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Battle of Warsaw (1920)

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: Military History and War

   Battle of Warsaw
   Part of Polish-Bolshevik War
   Miracle at the Vistula, oil on canvas, 1930. Painting by Jerzy Kossak

     Date   August 13 - August 25, 1920
   Location near Warsaw, Poland
    Result  Decisive Polish victory
   Combatants
   Second Polish Republic Bolshevist Russia
   Commanders
   Józef Piłsudski
   Tadeusz Rozwadowski
   Władysław Sikorski Mikhail Tukhachevski
   Joseph Stalin
   Semyon Budyonny
   Strength
   113,000-123,000 104,000-140,000
   Casualties
   4,500 dead
   22,000 wounded
   10,000 missing 15,000 - 25,000 dead, wounded, or missing
   65,000 - 66,000 captured
   30,000-35,000 interned in East Prussia
   Polish-Soviet War
   Target Vistula – Bereza Kartuska – Wilno – Minsk – Daugavpils –
   Koziatyn – Kiev – Volodarka – Mironówka – Olszanica – Żywotów –
   Miedwiedówka – Dziunków – Wasylkowce – Bystrzyk – Nowochwastów –
   Berezno – Spiczyniec – Boryspol – Zazime – Puchówka – Okuniew –
   Spiczyn – Lwów – Berezina – Nasielsk – Serock – Radzymin – Zadwórze –
   Warsaw – Komarów – Niemen – Zboiska – 2nd Minsk

   The Battle of Warsaw (sometimes referred to as the Miracle at the
   Vistula, Polish: Cud nad Wisłą) was the decisive battle of the
   Polish-Soviet War, which began soon after the end of World War I in
   1918 and lasting until the Treaty of Riga (1921).

   The Battle of Warsaw was fought from 13 to 25 August 1920 as Red Army
   forces commanded by Mikhail Tukhachevski approached the Polish capital
   of Warsaw and nearby Modlin Fortress. On August 16, Polish forces
   commanded by Józef Piłsudski counter-attacked from the south, forcing
   the Russian forces into a disorganised withdrawal eastward and behind
   the Niemen River. Estimated Bolshevik losses were 10,000 killed, 500
   missing, 10,000 wounded and 66,000 taken prisoner, compared with Polish
   losses of some 4,500 killed, 10,000 missing and 22,000 wounded.

   Before the Polish victory at the Vistula, both the Bolsheviks and the
   majority of foreign experts considered Poland to be on the verge of
   defeat. The stunning, unexpected Polish victory crippled the Bolshevik
   forces. In the following months, several more Polish victories secured
   Poland's independence and eastern borders.

The battle

Prelude to the battle

   The Poles were fighting to preserve their newly regained independence,
   lost in the 1795 third partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,
   and to carve out the borders of a new multinational federation (
   Międzymorze) from the territories of their former partitioners, Russia,
   Germany and the Austria-Hungary.

   The Bolsheviks had in 1919 gained the upper hand in the Russian Civil
   War, having dealt crippling blows to the White Russians. Vladimir Lenin
   viewed Poland as a bridge that had to be crossed so that communism
   could be brought to Central and Western Europe, and the
   Polish-Bolshevik War seemed the perfect way to test Bolshevik strength.
   Bolshevik speeches asserted that the revolution was to be carried to
   western Europe on the bayonets of Soviet soldats and that the shortest
   route to Berlin and Paris lay through Warsaw.

   After early setbacks against Poland in 1919, the Bolshevik offensive
   that eclipsed the Polish Kiev Operation began in early 1920 and had
   been overwhelmingly successful. By mid-1920, Poland's very survival was
   at stake and the entire world expected Poland to collapse at any
   moment. The Soviet strategy called for a massed push toward the Polish
   capital, Warsaw. Its capture would have had a tremendous propaganda
   effect for the Soviets, who expected it not only to undermine the
   morale of the Poles, but to spark an international series of communist
   uprisings and clear the way for the Red Army to join the German
   Revolution.
   Polish defences at Miłosna, near Warsaw.
   Enlarge
   Polish defences at Miłosna, near Warsaw.

