable for four to five months (and up
   to 18 months in several places) before the battle, and possessed
   geographical features favorable for a strong defensive setup. Thus,
   German forces had time to build extensive defensive positions,
   numbering as much as five or six defensive lines in some places, for a
   total depth extending from 100 to 130 kilometers (60–80 mi).

   The first (tactical or outer) defensive zone included the first (main)
   and the second defense lines, for a total depth varying between 12 and
   15 kilometers (7–9 mi), and located, whenever possible, on elevated
   ground. The main defense line, 5 kilometers deep, possessed three sets
   of trenches and firing points, linked by an extensive communication
   network. The density of firing points reached 6 or 7 per kilometers
   (0.6 mi) of front line. In some places, where heavy tank attacks were
   feared, the third set of trenches was in fact a solid antitank moat
   with a steep western side integrating artillery and machine guns
   emplacements. The forward edge of the battle area was protected by
   three lines of barbed wire and a solid wall of minefields.

   The second defense zone, located about 10 kilometers (6 mi) behind the
   outer defense zone and covering the most important directions, was
   composed of a set of firing points connected with trenches. It was
   protected with barbed wire, and also with minefields in some places
   where heavy tank offensives were anticipated. Between the outer and the
   second defense zones, a set of small firing points and garrisons was
   also created in order to slow down a Soviet advance should the Red Army
   break through the outer defense zone. Behind the second zone, heavy
   guns were positioned.

   Finally, deep behind the front line, three or four more defense lines
   were located, whenever possible, on the western shore of a river. For
   instance, important defense lines were set up on the western side of
   the Dnieper and Desna. Additionally, the main urban centers located on
   the defense line (such as Yelnya, Dukhovshchina and Spas-Demensk), were
   reinforced and fortified, preparing them for a potentially long fight.
   Roads were mined and covered with antitank devices and firing points
   were installed in the most important and tallest buildings.

Front line shape and location

   A detail of the Smolensk offensive, showing the concave shape of the
   Soviet front line
   Enlarge
   A detail of the Smolensk offensive, showing the concave shape of the
   Soviet front line

   As of July 1943, the Soviet front line on the Eastern Front had a
   concave shape with a re-entrant centered around Oryol, creating for
   German troops the risk of being exposed to flank attacks from the
   north. As the result, a significant number of divisions of Army Group
   Centre were kept on this part of the front because of a (quite
   legitimate) fear of a major offensive in this sector.

   For instance, at the end of July 1943, a German staff briefing stated:

     On the front… held by the Army Group Center many signs show a
     continuous preparation to a yet limited offensive (Roslavl,
     Smolensk, Vitebsk) and of a maneuver of immobilization of the Army
     Group Centre…

   Therefore, the offensive promised to be quite difficult for Soviet
   troops.

First stage (7 August – 20 August)

Main breakthrough

   General layout of Smolensk region during the battle
   Enlarge
   General layout of Smolensk region during the battle

   After a day of probing, the goal of which was to determine whether
   German troops would choose to withdraw or not from the first set of
   trenches, the offensive started on 7 August 1943 at 06:30 am (with a
   preliminary bombardment starting at 04:40 am) with a breakthrough
   towards Roslavl. Three armies were committed to this offensive: the 5th
   Army, the 10th Guards Army and the 33rd Army.

   However, the attack quickly encountered heavy opposition and stalled.
   German troops attempted numerous counterattacks from their
   well-prepared defense positions, supported by tanks, assault guns, and
   the fire of heavy guns and mortars. As Konstantin Rokossovsky recalls,
   "we literally had to tear ourselves through German lines, one by one".
   On the first day, the Soviet troops advanced only 4 kilometers
   (2.5 mi), with all available troops (including artillery,
   communications men and engineers) committed to battle.

   Despite violent Soviet attacks, it quickly became obvious that the
   three armies would not be able to get through the German lines.
   Therefore, it was decided to commit the 68th Army, kept in reserve, to
   battle. On the German side, three additionnal divisions ( 2nd Panzer
   Division, 36th Infantry Division and 56th Infantry Division) were sent
   to the front from the Oryol sector to try and stop the Soviet advance.

   The following day, the attack resumed, with another attempt at a
   simultaneous breakthrough taking place further north, towards Yartzevo.
   Both attacks were stopped in their tracks by heavy German resistance.
   In the following five days, Soviet troops slowly made their way through
   German defenses, repelling heavy counterattacks and sustaining heavy
   losses. By feeding reserve troops to battle, the Red Army managed to
   advance to a depth varying from 15 to 25 kilometers (10–15 mi) by 11
   August.

