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Battle of the Bulge

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: World War II

   Battle of the Bulge
   Part of World War II
   American soldiers photographed in the Ardennes during the Battle of the
   Bulge.

     Date   16 December 1944 - 25 January 1945
   Location The Ardennes, Belgium
    Result  Allied victory, last major German offensive
   Combatants
   United States
   United Kingdom Germany
   Commanders
   Dwight Eisenhower
   George Patton
   Bernard Montgomery Walther Model
   Gerd von Rundstedt
   Strength
   Dec 16 - start of the Battle: about 83,000 men; 242 Sherman tanks, 182
   tank destroyers, and 394 pieces of corps and divisional artillery. Dec
   16 - start of the Battle: about 200,000 men, 5 armoured divisions, 12⅔
   infantry divisions, and about 500 medium tanks, supported by 1,900 guns
   and Werfers.
   Casualties
   American:

   89,987 casualties
   (19,276 dead,
   23,218 captured or missing,
   47,493 wounded)

   British: 200 dead, 1400 wounded and missing
   84,834 casualties
   (15,652 dead,
   27,582 captured or missing,
   41,600 wounded)
                      Western European Campaign
   Normandy - Dragoon - Siegfried Line - Ardennes Offensive - Elbe
                      Western Front (World War II)
   France - The Netherlands - Dunkirk - Britain - Dieppe -
   Villefranche-de-Rouergue - Normandy - Dragoon - Arnhem - Scheldt -
   Hurtgen Forest - Aachen - Bulge - Plunder - Varsity - Aintree

   The Ardennes Offensive (called Unternehmen: Wacht am Rhein by the
   German military Army Gruppe B), officially named the Battle of the
   Ardennes by the U.S. Army (and known to the general public as the
   Battle of the Bulge), started on December 16, 1944. Wacht am Rhein was
   supported by subordinate operations known as Bodenplatte, Greif, and
   Wahrung. The goal of these operations as planned by the Germans was to
   split the British and American Allied line in half, capturing Antwerp
   and then proceeding to encircle and destroy four Allied armies, forcing
   the Western Allies to negotiate a peace treaty in the Axis' favour. The
   Ardennes attack was planned in total secrecy in almost total radio
   silence. Even Ultra (the allies reading of secret German radio
   messages) revealed nothing about the up-coming buildup and offensive.
   Moreover, the degree of surprise achieved was compounded by Allied
   overconfidence, preoccupation with their own offensive plans, poor
   aerial reconnaissance, and the relative lack of combat contact by the
   US First Army. Allied intelligence failed completely to detect the
   upcoming offensive and almost complete surprise against a weak section
   of the Allies line was achieved at a time of heavy overcast when the
   Allies strong air forces would be grounded. The "bulge" refers to the
   "dent" the Germans initially put into the Allies' line of advance, as
   seen in maps presented in newspapers of the time.

Battle Outline

     * The battle began on December 16, 1944, one of the coldest, snowiest
       days "in memory" in the Ardennes Forest, occupying about 80 miles
       of the German/Belgian border. Casualties from exposure to extreme
       cold grew as large as the losses from fighting.

     * At the end of the battle the forces included over a million men,
       about 560,000 Germans, 640,000 Americans (more than fought at
       Gettysburg) and 55,800 British.
          + 3 German armies, 10 corps, the equivalent of 29 divisions.
          + 3 American armies, 6 corps, the equivalent of 31 divisions.
          + The equivalent of 3 British divisions as well as contingents
            of Belgian, Canadian and French troops.
          + About 6,000 allied fighters and bombers against 2,400 German
            aircraft.
          + ~100,000 German casualties, killed, wounded or captured
            [~80,000 captured].
          + 81,000 American casualties, including 23,554 captured and
            19,000 killed.
          + 1,400 British casualties 200 killed.
          + 610 German and 730 U.S. tanks lost, 1,000 German aircraft
            destroyed.

   Most of the American casualties occurred within the first three days of
   battle, when two of the 106th division’s three regiments were forced to
   surrender. In its entirety, the "Battle of the Bulge" was the most
   bloody battle American Forces experienced in WWII, the 19,000 American
   dead unsurpassed by any other engagement. For the U.S. Army, the Battle
   of the Ardennes was a battle incorporating more American troops and
   engaging more enemy troops than any American conflict prior to WWII.

   Although the German objective was ultimately unrealized, the Allies'
   own offensive timetable was set back by months. In the wake of the
   defeat, many experienced German units were left severely depleted of
   men and equipment, as German survivors retreated to the defenses of the
   Siegfried Line.

Background

   The breakout from Normandy at the end of August 1944, coupled with
   landings in southern France, saw the Allies advance towards Germany
   faster than anticipated. The rapid advance, coupled with an initial
   lack of deep water ports, presented the Allies with enormous supply
   problems. Aside from the temporary Mulberry harbours established in
   Normandy and direct landing of LST's on the beaches, the only deep
   water port in Allied hands was at Cherbourg near the original invasion
   beaches. The port of Antwerp, Belgium was captured much later than the
   original planning had assumed and was severely damaged when finally
   captured. German forces remained in control of several major ports on
   the Channel coast until May 1945; those ports that did fall to the
   Allies in 1944 were sabotaged to deny their immediate use by the
   Allies. The extensive destruction of the French railroad system prior
   to D-Day, intended to deny movement to the Germans, now proved equally
   damaging to the Allies as it took time to repair the system of tracks
   and bridges. A trucking system known as the Red Ball Express was
   instituted to bring supplies to front line troops; however, for every
   gallon of fuel that reached the front line near the Belgian border,
   five gallons of fuel had been expended delivering it. By early October
   the supply situation had halted major Allied offensives as they paused
   to build up their supplies.