   The Soviet 1st Cavalry Army under Semyon Budyonny broke through Polish
   lines in early June 1920. This led to a collapse of all Polish fronts
   in the east. On July 4, 1920, Mikhail Tukhachevski's Western Front
   began an all-out assault in Belarus from the Berezina River, forcing
   Polish forces to retreat. On July 19 the Red Army seized Grodno, on
   July 28, it reached Białystok, and three days later, the Brześć
   Fortress was captured.

The battle plan

Polish plan

   Polish commander: Józef Piłsudski.
   Enlarge
   Polish commander: Józef Piłsudski.

   By the beginning of August, the Polish retreat had become more
   organized. At first, Józef Piłsudski wanted to base his operation on
   the Bug River and Brest-Litovsk, but their unexpected fall made it
   impossible. On the night of August 5—6, Piłsudski conceived a revised
   plan at the Belweder Palace in Warsaw. It called in the first phase for
   Polish forces to withdraw across the Vistula River and defend the
   bridgeheads at Warsaw and at the Wieprz River. Some 25% of the
   available divisions would be concentrated to the south for a strategic
   counteroffensive. Next, Piłsudski's plan called for the 1st and 2nd
   Armies of Gen. Józef Haller's Central Front (10 1/2 divisions) to take
   a passive role, facing the Soviet frontal attack on Warsaw from the
   east and holding their entrenched positions at all costs. At the same
   time, the 5th Army (5 1/2 divisions) under Gen. Władysław Sikorski,
   subordinate to Gen. Haller, would defend the northern area near the
   Modlin Fortress and, when it became feasible, strike from behind
   Warsaw, thus cutting off Soviet forces attempting to envelop Warsaw
   from that direction, and break through the enemy front and fall upon
   the rear of the Soviet Northwestern Front. An additional five divisions
   of the 5th Army were to defend Warsaw from the north. General
   Franciszek Latinik's 1st Army would defend Warsaw itself, while General
   Bolesław Roja's 2nd Army was to hold the Vistula River line from Góra
   Kalwaria to Dęblin.

   The most important role, however, was assigned to a relatively small
   (some 20,000-man), newly assembled "Reserve Army" (also called the
   "Assault Group" - Grupa Uderzeniowa), commanded personally by Józef
   Piłsudski, comprising the most battle-hardened and determined Polish
   units drawn from the southern front. They were to be reinforced by
   General Leonard Skierski's 4th Army and General Zygmunt Zieliński's 3rd
   Army, which, after retreating from the Western Bug River area, had
   moved not directly toward Warsaw but had crossed the Wieprz River and
   broken off contact with their pursuers. The Assault Group's assignment
   was to spearhead a lightning northern offensive from the Vistula-Wieprz
   River triangle south of Warsaw, through a weak spot identified by
   Polish intelligence between the Soviet Western and Southwestern Fronts.
   This would separate the Soviet Western Front from its reserves and
   disorganize its movements. Eventually the gap between Gen. Sikorski's
   5th Army and the advancing Assault Group would close near the East
   Prussian border, leaving the Soviet offensive "trapped in a sack."

   Although based on fairly reliable information provided by Polish
   intelligence and intercepted Soviet radio communications, the plan was
   labelled as 'amateurish' by many high-ranking army officers and
   military experts, who were quick to point out Piłsudski's lack of
   formal military education. Many Polish units, a mere week before the
   planned date of the counter-attack, were fighting in places as far as
   100-150 miles (150 to 250 km) from the concentration points. All of the
   troop movements were within striking distance of the Red Army. One
   strong push by the Red Army could derail plans for a Polish
   counter-attack and endanger the cohesion of the whole Polish front.
   Piłsudski's plan was strongly criticized by Polish commanders and
   officers of the French Military Mission. Even Piłsudski himself
   admitted in his memoirs that it was a very risky gamble and the reasons
   he decided to go forward with the plan were the defeatist mood of
   politicians, fear for the safety of the capital and the prevailing
   feeling that if Warsaw were to fall, all would be lost. Only the
   desperate situation persuaded other army commanders to go along with
   it, as they realized that under such circumstances it was the only
   possible way to avoid a devastating defeat. Ironically, when a copy of
   the plan accidentally fell into Soviet hands it was considered to be a
   poor deception attempt and ignored. A few days later, the Soviets paid
   dearly for this mistake.
   Soviet commander: Mikhail Tukhachevski.
   Enlarge
   Soviet commander: Mikhail Tukhachevski.