   Subsequent attacks by the armored and cavalry forces of the 6th Guards
   Cavalry Corps had no further effect and resulted in heavy casualties
   because of strong German defenses, leading to a stalemate.

Spas-Demensk offensive

   A destroyed German bunker, showing shell impacts in its steel plating
   Enlarge
   A destroyed German bunker, showing shell impacts in its steel plating

   Near Spas-Demensk, things went a little better for the 10th Army. In
   this area, the Wehrmacht had fewer troops and only limited reserves,
   enabling the 10th Army to break through German lines and advance
   10 kilometers in two days.

   However, the 5th Mechanized Corps, relocated from Kirov and committed
   to battle in order to exploit the breakthrough, failed in its mission,
   mainly because a poorly organized anti-aircraft defense enabled German
   dive bombers to attack Soviet tank formations with a certain degree of
   impunity. The corps sustained heavy losses and had to pull away from
   combat. Eventually, Soviet troops advanced a further 25 kilometers
   (15 mi) as of 13 August, liberating Spas-Demensk.

Dukhovshchina offensive

   As ordered by the Stavka (the Soviet Armed Forces Command), the
   offensive near Dukhovshchina started almost a week later, on 13 August.
   However, as on other parts of the front, the 39th and 43rd armies
   encountered very serious opposition. During the first day alone, German
   troops attempted 24 regimental-sized counterattacks, supported by
   tanks, assault guns, and aviation.

   During the next five days, Soviet troops managed to advance only 6 to
   7 kilometers (3 to 4 mi), and although they inflicted heavy casualties
   on German troops, their own losses were also heavy.

Causes of the stalemate

   By mid-August, Soviet operations all along the Smolensk front
   stabilized. The resulting stalemate, while not a defeat per se, was
   stinging for Soviet commanders, who provided several explanations for
   their failure to press forward. Deputy Chief of General Staff General
   A. I. Antonov reported "We have to deal both with forests and swamps
   and with increasing resistance of enemy troops reinforced by divisions
   arriving from Bryansk region" while Marshal Nikolai Voronov, formerly a
   Stavka member, analysed the stalemate in his memoirs, publishing what
   he saw as the eight primary causes:
    1. The German command knew about the operation and was prepared for
       it.
    2. German defense lines were exceptionally well prepared (firing
       points reinforced by trenches, barbed wire, minefields etc.)
    3. Several Soviet rifle divisions were insufficiently prepared to
       perform an assault of a multi-lined defense setup. This was
       especially true for reserve divisions, whose training was not
       always properly supervised.
    4. There were not enough tanks committed to battle, forcing Soviet
       commanders to rely on artillery, mortars and infantry to break
       through German lines. Moreover, numerous counterattacks and an
       abundance of minefields slowed down the infantry's progress.
    5. The interaction between regiments and divisions was far from
       perfect. There were unexpected pauses during the attack and a
       strong will of some regiments to "hide" from the attack and expose
       another regiment.
    6. Many Soviet commanders were too impressed by German counterattacks
       and failed to act properly, even if their own troops outnumbered
       those of the Wehrmacht.
    7. The infantry were not using their own weapons (such as their own
       heavy guns and portable mortars) well enough. They relied too much
       on artillery.
    8. The fact that the offensive was postponed from 3 August to 7 August
       gave German troops more time to increase their readiness.

   All these factors considered, Voronov demanded that the 4th Tank Army
   and the 8th Artillery Corps were transferred from the Bryansk Front and
   instead committed to support the attack near Smolensk.

   The stalemate was far from what had been desired by the Stavka, but it
   had at least one merit: it tied down as much as 40% of all German
   divisions on the Eastern Front near Smolensk, making the task for
   troops fighting in the south and near Kursk much easier. The Stavka
   planned to resume the offensive on 21 August, but decided to postpone
   it slightly to give Soviet units time to resupply and reinforce.

Second stage (21 August – 6 September)

   By mid-August, the situation on the Eastern Front had changed as the
   Red Army started a general offensive, beginning with the Kursk
   counteroffensive Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev and continuing with
   the Battle of the Dnieper in the south. Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht
   command was still reinforcing its troops around Smolensk and Roslavl,
   withdrawing several divisions from the Oryol region. As the result, the
   Kursk counteroffensive proceeded relatively easily around Oryol,
   creating a large salient south of Smolensk and Bryansk.