   Bradley, Patton and Montgomery each pressed for priority delivery of
   supplies to his own army, in order to continue advancing and keeping
   pressure on the Germans while the supply situation was worked out.
   Eisenhower, however, preferred a broad-front strategy—though with
   priority for Montgomery 's Northern forces, since their short-term goal
   included opening the urgently needed port of Antwerp, and their
   long-term goal was the capture of the Ruhr area, the industrial heart
   of Germany. With the Allies paused for lack of supplies, Gerd von
   Rundstedt was able to reorganize the disrupted German armies into a
   semi-coherent defence.

   Bernard Montgomery's Operation Market Garden, a September offensive
   designed to cross the Rhine and bypass the Siegfried Line, was
   unsuccessful and left the Allies little better off than before. In
   October the Canadian First Army fought the Battle of the Scheldt,
   clearing the Westerschelde by taking Walcheren and opening the ports of
   Antwerp to shipping. By the end of the month the supply situation was
   easing. The Allied seizure of the large port of Marseilles in the south
   also improved the supply situation.

   Despite a pause along the front after the Scheldt battles, the German
   situation remained dire. While operations continued in the autumn,
   notably the Lorraine Campaign, the Battle of Aachen, and the fighting
   in the Hurtgen forest, the strategic situation in the west changed
   little. In the east, Operation Bagration destroyed much of Army Group
   Centre during the summer; Soviet progress was so fast that the
   offensive ended only when the advancing Red Army forces outran their
   supply lines. By November it was clear the Soviet forces were preparing
   for a winter offensive, most likely in December.

   Meanwhile, the Allied air offensive of early 1944 had effectively
   grounded the Luftwaffe, leaving them with little battlefield
   intelligence and no way to interdict Allied supplies. The converse was
   equally damaging: daytime movement of German forces was almost
   instantly noticed, and interdiction of supplies combined with the
   bombing of the Romanian oilfields starved Germany of oil and gasoline.

   The only advantage for the German forces by November 1944 was that they
   were no longer defending all of western Europe. The front lines in the
   west were considerably shorter and closer to the German heartland,
   dramatically improving their supply problems regardless of the Allied
   air control. Additionally, their extensive telephone and telegraph
   network meant that radios no longer had to be used for communications,
   which deprived the Allies of their most powerful weapon, ULTRA
   intercepts.

Drafting the offensive

   Hitler felt that his armies still might be able to successfully defend
   Germany in the long term, if only they could somehow neutralize the
   Western front in the short term. Further, Hitler believed that he could
   split the Allies and make the Americans and British sue for a separate
   peace, independent of the Soviet Union. Success in the West would give
   the Germans time to design and produce more advanced weapons (such as
   jet aircraft and super-heavy tanks) and permit the concentration of
   forces in the East. This assessment is generally regarded as
   unrealistic, given Allied air superiority throughout Europe and the
   ability to intervene significantly in German offensive operations.

   Several senior German military advisors expressed their concern that
   favourable weather would permit Allied air power to effectively stop
   any offensive action undertaken. Hitler ignored or dismissed these
   concerns, though the offensive was intentionally scheduled for late
   autumn, when northwestern Europe is often covered by heavy fog and
   low-lying cloud, to neutralize the Allied air forces.

   When the Allied offensive in the Netherlands ( Operation Market Garden)
   wound down in September 1944, at about the same time as Operation
   Bagration, strategic initiative briefly swung to the Germans. Given the
   reduced manpower of German land forces at the time, it was believed
   that the best way to take advantage of the initiative would be to
   attack in the West, against the smaller Allied forces deployed there,
   rather than against the vast Soviet forces. Even the unrealistic
   encirclement and destruction of entire Soviet armies would still have
   left the Soviets with a large numerical superiority. Also, in the East,
   most of the "natural" defensive lines remained under German control.

   In the West, supply problems were beginning to significantly impede
   Allied operations, even though the opening of Antwerp in November 1944
   did slightly improve the situation. The Allied armies were overextended
   - their positions ran from southern France to the Netherlands. German
   planning revolved around the premise that a successful strike against
   thinly manned stretches of the line would halt Allied advances on the
   entire Western front.

   Several plans for major Western offensives were put forward, but the
   German High Command quickly concentrated on two. A first plan for an
   encirclement maneuver called for a two-prong attack along the borders
   of the U.S. armies, hoping to encircle the 9th and 3rd armies and leave
   the German forces back in control of the excellent defensive grounds
   where they had fought the U.S. to a standstill earlier in the year. A
   second plan for a blitzkrieg maneuver called for a classic blitzkrieg
   attack through the thinly defended Ardennes, splitting the armies along
   the U.S.-British lines and capturing Antwerp. The blitzkrieg plan was
   dubbed the "Wacht am Rhein," or "Watch on the Rhine." This name was
   deceptive in nature, implying a watch and wait strategy on the Western
   Front ( A popular German song also shared this name for the offensive).

   Hitler chose the second plan, believing that a successful encirclement
   would have little impact on the overall situation and finding the
   prospect of splitting the Anglo-American armies more appealing. The
   disputes between Montgomery and Patton were well known, and Hitler
   hoped he could exploit this perceived disunity, If the attack were to
   succeed, the capture of the port of Antwerp would trap four complete
   armies without supplies behind German lines. It was hoped that this
   might even bring about a repeat of the Allied evacuation of Dunkirk.

   Both plans centered on attacks against the American forces, due largely
   to Hitler's view of Americans as incapable of fighting effectively, and
   his belief that the American home front was likely to crack upon
   hearing of a decisive American loss. There is no evidence that Hitler
   realized, or any of his military staff pointed out, that of all the
   major combatants, the United States was the one which, up to this point
   in the war, had been damaged the least and had the greatest restorative
   powers.