   There is some controversy as to the authorship of the plan. Due to
   Piłsudski's political image, he was largely unpopular with the right
   wing of Polish politics. Because of that, after the battle many
   journalists suggested that the plan was in fact prepared either by
   Maxime Weygand or by the Polish Chief of Staff Tadeusz Rozwadowski.
   According to recent research, the French Military Mission to Poland
   proposed only a minor tactical counter-attack of two divisions towards
   Mińsk Mazowiecki. Its aim would have been to push the Bolshevik forces
   30 kilometres back in order to ease subsequent ceasefire negotiations.
   On the other hand, Gen. Rozwadowski's plan called for a deeper thrust
   into Russian lines from the area of Wieprz. However, Piłsudski proposed
   a large scale operation, with significant forces committed to beating
   the enemy forces rather than merely pushing them back. The plan was
   opposed by the French mission, which did not believe that the Polish
   Army would be able to regroup after a 600 kilometre retreat.
   Nonetheless for many years, a myth persisted that it was the timely
   arrival of Allied forces that had saved Poland, a myth in which Weygand
   occupied the central role.

Bolshevik plan

   Mikhail Tukhachevski planned to encircle and surround Warsaw by
   crossing the Vistula river, near Włocławek to the north and south of
   the city and launch an attack from the northwest. With his 24
   divisions, he planned to repeat the classic maneuvre of Ivan
   Paskievich, who in 1831, during the November Uprising, had crossed the
   Vistula at Toruń and reached Warsaw practically unopposed. This move
   would also cut the Polish forces off from Gdańsk, the only port open to
   shipments of arms and supplies.

   The main weakness of the Soviet plan was the poorly defended southern
   flank, secured only by the Pinsk Marshes and the weak Mozyr Group; the
   majority of the Soviet Southwest Front was engaged in the battle of
   Lwów (1920).

First phase, August 12

   Meanwhile Bolsheviks pushed forward. Gay Dimitrievich Gay's Cavalry
   Corps together with the 4th Army crossed Wkra river and advanced
   towards the town of Włocławek. The 15th and 3rd Armies were approaching
   Modlin fortress and the 16th Army moved towards Warsaw.

   The final Soviet assault on Warsaw began on August 12 with the Soviet
   16th Army the attack at the town of Radzymin (only 23 kilometres east
   of the city). Its initial success prompted Piłsudski to move up his
   plans by 24 hours.
   Positions prior to the battle.
   Enlarge
   Positions prior to the battle.

   The first phase of the battle started on August 13, with a Red Army
   frontal assault on the Praga bridgehead. In heavy fighting, Radzymin
   changed hands several times and foreign diplomats, with the exception
   of British and Vatican ambassadors, hastily left Warsaw. On August 14,
   it fell to the Red Army, and the lines of Gen. Władysław Sikorski's
   Polish 5th Army were broken. The 5th Army had to fight three Soviet
   armies at once: the 3rd, 4th and 15th. The Modlin sector was reinforced
   with reserves (the Siberian Brigade, and Gen. Franciszek Krajowski's
   fresh 18th Infantry Division—both elite, battle-tested units), and the
   5th Army held out until dawn.

