   #copyright

Hirohito

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: Political People

   CAPTION: Emperor Shōwa
   (Emperor Hirohito)

        Given name: Hirohito (裕仁)
    Childhood name: Michi no miya
    Dates of reign: 1926 – 1989
          Era name: Shōwa (昭和)
         Era dates: December 25, 1926 – January 7, 1989
   Posthumous name: Emperor Shōwa (昭和天皇)
              Born: April 29, 1901
            Father: Emperor Taishō
            Mother: Empress Teimei
   After his decease, he was renamed by Cabinet (see " posthumous name").

   His appellation is "Emperor Shōwa".

   Hirohito ( Japanese: 裕仁) ( April 29, 1901 – January 7, 1989) was the
   124th Emperor of Japan according to the traditional order of
   succession, reigning from 1926 to 1989. Since his death he has been
   known as Emperor Shōwa (昭和天皇, Shōwa Tennō^ ?) in Japan, the posthumous
   name given to him by order of the Japanese cabinet dated January 13,
   1989. Although he is widely referred to as Hirohito, or Emperor
   Hirohito outside of Japan, past emperors are only referred to in Japan
   by their posthumous names. His reign was the longest of any historical
   Japanese emperor, and he oversaw many significant changes to Japanese
   society.

Early life

   Born in the Aoyama Palace in Tokyo, Hirohito was the first son of the
   Crown Prince Yoshihito and then- Crown Princess Sadako. His childhood
   title was Prince Michi (迪宮, Michi no miya^ ?). He became heir apparent
   upon the death of his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, on July 30, 1912. His
   formal investiture as Crown Prince took place on November 2, 1916.

   He attended the boy's department of Gakushuin Peer's School from 1908
   to 1914 and then a special institute for the Crown Prince
   (Tōgū-gogakumonsho) from 1914 to 1921. On November 29, 1921, he became
   regent of Japan, in place of his ailing father. In 1921, Prince Regent
   Hirohito took a six month tour of Europe, including the United Kingdom,
   France; Italy, Vatican City; the Netherlands; and Belgium. By doing
   this he became the first Japanese crown prince to travel abroad.

   He married his distant cousin Princess Nagako, the eldest daughter of
   Prince Kuni Kuniyoshi, on January 26, 1924. There were seven children
   from the marriage:
    1. Princess Shigeko (Teru no miya Shigeko), b. December 9, 1925, d.
       July 23, 1961; m. October 10, 1943 Prince Morihiro (b. May 6, 1916,
       d. February 1, 1969), the eldest son of Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko
       and his wife, Princess Toshiko, the eighth daughter of Emperor
       Meiji; lost status as imperial family members, October 14, 1947.
    2. Princess Sachiko (Hisa no miya Sachiko), b. September 10, 1927, d.
       March 8, 1928.
    3. Princess Kazuko (Taka no miya Kazuko), b. September 30, 1929, d.
       May 26, 1989; m. May 5, 1950 Mr. Toshimichi Takatsukasa (b. August
       26, 1923, d. January 27, 1966), eldest son of Nobusuke Takatsukasa
       [peer].
    4. Princess Atsuko (Yori no miya Atsuko), b. March 7, 1931; m. October
       10, 1952 Mr. Takamasa Ikeda (b. October 21, 1927), eldest son of
       former Marquis Nobumasa Ikeda.
    5. Crown Prince Akihito (now HM The Emperor), b. December 23, 1933; m.
       April 10, 1959 Miss Michiko Shoda (b. October 20, 1934), elder
       daughter of Mr. Hidesaburo Shoda, former president and chairman of
       Nisshin Flour Milling Company.
    6. Prince Hitachi (Hitachi no miya Masahito), b. November 28, 1935; m.
       October 30, 1964 Miss Hanako Tsugaru (b. July 19, 1940), fourth
       daughter of former Count Yoshitaka Tsugaru.
    7. Princess Takako (Suga no miya Takako), b. March 2, 1939; m. March
       3, 1960 Mr. Hisanaga Shimazu, son of former Count Hisanori Shimazu.

Accession

   On December 25, 1926, upon the death of his father Yoshihito, he
   succeeded to the throne and a new era Shōwa (Enlightened Peace) was
   proclaimed. He was crowned emperor on November 10, 1928 in Kyoto. The
   new emperor had the distinction of being the first Japanese monarch in
   several hundred years whose biological mother was his predecessor's
   official wife.