Planning

   The German High Command decided by the middle of September, on Hitler's
   insistence, that the offensive be mounted in the Ardennes, as was done
   in France in 1940. While German forces in that battle had passed
   through the Ardennes before engaging the enemy, the 1944 plan called
   for battle to occur within the forest itself. The main forces were to
   advance westward until reaching the Meuse River, then turn northwest
   for Antwerp and Brussels. The close terrain of the Ardennes would make
   rapid movement difficult, though open ground beyond the Meuse offered
   the prospect of a successful dash to the coast.
   Enlarge

   Four armies were selected for the operation:
     * The 6th SS Panzer Army, led by Sepp Dietrich. Newly created on
       October 26, 1944, it incorporated the senior formation of the
       Waffen-SS, the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler as
       well as the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. The 6th SS Panzer
       Army was designated the northernmost attack force, with the
       offensive's primary objective of capturing Antwerp entrusted to it.
     * The 5th Panzer Army led by Hasso von Manteuffel, was assigned to
       the middle attack route with the objective of capturing Brussels.
     * The 7th Army, led by Erich Brandenberger, was assigned to the
       southernmost attack, with the task of protecting the flank. This
       Army was made up of only four infantry divisions, with no
       largescale armoured formations to use as a spearhead unit. As a
       result, they made little progress throughout the battle.
     * Also participating in a secondary role was the 15th Army, led by
       Gustav-Adolf von Zangen. Recently rebuilt after heavy fighting
       during Operation Market Garden, it was located on the far north of
       the Ardennes battlefield and tasked with holding US forces in
       place, with the possibility of launching its own attack given
       favourable conditions.

   Overseeing the operation were Field Marshals Walther Model, the
   commander of the German Army Group B, and Gerd von Rundstedt, the
   overall commander of German troops in the West.

   For the offensive to be successful, four criteria were deemed critical
   by the planners.
     * The attack had to be a complete surprise.
     * The weather conditions had to be poor in order to neutralize Allied
       air superiority and the damage it could inflict on the German
       offensive and its supply lines.
     * The progress had to be rapid. Model had declared that the Meuse
       River had to be reached by day 4, if the offensive was to have any
       chance of success.
     * Allied fuel supplies would have to be captured intact along the way
       due to the Wehrmacht's shortage of fuel. The General Staff
       estimated they only had enough fuel to cover a third to one half of
       the ground to Antwerp in heavy combat conditions.

   The plan originally called for just under 45 divisions, including a
   dozen panzer and panzergrenadier divisions forming the armoured
   spearhead and various infantry units to form a defensive line as the
   battle unfolded. The German army suffered from an acute manpower
   shortage by this time, however, and the force had been reduced to
   around 30 divisions. Although it retained most of its armour, there
   were not enough infantry units due to the defensive needs in the east.
   These thirty newly rebuilt divisions used some of the German army's
   last reserves. Among them were Volksgrenadier units formed from a mix
   of battle-hardened veterans and recruits formerly regarded as too young
   or too old to fight. Training time, equipment, and supplies were
   inadequate during the preparations. German fuel supplies were
   precarious—those materials and supplies that could not be directly
   transported by rail had to be horse-drawn in order to conserve fuel—the
   mechanized and panzer divisions would depend heavily on captured fuel.
   The start of the offensive was delayed from November 27 to December 16
   as a result.

   Before the offensive the Allies were virtually blind to German troop
   movement. During the reconquest of France the extensive network of the
   French resistance had provided valuable intelligence about German
   dispositions. Now that they had reached the German border this source
   dried up. In France orders had been relayed within the German army
   using radio messages enciphered by the Enigma machine, and these could
   be picked up and decrypted by Allied codebreakers to give the
   intelligence known as ULTRA. In Germany such orders were typically
   transmitted using telephone and teleprinter, and a special radio
   silence order was imposed on all matters concerning the upcoming
   offensive. The major crackdown in the Wehrmacht after the July 20 Plot
   resulted in much tighter security and fewer leaks. The foggy autumn
   weather also prevented Allied reconnaissance planes from correctly
   assessing the ground situation.

   Thus Allied High Command considered the Ardennes a quiet sector,
   relying on assessments from their intelligence services that the
   Germans were unable to launch any major offensive operations this late
   in the war. What little intelligence they had led the Allies to believe
   precisely what the Germans wanted them to believe—that preparations
   were being carried out only for defensive, not offensive operations. In
   fact, due to the Germans' efforts, the Allies were led to believe that
   a new defensive army was being formed around Dusseldorf in the northern
   Rhine, possibly to defend against British attack. This was done by
   increasing the number of flak batteries in the area and the artificial
   multiplication of radio transmissions in the area. The Allies at this
   point thought the information was of no importance. All of this meant
   that the attack, when it came, completely surprised the Allied forces.

   Because the Ardennes were considered a quiet sector, economy-of-force
   considerations led it to be used as a training ground for new units and
   a rest area for units that had seen hard fighting. The US units
   deployed in the Ardennes thus were a mixture of inexperienced troops
   (such as the rookie U.S. 99th and 106th Divisions), and battle-hardened
   troops sent to that sector to recuperate (the U.S. 2nd Division).

   Two major special operations were planned for the offensive. By October
   it was decided that Otto Skorzeny, the German commando who had rescued
   the former Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, was to lead a task force
   of English-speaking German soldiers in Operation Greif. These soldiers
   were to be dressed in American and British uniforms and wear dog tags
   taken from corpses and POWs. Their job was to go behind American lines
   and change signposts, misdirect traffic, generally cause disruption and
   to seize bridges across the Meuse River between Liège and Namur. By
   late November another ambitious special operation was added: Colonel
   Friedrich August von der Heydte was to lead a Fallschirmjäger
   (paratrooper) Kampfgruppe in Operation Stösser, a nighttime paratroop
   drop behind the Allied lines aimed at capturing a vital road junction
   near Malmedy.