   The situation was saved around midnight when the 203rd Uhlan Regiment
   managed to break through the Bolshevik lines and destroy the radio
   station of A.D. Shuvayev's Soviet 4th Army. The latter unit had only
   one remaining radio station fixed on one frequency which was known to
   the Polish intelligence. Since the Polish code-breakers did not want
   the Bolsheviks to find out that their codes were broken, but still
   neutralize the other radio station, the radio station in Warsaw recited
   the book of Genesis in Polish and Latin on the frequency used by the
   4th Army, which thus lost contact with its headquarters and continued
   marching toward Toruń and Płock, unaware of Tukhachevski's order to
   turn south. The raid by the 203rd Uhlans is sometimes referred to as
   the Miracle of Ciechanów.

   At the same time, the Polish 1st Army under Gen. Franciszek Latinik
   resisted a Red Army direct assault on Warsaw by six rifle divisions.
   The struggle for control of Radzymin forced Gen. Józef Haller,
   commander of the Polish Northern Front, to start the 5th Army's
   counterattack earlier than planned.

   During this time, Piłsudski was finishing his plans for the
   counter-offensive. He decided to personally supervise the attack and,
   because of the enormous risks involved, he handed in a letter with his
   resignation from all state functions. Thereafter, between August 13 and
   15, he visited all units of the 4th Army concentrating near Puławy,
   about 100 kilometres south of Warsaw. He tried to raise morale, since
   many soldiers were tired and demoralized and numerous recently
   incorporated replacements showed everyone the extent of Polish losses.
   Logistics were a nightmare, as the Polish army was equipped with guns
   made in five countries and rifles manufactured in six, each of them
   using different ammunition. Adding to the problem was the fact that the
   equipment was in poor shape. Piłsudski remembers: "In 21 Division,
   almost half of the soldiers paraded in front of me barefoot."
   Nevertheless, in only three days, Piłsudski was able to raise the
   morale of his troops and motivate them for one of their greatest
   efforts.

Second phase, August 14

   The 27th Infantry Division of the Red Army managed to reach the village
   of Izabelin, 13 kilometres from the capital, but this was the closest
   that Russian forces would come. Soon the tides of battle would change.
   Positions around Warsaw, early morning on August 15.
   Enlarge
   Positions around Warsaw, early morning on August 15.

   Tukhachevski, certain that all was going according to plan, was
   actually falling into Piłsudski's trap. The Russian march across the
   Vistula in the north was striking into an operational vacuum, where
   there was no sizeable group of Polish troops. On the other hand, south
   of Warsaw, Tukhachevski left only token forces to guard the vital link
   between the North-Western and South-Western Fronts. The Mozyr Group,
   which was assigned this task, numbered only 8,000 soldiers. Another
   error neutralized the 1st Cavalry Army of Semyon Budyonny, a unit much
   feared by Piłsudski and other Polish commanders. Soviet High Command,
   at Tukhachevski's insistence, ordered the 1st Cavalry Army to march
   toward Warsaw from the south. Semyon Budyonny did not obey this order
   due to a grudge between commanding South-Western Front generals
   Aleksandr Yegorov and Tukhachevski. In addition, the political games of
   Joseph Stalin at the time the chief political commissar of the
   South-Western Front, further contributed to Yegorov's and Budyonny's
   disobedience. Stalin, in search of personal glory, wanted to capture
   the besieged important industrial centre of Lwów. Ultimately,
   Budyonny's forces marched on Lwow instead of Warsaw and thus missed the
   battle.
   Second phase of the battle: Polish counterattack.
   Enlarge
   Second phase of the battle: Polish counterattack.
   Heavy fighting for Radzymin, 13:00 hours, August 15.
   Enlarge
   Heavy fighting for Radzymin, 13:00 hours, August 15.

   The Polish 5th Army counter-attacked on August 14, crossing the Wkra
   River. It faced the combined forces of the Soviet 3rd and 15th Armies
   (both numerically and technically superior). The struggle at Nasielsk
   lasted until August 15 and resulted in the almost complete destruction
   of the town. However, the Soviet advance toward Warsaw and Modlin was
   halted at the end of August 15th and on that day Polish forces
   recaptured Radzymin, which boosted the Polish morale.