Early reign

   The young Emperor in his coronation robes 1928
   Enlarge
   The young Emperor in his coronation robes 1928

   The first part of Hirohito's reign as sovereign (between 1926 and 1945)
   took place against a background of increasing military power within the
   government, through both legal and extralegal means. The Imperial
   Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy had held veto power over the
   formation of cabinets since 1900, and between 1921 and 1944 there were
   no fewer than 64 incidents of right-wing political violence.

   One notable case was the assassination of moderate Prime Minister
   Inukai Tsuyoshi in 1932, which marked the end of any real civilian
   control of the military. This was followed by an attempted military
   coup in February 1936, mounted by junior Army officers of the Kōdōha
   who had the sympathy of many high-rank officers including Yasuhito (
   prince Chichibu), one of Hirohito's brothers. This revolt was
   occasioned by a loss of ground by the militarist faction in Diet
   elections. The coup resulted in the murder of a number of high
   government and Army officials, and was put down with Hirohito angrily
   assuming a major role in confronting them.

   When Chief Aide-de-camp Shigeru Honjō informed the Emperor of the
   revolt, Hirohito immediately ordered that it be put down and referred
   to the officers as rebels (bōto). Shortly thereafter, he ordered Army
   minister Yoshiyuki Kawashima to suppress the rebels within one hour,
   and he asked reports from Honjō every thirty minutes. The next day,
   when told by Honjō that little progress was being made by the high
   command in quashing the rebels, Hirohito told him "I Myself, will lead
   the Konoe Division and subdue them". This, he was not forced to do but
   the rebellion was suppressed following his orders on February 29.

   Still, from the 1930s on, the military clique held almost all political
   power in Japan, and pursued policies that eventually led Japan to fight
   the second Sino-Japanese War and World War II.

The problem of imperial responsibility

   Many people in China, Taiwan, Korea and Southeast Asia see Hirohito as
   the mastermind behind the atrocities committed by the imperial forces
   in the Second Sino-Japanese War and in World War II. Some feel he, and
   some members of the imperial family such as princes Chichibu, Takeda,
   Kan'in, Asaka, Fushimi and Higashikuni, should have been tried for war
   crimes. Because of this, many Asians residing in countries that were
   subject to Japanese invasion retain a hostile attitude towards the
   Japanese imperial family.

   The central question is how much real control Hirohito had over the
   Japanese military during the two wars. The view promoted by both the
   Japanese Imperial Palace and the American occupation forces immediately
   after World War II had Hirohito as a powerless figurehead behaving
   strictly according to protocol, while remaining at a distance from the
   decision-making processes.

   However, many historians such as Akira Fujiwara (Shōwa Tennō no Jū-go
   Nen Sensō, 1991) and Peter Wetzler (Hirohito and War, 1998), based on
   the primary sources and the monumental work of Shirō Hara, have
   produced evidence suggesting that the Emperor worked through
   intermediaries to exercise a great deal of control over the military
   and was not bellicose nor a pacifist, but an opportunist who governed
   in a pluralistic decision-making process. For Herbert Bix he may even
   have been the prime mover of most of the events of the two wars. These
   historians recognize that the post-war Occidental view focused on
   imperial conferences and had missed numerous "behind the chrysanthemum
   curtain" meetings where the real decisions were made between the
   Emperor, his chiefs of staff and the cabinet.

   The primary sources, such as a General Sugiyama memo and the diaries of
   Kido and Konoe, describe in detail the informal meetings Hirohito had
   with his chiefs of staff and ministers (For example, Prince Fumimaro
   Konoe had very good firsthand view of the surrender events). These
   documents show that the Emperor was kept informed of all main military
   operations and that he frequently questioned his senior staff, asking
   for changes.

World War II

   Prior to what is formally known as "World War II", Japan invaded
   Manchuria in 1931 and the rest of China in 1937 (the Second
   Sino-Japanese War). The primary sources reveal that Hirohito never
   really had any objection to the invasion of China in 1937, which was
   recommended to him by his chiefs of staff and prime minister Fumimaro
   Konoe. His main concern seems to have been the possibility of an attack
   by the Soviets in the north and his questions to his chief of staff
   prince Kan'in and minister of the army Hajime Sugiyama were mostly
   about the time it could take to crush the Chinese resistance.