   German intelligence had set December 20 as the expected date for the
   start of the upcoming Soviet offensive, aimed at crushing what was left
   of German resistance on the Eastern Front and thereby opening the way
   to Berlin. It was hoped that Stalin would delay the start of the
   operation once the German assault in the Ardennes had begun and wait
   for the outcome before continuing.

   In the final stage of preparations Hitler and his staff left their
   Wolf's Lair headquarters in East Prussia, in which they had
   co-ordinated much of the fighting on the Eastern Front. After a brief
   visit to Berlin, on December 11, they came to the Eagle's Nest,
   Hitler's headquarters in southern Germany, the site from which he had
   overseen the successful 1940 campaign against France and the low
   countries.

Initial German assault

   Sepp Dietrich led the 6th SS Panzer Army in the northernmost attack
   route
   Enlarge
   Sepp Dietrich led the 6th SS Panzer Army in the northernmost attack
   route
   Hasso von Manteuffel led the 5th Panzer Army in the middle attack route
   Enlarge
   Hasso von Manteuffel led the 5th Panzer Army in the middle attack route
   Erich Brandenberger led the 7th Army in the southernmost attack route
   Enlarge
   Erich Brandenberger led the 7th Army in the southernmost attack route

   The German assault began on December 16, 1944, at 0530 hrs with a
   massive artillery barrage on the Allied troops facing the 6th SS Panzer
   Army. By 0800 all three German armies attacked through the Ardennes. In
   the northern sector Dietrich's 6th SS Panzer Army assaulted Losheim Gap
   and the Elsenborn Ridge in an effort to break through to Liège. In the
   centre von Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army attacked towards Bastogne and
   St. Vith, both road junctions of great strategic importance. In the
   south, Brandenberger's 7th Army pushed towards Luxembourg in their
   efforts to secure the flank from Allied attacks.

   Attacks by the 6th SS Panzer Army infantry units in the north fared
   badly due to unexpectedly fierce resistance by the U.S. 2nd Infantry
   Division and U.S. 99th Infantry Division, which was attached to the
   2nd, at the Elsenborn Ridge, stalling their advance; this forced
   Dietrich to unleash his panzer forces early. Starting on December 16,
   however, snowstorms engulfed parts of the Ardennes area. While having
   the desired effect of keeping the Allied aircraft grounded, the weather
   also proved troublesome for the Germans as poor road conditions
   hampered their advance. Poor traffic control led to massive traffic
   jams and fuel shortages in forward units.

   The Germans fared better in the centre (the 20 mile wide Schnee Eifel
   sector) as they attacked positions held by the U.S. 28th Infantry
   Division and the U.S. 106th Infantry Division. The remarkable feature
   here was that the German attackers lacked any such overwhelming
   strength as had been deployed in the north; but it succeeded in
   surrounding two regiments (422nd and 423rd) of the 106th Division in a
   pincer movement and forced their surrender. That was a tribute to the
   way that Manteuffel’s new tactics had been applied. The official U.S.
   Army history states: At least seven thousand [men] were lost here and
   the figure probably is closer to eight or nine thousand. The amount
   lost in arms and equipment, of course, was very substantial. The Schnee
   Eifel battle, therefore, represents the most serious reverse suffered
   by American arms during the operations of 1944-45 in the European
   theatre.

   Further south on Manteuffel’s front the main thrust was delivered by
   all attacking divisions crossing the River Our, then increasing the
   pressure on the key road centers of St. Vith and Bastogne. Panzer
   columns took the outlying villages. The struggle for these villages,
   and transport confusion on the German side, slowed the attack to allow
   the 101st Airborne Division (along with units from the U.S. 9th & 10th
   Armored Divisions) to reach Bastogne by truck on the morning of 19
   December 1944. The fierce defense of Bastogne, in which American
   engineers particularly distinguished themselves, made it impossible for
   the Germans to rush the town, and the panzer columns swung past on
   either side, thus Bastogne was cut off on 20 December.

   In the extreme south, Brandenberger’s three infantry divisions were
   checked after an advance of four miles by divisions of the U.S. 8th
   Corps; that front was then firmly held. Only the German 5th Parachute
   Division of Brandenberger’s command was able to thrust forward 12 miles
   on the inner flank to partially fulfill its assigned role.

   Eisenhower and his principal commanders realized by 17 December that
   the fighting in the Ardennes was a major offensive and not a local
   counter-attack, and ordered vast reinforcements to the area. Within a
   week 250,000 troops had been sent. In addition, the 82nd Airborne
   Division was also thrown into the battle north of the bulge, near
   Liège.

Operation Stösser

   Originally planned for the early hours of 16 December, Operation
   Stösser was delayed for a day because of bad weather and fuel
   shortages. The new drop time was set for 0300 hrs on December 17; their
   drop zone was 11 km north of Malmedy and their target was the "Baraque
   Michel" crossroads. Von der Heydte and his men were to take it and hold
   it for approximately twenty-four hours until being relieved by the 12th
   SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, thereby hampering the Allied flow of
   reinforcements and supplies into the area.

   Just after midnight 16 December/ 17 December 112 Ju 52 transport planes
   with around 1,300 Fallschirmjäger (German paratroopers) on board took
   off amid a powerful snowstorm, with strong winds and extensive low
   cloud cover. As a result, many planes went off-course, and men were
   dropped as far as a dozen kilometres away from the intended drop zone,
   with only a fraction of the force landing near it. Strong winds also
   took off-target those paratroopers whose planes were relatively close
   to the intended drop zone and made their landings far rougher.