   From that moment on, Gen. Sikorski's 5th Army pushed exhausted Soviet
   units away from Warsaw, in an almost blitzkrieg-like operation.
   Sikorski's units, supported by the majority of the small number of
   Polish tanks, armoured cars and artillery of the two armoured trains,
   advanced at the speed of 30 kilometres a day, soon destroying any
   Soviet hopes for completing their "enveloping" manoeuvre in the north.

Third phase, August 16

   On August 16, the Polish Reserve Army commanded by Józef Piłsudski
   began its march north from the Wieprz River. It faced the Mozyr Group,
   a Soviet corps that had defeated the Poles during the Kyiv operation
   several months earlier. However, during its pursuit of the retreating
   Polish armies, the Mozyr Group had lost most of its forces and been
   reduced to a mere two divisions covering a 150-kilometre front-line on
   the left flank of the Soviet 16th Army. On the first day of the
   counter-offensive, only one of the five Polish divisions reported any
   sort of opposition, while the remaining four, supported by a cavalry
   brigade, managed to push north 45 kilometres unopposed. When evening
   fell, the town of Włodawa had been liberated, and the communication and
   supply lines of the Soviet 16th Army had been cut. Even Piłsudski was
   surprised by the extent of these early successes. Reserve Army units
   covered about 70 kilometres in 36 hours, splitting the Soviet offensive
   and meeting virtually no resistance. The Mozyr Group consisted solely
   of the 57th Infantry Division, which had been beaten in the first day
   of the operation. Consequently, the Polish armies found a huge gap
   between the Russian fronts and exploited it, continuing their northward
   offensive with two armies following and falling on the surprised and
   confused enemy.

   On August 18, Mikhail Tukhachevski, in his headquarters in Minsk some
   300 miles east of Warsaw, became fully aware of the extent of his
   defeat and ordered the remnants of his forces to retreat and regroup.
   His intention was to straighten the front line, stop the Polish attack
   and to regain the initiative, but the orders either arrived too late or
   failed to arrive at all. Soviet General Gay's 3rd Cavalry Corps
   continued to advance toward Pomerania, its lines endangered by the
   Polish 5th Army, which had finally managed to push back the Bolshevik
   armies and gone over in pursuit. The Polish 1st Division of the Legion,
   in order to cut the enemy's retreat, made a remarkable march from
   Lubartów to Białystok - 163 miles in 6 days. The soldiers fought in two
   battles, slept only a few hours and marched for up to 21 hours a day.
   Their sacrifice and endurance was rewarded when the entire 16th Soviet
   Army was cut off at Białystok and most of its troops taken prisoner.

   The Soviet armies in the centre of the front fell into chaos. Some
   divisions continued to fight their way toward Warsaw, while others
   turned to retreat, lost their cohesion and panicked. The Russian
   commander-in-chief lost contact with most of his forces, and all Soviet
   plans were thrown into disorder. Only the 15th Army remained an
   organised force and tried to obey Tukhachevski's orders, shielding the
   withdrawal of the westernmost extended 4th Army. But it was defeated
   twice on August 19th and 20th and joined the general rout of the Red
   Army's North-Western Front. Tukhachevski had no choice but to order a
   full retreat toward the Western Bug River. By August 21st, all
   organized resistance ceased to exist and by August 31, the Soviet
   South-Western Front was completely routed.

Aftermath

   Although Poland managed to achieve victory and push back the Russians,
   Piłsudski's plan to outmanoeuvre and surround the Red Army did not
   succeed completely. Four Soviet armies began to march toward Warsaw on
   July 4th in the framework of the North-Western Front. By the end of
   August, the 4th and 15th Armies were defeated in the field, their
   remnants crossed the Prussian border and were disarmed. Nevertheless,
   these troops were soon released and fought against Poland again. The
   3rd Army retreated east so quickly that Polish troops could not catch
   up with them; consequently, this army sustained the fewest losses. The
   16th Army disintegrated at Białystok and most of its soldiers became
   prisoners of war. The majority of Gay's 3rd Cavalry Corps were forced
   across the German border and were temporarly interned in East Prussia.
   Polish soldiers displaying captured Soviet battle standards.
   Enlarge
   Polish soldiers displaying captured Soviet battle standards.