   According to Akira Fujiwara, Hirohito even personally ratified the
   proposition of his army to remove the constraints of international law
   on the treatment of Chinese prisoners on August 5. More, the works of
   Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, show that he authorized by specific
   orders (rinsanmei) the use of chemical weapons against the Chinese. For
   example, during the invasion of Wuhan, from August to October 1938, the
   Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions,
   despite the resolution adopted by the League of Nations on May 14
   condemning the use of toxic gas by the Japanese Army.

   During World War II, ostensibly under Hirohito's leadership, Japan
   formed alliances with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, forming the Axis
   Powers. Hirohito, who had a predilection for England, was reluctant to
   form this alliance. In July 1939, he even had a bad quarrel on this
   subject with one of his brothers, Prince Chichibu, who was visiting him
   three times a week to support the treaty, and reprimanded the army
   minister Itagaki, but he finally gave his consent after the success of
   the Wehrmacht in Europe.

   On September 4, 1941, the Japanese Cabinet met to consider the war
   plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters, and decided that:

          Our Empire, for the purpose of self-defence and
          self-preservation, will complete preparations for war ... [and
          is] ... resolved to go to war with the United States, Great
          Britain and the Netherlands if necessary. Our Empire will
          concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-a-vis the
          United States and Great Britain, and thereby endeavor to obtain
          our objectives ... In the event that there is no prospect of our
          demands being met by the first ten days of October through the
          diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately
          decide to commence hostilities against the United States,
          Britain and the Netherlands.

   The "objectives" to be obtained were clearly defined: a free hand to
   continue with the conquest of China and Southeast Asia, no increase in
   US or British military forces in the region, and cooperation by the
   West "in the acquisition of goods needed by our Empire".

   On September 5, Prime Minister Konoe informally submitted a draft of
   the decision to the Emperor, just one day in advance of the Imperial
   Conference at which it would be formally implemented. On this evening,
   Hirohito had a meeting with chief of staff of the army Sugiyama, chief
   of staff of the navy Nagano and Konoe. The emperor then questionned
   Sugiyama about the chances of success of an open war with the Occident.
   As Sugiyama answered positively, Hirohito scolded him:

          "At the time of the Shina [China] incident, the army told me
          that we could make Chiang surrender after three months but you
          still can't beat him even today! Sugiyama, you were minister at
          the time."
          "China is a vast area with many ways in and ways out, and we met
          unexpectedly big difficulties."
          "You say the interior of China is huge; isn't the Pacific Ocean
          even bigger than China? Didn't I caution you each time about
          those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me?"

   Chief of Naval General Staff Admiral Osami Nagano, a former Navy
   Minister and vastly experienced, later told a trusted colleague, "I
   have never seen the Emperor reprimand us in such a manner, his face
   turning red and raising his voice."

   According to the traditional view, Hirohito was deeply concerned by the
   decision to place "war preparations first and diplomatic negotiations
   second", and he announced his intention to break with tradition. At the
   Imperial Conference on the following day, he directly questioned the
   chiefs of the Army and Navy general staffs, a quite unprecedented
   action.

   Nevertheless, all speakers at the Imperial Conference were united in
   favour of war rather than diplomacy. Baron Yoshimichi Hara, President
   of the Imperial Council and the Emperor's representative, then
   questioned them closely, producing replies to the effect that war would
   only be considered as a last resort from some, and silence from others.

   At this point, the sovereign astonished all present by addressing the
   conference personally, and in breaking the tradition of Imperial
   silence left his advisors "struck with awe". (Prime Minister Konoe's
   description of the event.) Emperor Hirohito stressed the need for
   peaceful resolution of international problems, expressed regret at his
   ministers' failure to respond to Baron Hara's probings, and recited a
   poem written by his grandfather, Emperor Meiji which, he said, he had
   read "over and over again":

          Methinks all the people of the world are brethren, then.
          Why are the waves and the wind so unsettled nowadays?

   Recovering from their shock, the ministers hastened to express their
   profound wish to explore all possible peaceful avenues. The Emperor's
   presentation was in line with his practical role as leader of the
   Shinto religion.

   At this time, Army Imperial Headquarters was continually communicating
   with the Imperial household in detail about the military situation. On
   October 8, Sugiyama signed a 47-page report to the Emperor (sōjōan)
   outlining in minute detail plans for the advance in Southeast Asia and,
   on the third week, gave him a 51-page document, "Materials in Reply to
   the Throne", about an operational outlook on the war.