   By noon a group of around 300 managed to assemble, but this force was
   too small and too weak to counter the Allies. Colonel von der Heydte
   abandoned plans to take the crossroads and instead ordered his men to
   harass the Allied troops in the vicinity with guerrilla-like actions.
   Because of the extensive dispersal of the jump, with Fallschirmjäger
   being reported all over the Ardennes, the Allies believed a major
   divisional-sized jump had taken place, resulting in much confusion and
   causing them to allocate men to secure their rear instead of sending
   them off to the front to face the main German thrust.

Operation Greif

          Main article: Operation Greif

   Skorzeny successfully infiltrated a small part of his battalion of
   disguised, English-speaking Germans behind the Allied lines. Although
   they failed to take the vital bridges over the Meuse, the battalion's
   presence produced confusion out of all proportion to their military
   activities, and rumours spread like wildfire. Even General Patton was
   alarmed and, on December 17, described the situation to General
   Eisenhower as " Krauts... speaking perfect English... raising hell,
   cutting wires, turning road signs around, spooking whole divisions, and
   shoving a bulge into our defenses".

   Checkpoints were soon set up all over the Allied rear, greatly slowing
   the movement of soldiers and equipment. Military policemen drilled
   servicemen on things which every American was expected to know, such as
   the identity of Mickey Mouse's girlfriend, baseball scores, or the
   capital of Illinois. This latter question resulted in the brief
   detention of General Omar Bradley himself; although he gave the correct
   answer— Springfield—the GI who questioned him apparently believed that
   the capital was Chicago.

   The tightened security nonetheless made things harder for the German
   infiltrators, and some of them were captured. Even during interrogation
   they continued their goal of spreading disinformation; when asked about
   their mission, some of them claimed they had been told to go to Paris
   to either kill or capture General Eisenhower. Security around the
   general was greatly increased, and he was confined to his headquarters.
   Because these prisoners had been captured in American uniform they were
   later executed by firing squad; this was the standard practice of every
   army at the time, although it was left ambivalent under the Geneva
   Convention, which merely stated that soldiers had to wear uniforms that
   distinguished them as combatants. In addition, Skorzeny was an expert
   at international law and knew that such an operation would be well
   within its boundaries as long as they were wearing their German
   uniforms when firing. Skorzeny and his men were fully aware of their
   likely fate, and most wore their German uniforms underneath their
   Allied ones in case of capture. Skorzeny himself avoided capture,
   survived the war and may have been involved with the Nazi ODESSA
   ratline escape network.

Malmedy massacre

   The Malmedy massacre
   Enlarge
   The Malmedy massacre

          Main article: Malmedy massacre

   In the north the main armoured spearhead of the 6th SS Panzer Army,
   Kampfgruppe Peiper, consisting of 4,800 men and 600 vehicles under the
   command of Waffen-SS Colonel Jochen Peiper, pushed west into Belgium.
   At 0700 hrs December 17 they seized a U.S. fuel depot at Büllingen,
   where they paused to refuel before continuing westward. At 1230 hrs,
   near the hamlet of Baugnez, on the height halfway between the town of
   Malmedy and Ligneuville, they encountered elements of the American
   285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion. After a brief battle the
   Americans surrendered. They were disarmed and, with some other
   Americans captured earlier (approximately 150 people), sent to stand in
   a field near the crossroads. Here they were all shot. It is not known
   what caused the shooting and there is no record of an SS officer giving
   an execution order; such shootings of prisoners of war (POWs), however,
   were more common by both sides on the Eastern Front. News of the
   killings raced through Allied lines. Afterwards, it became common for
   soldiers to take no SS or Fallschirmjäger soldiers prisoner. Captured
   SS soldiers who were part of Kampfgruppe Peiper were tried in the
   Malmedy massacre trial following the war.

   The fighting went on and, by the evening, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf
   Hitler Division spearhead had pushed north to engage the U.S. 99th
   Infantry Division and Kampfgruppe Peiper arrived in front of Stavelot.
   He was already behind the timetable as it took 36 hours to advance from
   Eifel to Stavelot; it had taken just 9 hours in 1940. As the Americans
   fell back they blew up bridges and fuel dumps, denying the Germans
   critically needed fuel and further slowing their progress.

The Wereth 11

          Main Article: Wereth 11

   Another, much smaller, massacre was committed in Wereth, Belgium,
   approximately a thousand yards north-east of Saint Vith by men of the
   1st SS Division, belonging to Kampfgruppe Hansen. Due to the lack of
   any verifiable evidence to identify the murderers, the murders went
   mostly unavenged and unpublicized.

The assault of Kampfgruppe Peiper

   Peiper entered Stavelot on December 18 but encountered fierce
   resistance by the American defenders. Unable to defeat the American
   force in the area, he left a smaller support force in town and headed
   for the bridge at Trois-Ponts with the bulk of his forces, but by the
   time he reached it, the retreating US engineers had already destroyed
   it. Peiper pulled off and headed for the village of La Gleize and from
   then on to Stoumont. There, as Peiper approached, the American
   engineers blew up the bridge and the American troops were entrenched
   and ready to fight a bitter battle.

   His troops were cut off from the main German force and supplies when
   the Americans recaptured the poorly defended Stavelot on December 19.
   As their situation in Stoumont was becoming hopeless, Peiper decided to
   pull back to La Gleize where he set up his defences waiting for the
   German relief force. As no relief force was able to penetrate the
   Allied line, on December 23 Peiper decided to break through back to the
   German lines. The men of the Kampfgruppe were forced to abandon their
   vehicles and heavy equipment, although most of the unit was able to
   escape.