   In this situation, the former attack axis, directed southwest towards
   Roslavl and Bryansk, became useless. The Stavka decided instead to
   shift the attack axis west to Yelnya and Smolensk.

Yelnya offensive

   A camouflaged Ilyushin Il-2 ground attack aircraft sitting on its base.
   Enlarge
   A camouflaged Ilyushin Il-2 ground attack aircraft sitting on its base.

   Yelnya was considered a "key" to Smolensk, and therefore German troops
   created a massive defense setup around the city. Swampy areas on the
   Desna and Ugra rivers were mined and heavy guns set up on hills
   overlooking the city. During the week from 20 August to 27 August, the
   Soviet armies were reinforced with tanks and artillery.

   The offensive finally commenced on 28 August by three armies (10th
   Guards, 21st and 33rd), supported by three Tank and Mechanized corps
   and the 1st Air Army. These three armies were covering a front of only
   36 kilometers (22 mi), forming a very strong concentration of troops.
   However, the troops lacked fuel and supplies, with enough supplies for
   only one or two weeks.

   After an intense shelling that lasted 90 minutes, Soviet troops moved
   forward. The artillery bombardment as well as ground attack aircraft
   softened German lines, allowing the Red Army to execute a breakthrough
   on a 25 kilometer (15 mi) front and advance 6 to 8 kilometers (4–5 mi)
   by the end of the day. The following day, 29 August, Soviet rifle
   divisions advanced further, creating a salient 30 kilometers (19 mi)
   wide and 12 to 15 kilometers (7–9 mi) deep.

   In order to exploit the breakthrough, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was
   thrown into battle. In one day, its troops advanced by 30 kilometers
   (19 mi) and reached the outskirts of Yelnya. Leaving the Germans no
   time to regroup their forces, Soviet troops attacked the city and
   started to surround it. On 30 August, German forces were forced to
   abandon Yelnya, sustaining heavy casualties. This started a full-scale
   German retreat from the area. By 3 September, Soviet forces reached the
   eastern shore of the Dnieper.

Bryansk maneuver

   Near Bryansk, things went equally well, despite heavy German
   resistance. However, an identified weakness changed all the previous
   plans. A surprisingly easy capture of several hills commanding the
   Dubrovka region north of Bryansk, with numerous German soldiers
   captured in total absence of battle readiness, came to the attention of
   General Markian Popov, commander of the Bryansk Front from June to
   October 1943. This meant that the Soviet offensive was probably not
   expected along that particular axis.

   Therefore, the boundary between the Belorussian Front and the Western
   Front was shifted south, and two "new" armies executed a single- pincer
   movement to Dubrovka and around Bryansk, forcing German forces to
   withdraw.

   By 6 September, the offensive slowed down almost to a halt on the
   entire front, with Soviet troops advancing only 2 kilometers (1 mi)
   each day. On the right flank, heavy fighting broke out in the woods
   near Yartzevo. On the centre, advancing Soviet troops hit the Dnieper
   defense line. On the left flank, Soviet rifle divisions were slowed as
   they entered forests southwest of Yelnya. Moreover, Soviet divisions
   were tired and depleted, at less than 60% nominal strength. On 7
   September, the offensive was stopped, and the second stage of the
   Smolensk operation was over.

Third stage (7 September – 2 October)

   Soviet sappers erecting a bridge across northern Dnieper
   Enlarge
   Soviet sappers erecting a bridge across northern Dnieper

   In the week from 7 September to 14 September, Soviet troops were yet
   again reinforced and were preparing for another offensive. The next
   objectives set by the Stavka were the major cities of Smolensk, Vitebsk
   and Orsha. The operation resumed on 14 September, involving the left
   flank of the Kalinin Front and the Western Front. Once again, after a
   preliminary artillery bombardment, Soviet troops attempted to break
   through German lines.

   On the Kalinin Front’s attack sector, the Red Army created a salient
   30 kilometers (19 mi) wide and 3 to 13 kilometers (2–8 mi) deep by the
   end of the day. After four days of battle, Soviet rifle divisions
   captured Dukhovshchina, another "key" to Smolensk.