   Soviet losses were about 10,000 dead, 500 missing, 10,000 wounded and
   65,000 captured, compared to Polish losses of approximately 4,500
   killed, 22,000 wounded and 10,000 missing. Between 25,000 and 30,000
   Soviet troops managed to reach the borders of Germany. After crossing
   into East Prussia, they were briefly interned, then allowed to leave
   with their arms and equipment. Poland captured about 231 artillery guns
   and 1,023 machine-guns.

   The southern arm of the Red Army's forces had been routed and no longer
   posed a threat to the Poles. Semyon Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army
   besieging Lwów had been defeated at the Battle of Komarów (August 31,
   1920) and the Battle of Hrubieszów. By mid-October, the Polish Army had
   reached the Tarnopol- Dubno- Minsk- Drisa line.

   Tukhachevski managed to reorganize the eastward-retreating forces and
   in September established a new defensive line near Grodno. In order to
   break it, the Polish Army had to fight the Battle of the Niemen River
   (September 15-September 21), once again defeating the Bolshevik armies.
   After the Battle of the Szczara River, both sides were exhausted and on
   October 12, under heavy pressure from France and Britain, a cease-fire
   was signed. By October 18, the fighting was over, and on March 18,
   1921, the Treaty of Riga was signed, ending hostilities.

   Soviet propaganda before the Battle of Warsaw had described the fall of
   Poland's capital as imminent, and the anticipated fall of Warsaw was to
   be a signal for the start of a large-scale communist revolutions in
   Poland, Germany and other European countries, economically devastated
   by the First World War. The Soviet defeat was thus a setback for some
   Soviet officials (particularly Vladimir Lenin).

   A National Democrat Sejm deputy, Stanisław Stroński, coined the phrase,
   "Miracle at the Wisła" ( Polish: "Cud nad Wisłą"), to underline his
   disapproval of Piłsudski's "Ukrainian adventure." Stroński's phrase was
   adopted with approval by some patriotically- or piously-minded Poles
   unaware of Stroński's ironic intent.

Breaking of Soviet ciphers

   According to documents found in 2005 at Poland's Central Military
   Archives, Polish cryptologists broke intercepted Russian ciphers as
   early as September 1919. At least some of the Polish victories, not
   only the Battle of Warsaw but throughout the campaign, are attributable
   to this. Lieutenant Jan Kowalewski, credited with the original
   breakthrough, received the order of Virtuti Militari in 1921.

Orders of battle

Polish

   Graves of Polish soldiers fallen at the Battle of Warsaw, Powązki
   Cemetery, Warsaw.
   Enlarge
   Graves of Polish soldiers fallen at the Battle of Warsaw, Powązki
   Cemetery, Warsaw.

   3 Fronts (Northern, Central, Southern), 7 Armies, a total of 32
   divisions: 46,000 infantry; 2,000 cavalry; 730 machine guns; 192
   artillery batteries; and several units of (mostly FT-17) tanks.

   CAPTION: Polish Army

   Northern Front
   Haller        Central Front
                 Rydz-Śmigły  Southern Front
                              Iwaszkiewicz
   5th Army
   Sikorski      4th Army
                 Skierski     6th Army
                              Jędrzejewski
   1st Army
   Latinik       3rd Army
                 Zieliński    Ukrainian Army
                              Petlura
   2nd Army
   Roja

   Fronts:
     * Northern Front: 250 km., from East Prussia, along the Vistula
       River, to Modlin:
          + 5th Army
          + 1st Army - Warsaw
          + 2nd Army - Warsaw
     * Central Front:
          + 4th Army - between Dęblin and Kock
          + 3rd Army - between south of Kock and Brody
     * Southern Front - between Brody and the Dniestr River

Soviet

   CAPTION: Red Army

   North-Western Front
   Tukhachevskiy
   4th Army
   Shuvayev
   3rd Cavalry Corps
   Gay
   15th Army
   Kork
   3rd Army
   Lazarievich
   16th Army
   Sollohub
   Cavalry Army
   Budyonny

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