St. Vith

   In the centre, the town of St. Vith, a vital road junction, presented
   the main challenge for both von Manteuffel's and Dietrich's forces. The
   defenders, led by the U.S. 7th Armored Division, and also including one
   regiment of the U.S. 106th Infantry Division, and additional elements
   of the U.S. 9th Armored Division and U.S. 28th Infantry Division, all
   under the command of General Bruce C. Clarke, successfully resisted the
   German attacks, thereby significantly slowing the German advance. Under
   orders, St. Vith was given up on December 21; U.S. troops fell back to
   entrenched positions in the area, presenting an imposing obstacle to a
   successful German advance. By December 23, as the Germans shattered
   their flanks, the defenders' position became untenable and U.S. troops
   were ordered to retreat west of the Salm River. As the German plan
   called for the capture of St. Vith by 1800 hrs December 17, the
   prolonged action in and around it presented a major blow to their
   timetable.

Bastogne

   Wacht am Rhein—the German offensive, 16–25 December 1944
   Enlarge
   Wacht am Rhein—the German offensive, 16–25 December 1944

          Main article: Battle of Bastogne

   On December 19, the senior Allied commanders met in a bunker in Verdun.
   Eisenhower, realizing that the Allies could destroy German forces much
   more easily when they were out in the open and on the offensive than if
   they were on the defensive, told the generals, "The present situation
   is to be regarded as one of opportunity for us and not of disaster.
   There will be only cheerful faces at this table". Patton, realizing
   what Eisenhower implied, responded, "Hell, let's have the guts to let
   the bastards go all the way to Paris. Then, we'll really cut'em off and
   chew'em up". Eisenhower asked Patton how long it would take to turn his
   Third Army (then located in south-central France) north to
   counter-attack. He said he could do it in 48 hours, to the disbelief of
   the other generals present. Before he had gone to the meeting, in fact,
   Patton had ordered his staff to prepare to turn north; by the time
   Eisenhower asked him how long it would take the movement was already
   underway (Citizen Soldiers, p 208). On 20 December, Eisenhower removed
   the 1st and 9th American Armies from Bradley's 12th Army Group and
   placed them under Montgomery's 21st Army Group command.

   By December 21 the German forces had surrounded Bastogne, which was
   defended by the 101st Airborne Division and Combat Command B of the
   10th Armored Division. Conditions inside the perimeter were tough—most
   of the medical supplies and medical personnel had been captured. Food
   was scarce, and ammunition was so low that artillery crews were
   forbidden to fire on advancing Germans unless there was a large, heavy
   concentration of them. Despite determined German attacks, however, the
   perimeter held. The German Commander sent this request to the American
   commander in Bastogne.

   "To the USA Commander of the encircled town of Bastogne: The fortune of
   war is changing. This time strong German armored units have encircled
   the USA forces in and near Bastogne ... There is only one possibility
   to save the encircled USA troops from total annihilation; that is the
   honorable surrender of the encircled town ... If this proposal is
   rejected, one German Artillery Corps and six heavy AA Battalions are
   ready to annihilate USA troops ... all the serious civilian losses
   caused by this artillery fire would not correspond with the well-known
   American humanity..." -The German Commander

   When General Anthony McAuliffe was awakened by a German invitation to
   surrender, he gave a reply of annoyance that has been variously
   reported and was probably unprintable. There is no disagreement,
   however, as to what he wrote on the paper delivered to the Germans:
   "NUTS!" That reply had to be explained, both to the Germans and to
   non-American Allies.

   Rather than launching one simultaneous attack all around the perimeter
   the German forces concentrated their assaults on several individual
   locations attacked in sequence. Although this compelled the defenders
   to constantly shift reinforcements in order to repel each attack, it
   tended to dissipate the Germans' numerical advantage.

The Meuse

   To protect the crossings on the Meuse at Givet, Dinant and Namur, on
   the 19 December Montgomery ordered those few units available to hold
   the bridges. This led to a hastily assembled force including rear
   echelon troops, military police and Air Corps personnel. The British
   29th Armoured Brigade, which had turned in its tanks for re-equipping,
   was told to take back their tanks and head to the area. XXX Corps in
   Holland began their move to the area.

Allied counter-offensive

   The Germans fell far short of achieving their objectives
   Enlarge
   The Germans fell far short of achieving their objectives

   On 23 December the weather conditions started improving, allowing the
   Allied air forces to attack. They launched devastating bombing raids on
   the German supply points in their rear, and P-47s started attacking the
   German troops on the roads. The Allied air forces also helped the
   defenders of Bastogne, dropping much-needed supplies—medicine, food,
   blankets and ammunition. A team of volunteer surgeons flew in by glider
   and began operating in a tool room.

   By December 24 the German advance was effectively stalled short of the
   Meuse River. Units of the British XXX Corps were holding the bridges at
   Dinant, Givet, and Namur and US units were about to take over. The
   Germans had outrun their supply lines and shortages of fuel and
   ammunition were becoming critical. Up to this point the German losses
   had been light, notably in armour, which was almost untouched with the
   exception of Peiper's losses. On the evening of the 24th, General Hasso
   von Manteuffel recommended to Hitler's Military Adjutant a halt to all
   offensive operations and a withdrawal back to the West Wall. Hitler
   rejected this.

   Patton's Third Army was now battling to relieve Bastogne. At 1650 on
   December 26, the lead element of the 37th Tank Battalion of the Fourth
   Armored Division reached Bastogne, ending the siege.

          Charles Boggess drove the first vehicle from the 4th Armored
          into the lines of the 101st Airborne. He was followed by Capt.
          William Dwight. 'How are you, General?' Dwight asked General
          McAuliffe, who had driven out to the perimeter to greet them.
          'Gee, I'm mighty glad to see you', McAuliffe replied'. (Citizen
          Soldiers, p 248).