   As the war preparations continued, however, Konoe found himself more
   and more isolated and gave his demission on October 16. The army and
   the navy recommended at this point the candidacy of prince Higashikuni,
   one of the emperor's uncles. According to the Shōwa "Monologue",
   written after the war, the Emperor then said that if the war were to
   begin while a member of the imperial house was prime minister, the
   imperial house would have to carry the responsibility and this he
   opposed.

   He thus choose the hard-line General Hideki Tojo, who was known for his
   devotion to the imperial institution and asked him to make a policy
   review of what had been sanctioned by the imperial conferences. On
   November 2, Tōjō, Sugiyama and Nagano reported to the emperor that the
   review of eleven points had been in vain. Hirohito gave his consent to
   the war and then asked, "Are you going to provide justification for the
   war?"

   On November 3, Nagano explained in detail the Pearl Harbour attack plan
   to the emperor. On November 5, Hirohito approved in imperial conference
   the operations plan for a war against Occident and had many meetings
   with the military and Tōjō until the end of the month. On December 1,
   an imperial conference finally sanctioned the "War against the United
   States, England and Holland". On December 8 ( December 7 in Hawaii)
   1941, in simultaneous attacks, Japanese forces struck at the US Fleet
   in Pearl Harbour and began the invasion of Malaysia. From this point,
   there was no turning back.

   With the nation now fully committed to the war, Emperor Hirohito took a
   keen interest in military progress and sought to boost morale.
   According to Akira Yamada and Akira Fujiwara, the Emperor even made
   major interventions in some military operations. For example, he
   pressed Sugiyama four times, on January 13 and 21 and February 9 and
   26, to increase troop strength and launch an attack of Bataan. On
   February 9, March 19 and May 29, he ordered the Army Chief of staff to
   examine the possibilities for an attack on Chungking which led to
   operation Gogo.

   As the tide of war gradually began to turn (around late 1942 and early
   1943), some people argue that the flow of information to the palace
   gradually began to bear less and less relation to reality, while others
   suggest that the emperor worked closely with Prime Minister Tojo,
   continued to be well and accurately briefed by the military, and knew
   Japan's military position precisely right up to the point of surrender.
   The chief of staff of the General Affairs section of the Prime
   Minister's office, Shuichi Inada, remarked to Tōjō's private secretary,
   Sadao Akamatsu:

          There has never been a cabinet in which the prime minister, and
          all the ministers, reported so often to the throne. In order to
          effect the essence of genuine direct imperial rule and to
          relieve the concerns of the emperor, the ministers reported to
          the throne matters within the scope of their responsibilities as
          per the prime minister's directives... In times of intense
          activities, typed drafts were presented to the emperor with
          corrections in red. First draft, second draft, final draft and
          so forth, came as deliberations progressed one after the other
          and were sanctioned accordingly by the emperor.

   In the first six months of war, all the major engagements had been
   victories. Throughout the following years, the sequence of drawn and
   then decisively lost engagements was also reported to the public as a
   series of great victories. Only gradually did it become apparent to the
   people in the home islands that the situation was very grim. U.S. air
   raids on the cities of Japan starting in 1944 made a mockery of the
   unending tales of victory. Later that year, with the downfall of Hideki
   Tojo's government, two other prime ministers were appointed to continue
   the war effort, Kuniaki Koiso and Kantaro Suzuki—again, with at least
   the formal approval of Hirohito, but whether he agreed with their
   policies is still disputed. Both were unsuccessful and Japan was
   nearing defeat.

Last days of the war

   In early 1945, in the wake of the loss of Leyte, the Emperor began a
   series of individual meetings with senior government officials to
   consider the progress of the war. All but one advised continuing. The
   exception was ex-Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, who feared a communist
   revolution even more than defeat and urged a negotiated surrender.
   According to some accounts, Hirohito apparently took the view that
   peace was essential, but that the armed forces would have to engineer a
   conspicuous military victory somewhere in order to provide a stronger
   bargaining position. With each passing week this became less likely. In
   April the Soviet Union issued notice that it would not renew its
   neutrality agreement. Japan's ally Germany surrendered in early May
   1945. In June, the cabinet reassessed the war strategy, only to decide
   more firmly than ever on a fight to the last man. This was officially
   affirmed at a brief Imperial Council meeting, to which the Emperor
   listened in stone-faced silence.