   On the Western Front's attack sector, where the offensive started one
   day later, the breakthrough was also promising, with a salient
   20 kilometers (12 mi) large and 10 kilometers (6 mi) deep. The same
   day, Yartzevo, an important railroad hub near Smolensk, was liberated
   by Soviet troops. On the Western Front's left flank, Soviet rifle
   divisions reached Desna and force-crossed it, creating several
   bridgeheads on its western shore.

   As the result, the defense line protecting Smolensk was overrun,
   exposing the troops defending the city to enveloping maneuvers. General
   Kurt von Tippelskirch, Chief of Staff of the 4th Army during the
   Smolensk operation and later commander of the 4th Army, later wrote:

   "The forces of the Soviet Western Front struck the left wing of Army
   Group Centre from the Dorogobuzh-Yelnya line with the aim of achieving
   a breakthrough in the direction of Smolensk. It became clear that the
   salient—projecting far to the east—in which the 9th Army was positioned
   could no longer be held."

   By 19 September, Soviet troops had created a 250 kilometers (150 mi)
   large and 40 kilometers (25 mi) wide hole in German lines. The
   following day, the Stavka ordered Western Front troops to advance to
   Smolensk before 27 September, then to proceed towards Orsha and
   Mogilev. Kalinin front was ordered to capture Vitebsk before 10
   October.

   On 25 September, after a force-crossing of the northern Dnieper and
   street fighting that lasted all night, Soviet troops liberated the city
   of Smolensk. The same day, Roslavl, another important city, was
   recaptured. By 30 September, the Soviet offensive force was tired and
   depleted, and became bogged down outside Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev,
   which were still held by the Wehrmacht, and on 2 October the Smolensk
   operation was over. A limited follow-on was made to successfully
   capture Nevel after two days of street fighting. Overall, Soviet troops
   advanced 100 to 180 kilometers (60–110 mi) during the almost 20 days of
   this third part of the offensive.

Aftermath

   A sapper searching for mines in the streets of Smolensk
   Enlarge
   A sapper searching for mines in the streets of Smolensk

   The Smolensk operation was a decisive Soviet victory and a stinging
   defeat for the Wehrmacht. Although quite modest compared to later
   offensive operations (not more than 200–250 kilometers or 120–150 miles
   were gained in depth), the Soviet advance during this operation was
   important from several points of view.

   Firstly, German troops were definitively driven back from the Moscow
   approaches. This strategic threat, which had been the Stavka's biggest
   source of worries since 1941, was finally removed.

   Secondly, German defense rings, on which German troops planned to rely,
   were almost completely overrun. Quite a few remained, but it was
   obvious that they would not last. An essay written after the war by
   several Wehrmacht officers stated that:

     Although the vigorous actions of their command and troops allowed
     the Germans to create a continuous front, there was no doubt that
     the poor condition of the troops, the complete lack of reserves, and
     the unavoidable lengthening of individual units' lines concealed the
     danger that the next major Soviet attack would cause this patchwork
     front—constructed with such difficulty—to collapse.

   Thirdly, as outlined above, the Smolensk Operation was an important
   "helper" for the Battle of the Dnieper, locking between 40 and 55
   divisions near Smolensk and preventing their relocation to the southern
   front.
   Smolensk streets during the war.
   Enlarge
   Smolensk streets during the war.

   Finally, a once-united German front was now separated by the huge and
   impassable Pripet marshes, cutting Army Group South off from its
   northern counterparts, thus greatly reducing the Wehrmacht's abilities
   to shift troops and supplies from one sector of the front to the other.

   For the first time, Soviet troops entered territories which had been
   occupied for a long time by German soldiers, and discovered war crimes
   committed by the SS, Einsatzgruppen, and Wehrmacht troops. In the areas
   liberated during the Smolensk operation (occupied for almost two
   years), almost all industry and agriculture was gone. In Smolensk
   oblast itself, almost 80% of urban and 50% of rural living space had
   been destroyed, along with numerous factories and plants.

   After the Smolensk offensive, the central part of the Soviet-German
   front stabilized again for many months until late June 1944, while the
   major fighting shifted to the south for the Dnieper line and the
   territory of the Ukraine. Only during January 1944 would the front move
   again in the north, when German forces were driven back from Leningrad,
   completely lifting the siege which had lasted for 900 days. Finally,
   Operation Bagration in summer 1944 allowed the Red Army to clear almost
   all the remaining territory of the USSR of Wehrmacht troops, ending
   German occupation and shifting the war into Poland and Germany.
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