Germans strike back

   On 1 January, in an attempt to keep the offensive going, the Germans
   launched two new operations. At 0915 the Luftwaffe launched Operation
   Bodenplatte, a major campaign against Allied airfields in the Low
   Countries. Hundreds of planes attacked Allied airfields, destroying or
   severely damaging some 465 aircraft. However, the Luftwaffe lost 277
   planes, 62 to Allied fighters and 172 mostly because of an unexpectedly
   high number of Allied flak guns, set up to protect against German V-1
   flying bomb attacks, but also due to friendly fire from the German flak
   guns that were uninformed of the pending large-scale German air
   operation. While the Allies recovered from their losses in just days,
   the operation left the Luftwaffe "weaker than ever and incapable of
   mounting any major attack again". (A World At Arms, p 769, Gerhard
   Weinberg).

   On the same day, German Army Group G launched a major offensive against
   the thinly stretched, 110 km line of the Seventh U.S. Army. Operation
   Nordwind, the last major German offensive of the war on the Western
   Front, soon had the weakened Seventh U.S. Army, which had, at
   Eisenhower's orders, sent troops, equipment, and supplies north to
   reinforce the American armies in the Ardennes, in dire straits. By 15
   January, the Seventh U.S. Army VI Corps was fighting for its very life
   on three sides in Alsace. With casualties mounting, and running short
   on replacements, tanks, ammunition, and supplies, Seventh U.S. Army was
   forced to withdraw to defensive positions on the south bank of the
   Moder River on 21 January. The German offensive finally drew to a close
   on 25 January. In the bitter, desperate fighting of Operation Nordwind,
   VI Corps, which had borne the brunt of the fighting suffered a total of
   14,716 casualties. The total for the Seventh U.S. Army is unclear, but
   the total casualties included at least 9,000 wounded and 17,000 sick
   and injured.(Smith and Clark, "Riviera To The Rhine," p. 527.)

Allies prevail

   While the German offensive had ground to a halt, they still controlled
   a dangerous salient in the Allied line. Patton's Third Army in the
   south, centred around Bastogne, would attack north, Montgomery's forces
   in the north would strike south, and the two forces planned to meet at
   Houffalize.

   The temperature during January 1945 was unseasonably low. Trucks had to
   be run every half hour or the oil in them would freeze, and weapons
   would freeze. The offensive went forward regardless.
   Erasing the Bulge—The Allied counter-attack, 26 December – 25 January
   Enlarge
   Erasing the Bulge—The Allied counter-attack, 26 December – 25 January

   Eisenhower wanted Montgomery to go on the offensive on January 1, with
   the aim of meeting up with Patton's advancing Third Army and cutting
   off most of the attacking Germans, trapping them in a pocket. However,
   refusing to risk underprepared infantry in a snowstorm for a
   strategically unimportant area, Montgomery did not launch the attack
   until 3 January, by which time substantial numbers of German troops had
   already managed to successfully disengage, albeit with the loss of
   their heavy equipment.

   At the start of the offensive, the two Armies were separated by about
   40 km. American progress in the south was also restricted to about a
   kilometre a day. The majority of the German force executed a successful
   fighting withdrawal and escaped the battle area, although the fuel
   situation had become so dire that most of the German armour had to be
   abandoned. On 7 January 1945, Hitler agreed to withdraw forces from the
   Ardennes, including the SS Panzer Divisions, thus ending all offensive
   operations.

Controversy in the Allied high command

   On the same day as Hitler's withdrawal order, 7 January, Montgomery
   held a press conference at Zonhoven in which he gave credit for the
   victory to the "courage and good fighting quality" of the American
   troops, characterizing a typical American as a "very brave fighting man
   who has that tenacity in battle which makes a great soldier". He went
   on to talk about the necessity of Allied teamwork, and praised
   Eisenhower, stating that "Teamwork wins battles and battle victories
   win wars. On our team the captain is General Ike."

   The conference caused some controversy when his comments were
   interpreted as self-promoting, particularly his claiming that when the
   situation "began to deteriorate", Eisenhower had placed him in command
   in the north. Patton and Eisenhower both felt this was a
   misrepresentation of the relative share of the fighting played by the
   British and Americans in the Ardennes. In the context of Patton and
   Montgomery's well-known antipathy, Montgomery's failure to mention the
   contribution of any American general beside Eisenhower was seen as
   insulting. Focusing exclusively on his own generalship, Montgomery
   continued to say that he thought the counter-offensive had gone very
   well but did not explain the reason for his delayed attack on January
   3. He later attributed this to needing more time for preparation on the
   northern front. According to Churchill, the attack from the south under
   Patton was steady but slow and involved heavy losses, and Montgomery
   claimed to be trying to avoid this situation.

   Montgomery subsequently recognised his error and later wrote: "I think
   now that I should never have held that press conference. So great were
   the feelings against me on the part of the American generals that
   whatever I said was bound to be wrong. I should therefore have said
   nothing." Eisenhower commented in his own memoirs: "I doubt if
   Montgomery ever came to realise how resentful some American commanders
   were. They believed he had belittled them - and they were not slow to
   voice reciprocal scorn and contempt".

   Bradley and Patton both threatened to resign unless Montgomery's
   command was changed. Subsequently Bradley started to court the press,
   and it was stated that he would rarely leave headquarters "without at
   least fifteen newspapermen"; it has been suggested that he and Patton
   began to leak information detrimental to Montgomery. Eisenhower,
   encouraged by his British deputy, Tedder, was minded to sack
   Montgomery. However, intervention by Montgomery's and Eisenhower's
   Chiefs of Staff, Major-General Freddie de Guingand, and
   Lieutenant-General Walter Bedell Smith allowed Eisenhower to
   re-consider and Montgomery to apologise.