   The following day, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kōichi Kido prepared a
   draft document which summarised the hopeless military situation and
   proposed a negotiated settlement. According to some sources, the
   Emperor privately approved of it and authorised Kido to circulate it
   discreetly amongst the less hawkish cabinet members; others suggest
   that the Emperor was indecisive, and that the delay cost many tens of
   thousands of Japanese and Allied lives. Extremists in Japan were also
   calling for a death-before-dishonor mass suicide, modeled on the " 47
   Ronin" incident. By mid-June the cabinet had agreed to approach the
   Soviet Union to act as a mediator, though not before the bargaining
   position had been improved by a repulse of the coming Allied invasion
   of mainland Japan.

   On June 22, Hirohito met his ministers, saying "I desire that concrete
   plans to end the war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily
   studied and that efforts be made to implement them." The attempt to
   negotiate a peace via the Soviet Union came to nothing. There was
   always the threat that extremists would carry out a coup or foment
   other violence. The Allies were determined not to settle for anything
   short of unconditional surrender, and as late as July 1945 the Japanese
   government council, the Big Six, considered that option and recommended
   one to three conditions, beginning with a guarantee of the emperor's
   continued position in Japanese society.

   On August 9, 1945, following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
   Nagasaki and the Soviet declaration of war, Hirohito told Kido to
   "quickly control the situation" because "the Soviet Union has declared
   war and today began hostilities against us." On August 10, the cabinet
   drafted an "Imperial Rescript ending the War" following the Emperor's
   indications that the declaration does not compromise any demande which
   prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.

   On August 12, the Emperor informed the imperial family of his decision
   to surrender. One of his uncles, prince Asaka, then asked whether the
   war would be continued if the kokutai (national policy) could not be
   preserved. Hirohito simply replied "of course". On August 14, the
   Suzuki government notified the Allies that it had accepted the Potsdam
   Declaration and on August 15, Hirohito made a recording that was
   broadcast over the radio signifying the unconditional surrender of
   Japan's military forces (known as Gyokuon-hōsō).

   The physical recording was hidden and preserved overnight despite a
   full military assault and takeover of the Imperial Palace by die-hard
   army fanatics which was crushed on the Emperor's order. The broadcast
   ordered the Japanese to "accept the unacceptable" in surrender. It was
   the first time the public had heard the Emperor's voice. He was
   purposely vague, because the Emperor of Japan was not regarded merely
   as a human saying "We surrender to the Americans"; he was viewed as the
   holy leader of Japan, so when he said "accept the unacceptable", most
   people sitting by the radio didn't know what he meant. Even if they had
   known, there was a clear difference between standard Japanese speech
   and the emperor's own lexicon. He used in this broadcast, according to
   historian Richard Storry in A History of Modern Japan, "a form of
   language familiar only to the well-educated" and to the more
   traditional samurai families. The most important immediate result of
   this surrender was that food relief shipments could be arranged within
   weeks, where otherwise the urban population of Japan was in danger of
   mass starvation similar to Germany and Central Europe after World War
   I. He was the only leader of the Axis Powers to remain alive and in
   power following the end of the Second World War.

Post-war reign

   General MacArthur and The Emperor
   Enlarge
   General MacArthur and The Emperor

   As Hirohito chose his uncle Prince Higashikuni as prime minister to
   assist the occupation, there were attempts by numerous leaders, among
   them President Harry S. Truman, to have him put on trial for alleged
   war crimes. Many members of the imperial family such as princes
   Chichibu, Takamatsu and Higashikuni pressured Hirohito to abdicate so
   one of the princes could serve as regent until Akihito came of age. On
   February 27, 1946, Hirohito's youngest brother, Takahito (prince
   Mikasa), even stood up in the privy council and indirectly urged the
   Emperor to step down and accept responsibility for Japan's defeat.
   According to minister of Welfare Ashida's diary, "Everyone seemed to
   ponder Mikasa's words. Never have I seen his majesty's face so pale."

   U.S. General Douglas MacArthur insisted that Hirohito remain Emperor.
   MacArthur saw him as a symbol of the continuity and cohesion of the
   Japanese people, along with knowing the details of the surrender
   events. Hirohito was not put on trial, but he was forced to explicitly
   reject (in the Ningen-sengen (人間宣言, Ningen-sengen^ ?)) the traditional
   claim that the Emperor of Japan was divine, and a descendant of the Sun
   Goddess.

   According to the Japanese constitution of 1889, Hirohito had a divine
   power over his country, which was derived from the mythology of the
   Japanese Imperial Family who were said to be the offspring of the
   creator of Japan, Amaterasu. The imperial title was thus transformed
   from 'imperial sovereign' to 'constitutional monarch' in 1946.
   Immediately after Hirohito's repudiation of divinity, he asked the
   occupation authorities for permission to worship the Sun Goddess. Some
   have seen this as an implicit reaffirmation of the claim to divine
   status; others have seen it as simply an expression of Hirohito's
   personal religious beliefs, with no political or social implications.

   Although Hirohito was compelled to reject claims to his own divine
   status, his public position was deliberately left vague, partly because
   General MacArthur thought him likely to be a useful partner to get the
   Japanese to accept the occupation, and partly due to behind-the-scenes
   maneuverings by Shigeru Yoshida to thwart attempts to cast Hirohito as
   a European-style monarch. While Hirohito was usually seen abroad as a
   head of state, there is still a broad dispute about whether he became a
   common citizen or retained special status related to his religious
   offices and participations in Shinto and Buddhist calendar rituals.
   Many scholars claim that today's tennō (usually translated Emperor of
   Japan in English) is not an emperor. See the " Emperor of Japan"
   article for discussion of the position of Emperor of Japan.

   For the rest of his life, Hirohito was an active figure in Japanese
   life, and performed many of the duties commonly associated with a
   constitutional head of state. The emperor and his family maintained a
   strong public presence, often holding public walkabouts, and making
   public appearances on special events and ceremonies. He also played an
   important role in rebuilding Japan's diplomatic image, traveling abroad
   to meet with many foreign leaders, including numerous American
   presidents and Queen Elizabeth II. In 1975, Hirohito and his wife were
   honored guests at Colonial Williamsburg in Virginia, the first such
   visit by Japanese royalty.

   Hirohito was deeply interested in and well-informed about marine
   biology, and the Imperial Palace contained a laboratory from which
   Hirohito published several papers in the field. His contributions
   included the description of several dozen species of jellyfish new to
   science.

Death and state funeral

   On September 22, 1987, Hirohito underwent surgery on his pancreas after
   having digestive problems for several months. This was the very first
   time a Japanese Emperor underwent surgery. The doctors discovered that
   he had duodenal cancer, but in accordance with Japanese tradition, they
   did not tell him. Hirohito seemed to be recovering well for several
   months after his surgery. About a year later, however, on September 19,
   1988, he collapsed in his palace, and his health worsened over the next
   several months as he suffered from continuous internal bleeding. On
   January 7, 1989, at 6:33 AM, Hirohito died. At 7:55 AM, the grand
   steward of Japan's Imperial Household Agency, Shoichi Fujimori,
   officially announced the Emperor's death, and revealed details about
   his cancer for the first time. Upon his death, he was renamed Emperor
   Showa (Shōwa Tennō), after the era during which he ruled. His
   posthumous name was determined on January 13 and formally released on
   January 31 by Japanese prime minister. (From January 7 until January
   31, the formal appellation of Hirohito was "Taikō Tennō(大行天皇)", which
   means the departed emperor.)

   On February 24, Emperor Showa's state funeral was held, and unlike that
   of his predecessor, it was formal but not done in a strictly Shinto
   manner. A large number of world leaders attended it, including U.S.
   President George H.W. Bush. The general feeling of public opinion
   throughout the world at this time was that Emperor Showa's regal
   presence on the throne had greatly helped Japan to regain economic and
   political stability during the postwar era. He is buried in the
   Imperial mausoleum in Hachioji, alongside other past emperors.

Yasukuni Shrine

   Although largely refraining from becoming involved in the politics
   surrounding Yasukuni Jinja, Hirohito maintained an official boycott of
   the controversial monument from 1978 until the time of his death, after
   it was revealed to him that some wartime supporters of the alliance
   with Germany were being honored there. However, his motivations remain
   unclear as, even if he notoriously hated minister Matsuoka, he never
   blamed leaders such as Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, calling him his
   "loyal servant". For journalist Masanori Yamaguchi, who analyzed
   comments made by Hirohito in the Tomita "memo" and in his first-ever
   press conference in 1975, the evasive and opaque attitude of the
   Emperor about his responsibility for the war and his comment that the
   bombing of Hiroshima "could not be helped", is significant that
   Hirohito was afraid that the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals
   would "reignite" debate over his own responsibility for the war.

   This boycott has been maintained by his son Akihito, who has also
   refused to worship at Yasukuni since 1978.

   Retrieved from " http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito"
   This reference article is mainly selected from the English Wikipedia
   with only minor checks and changes (see www.wikipedia.org for details
   of authors and sources) and is available under the GNU Free
   Documentation License. See also our Disclaimer.