Strategic situation after the Bulge

   Although the German advance was halted, the overall situation remained
   dangerous. On 6 January Winston Churchill once again asked Stalin for
   support. On 12 January, the Red Army launched the Vistula-Oder
   Offensive in Poland and East Prussia. Soviet sources claim this was
   done ahead of schedule, while most Western sources doubt it, and
   instead claim the Soviet offensive was delayed because of the situation
   in the West, with Stalin waiting until both sides had militarily
   exhausted themselves.

   The Battle of the Bulge officially ended when the two American forces
   met up on 15 January 1945.

Aftermath

   Battle of the Bulge memorial in Belgium
   Enlarge
   Battle of the Bulge memorial in Belgium

   Casualty estimates from the battle vary widely. The official US account
   lists 80,987 American casualties, while other estimates range from
   70,000 to 104,000. British losses totaled 1,400. The German High
   Command's official figure for the campaign was 84,834 casualties, and
   other estimates range between 60,000 and 100,000.

   The Allies pressed their advantage following the battle. By the
   beginning of February 1945, the lines were roughly where they had been
   in December 1944. In early February, the Allies launched an attack all
   along the Western front: in the north under Montgomery toward Aachen;
   in the centre, under Courtney Hodges; and in the south, under Patton.
   Montgomery's behaviour during the months of December and January,
   including the press conference on January 7 where he downplayed the
   contribution of the American generals, further soured his relationship
   with his American counterparts through to the end of the war.

   The German losses in the battle were critical in several respects: the
   last of the German reserves were now gone; the Luftwaffe had been
   broken; and the German army in the West was being pushed back. Most
   importantly, the Eastern Front was now ripe for the taking. In the
   East, the German army was unable to halt the Soviet juggernaut. German
   forces were sent reeling on two fronts and never recovered.

   The Americans were short of available in-theatre reinforcements. The
   American Military History says:

          "Faced with a shortage of infantry replacements during the
          enemy's counteroffensive General Eisenhower offered Negro
          soldiers in service units an opportunity to volunteer for duty
          with the infantry. More than 4,500 responded, many taking
          reductions in grade in order to meet specified requirements. The
          6th Army Group formed these men into provisional companies,
          while the 12th Army Group employed them as an additional platoon
          in existing rifle companies. The excellent record established by
          these volunteers, particularly those serving as platoons,
          presaged major postwar changes in the traditional approach to
          employing Negro troops."

The battle in popular culture

   The Battle of the Bulge has been the setting of several movies, novels,
   and other media.

Films

   Battleground was an Oscar winning 1949 film depicting the 101st
   Airborne's defence of Bastogne, told from the common soldier's point of
   view, depicting the troops as weary but determined survivors.

   Battle of the Bulge was released in 1965, starring Robert Shaw and
   Henry Fonda. While filmed against sweeping vistas and with famous stars
   in the lead roles, the movie is notorious for countless major
   inaccuracies.

   The movie Silent Night takes place during the campaign and is based on
   a true story about a German woman named Elisabeth Vincken who was able
   to broker a truce between American and German soldiers who sought
   shelter in her cabin on Christmas Eve.

   The 1992 film A Midnight Clear, featuring Ethan Hawke and Gary Sinise,
   is set on the eve of the Battle of the Bulge and depicts the beginning
   of the German offensive.

   The 1994 PBS documentary "Battle of the Bulge", produced by Thomas F.
   Lennon, wrtten by Lennon and Mark Zwonitzer, was told from the
   perspective of American soldiers who survived. It received many awards,
   including the duPont-Columbia Journalism award.

   The 2002 film Hart's War, featuring Colin Farrell, Terrence Howard, and
   Bruce Willis also depicts the beginning of the battle.

   The 2005 film " Saints and Soldiers" depicts the Massacre at Malmedy
   with its opening scene.

   Stephen Ambrose's Band of Brothers is a factual account which follows
   the fortunes of Easy Company, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st
   Airborne. It was later made into a BBC/ HBO television series, also
   called Band of Brothers, that includes the Company's experiences in the
   Battle of the Bulge, particularly near Bastogne. Episode 6 of the
   television series, titled "Bastogne", depicts the fighting around
   Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. Episode 7 of the series,
   titled "Breaking Point" covers the end of the Battle of Bastogne,
   including an assault on Foy, a Belgian village about 5 km outside of
   Bastogne.

Games

   The computer game Battlefield 1942 allows players to reenact the
   battle, as does the United Offensive expansion pack for Call of Duty,
   but the games are generally considered focused too heavily on Bastogne
   to be considered a full reenactment. "Decisive Battles: The Ardennes
   Offensive" and Close Combat IV: Battle of the Bulge (1999 by SSI) are
   seen by many as the most accurate implementations of the full battle,
   though the latter focuses on platoon-sized battles translated onto a
   much larger strategic map and bear little resemblance to the actual
   battle. The WWII first person shooter Medal of Honour: European Assault
   and Medal of Honour: Spearhead also feature the battle.

   The award-winning WWII-themed board game Memoir '44 also contains a
   scenario that reenacts the battle. A number of other board games deal
   with this battle in various degrees of complexity, but in greater
   detail than Memoir '44. There are also two Historical Modules for
   Advanced Squad Leader depicting the fighting by Kampfgruppe Peiper
   during the battle. Other games have included Battle of the Bulge Bitter
   Woods by The Avalon Hill Company, as well as Tigers in the Mist and
   Ardennes '44 by GMT Games.
   Retrieved from " http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Bulge"
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   with only minor checks and changes (see www.wikipedia.org for details
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