   #copyright

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: World War II

   Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
   Part of the Pacific Theatre of World War II
   Smoke rises from two Japanese aircraft
   Smoke rises from two Japanese aircraft shot down off Guadalcanal on
   November 12, 1942. Photographed from USS President Adams; ship at right
   is USS Betelgeuse.

     Date   November 12, 1942 – November 15, 1942
   Location Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands
    Result  Allied strategic victory
   Combatants
   United States
   Australia
   New Zealand Empire of Japan
   Commanders
   William Halsey, Jr
   Daniel J. Callaghan†
   Willis A. Lee Isoroku Yamamoto
   Nobutake Kondo
   Hiroaki Abe
   Strength
   1 carrier,
   2 battleships,
   5 cruisers,
   12 destroyers 2 battleships,
   8 cruisers,
   16 destroyers
   Casualties
   2 light cruisers,
   7 destroyers sunk,
   26 aircraft destroyed,
   1,732 killed 2 battleships,
   1 heavy cruiser,
   3 destroyers,
   11 transports sunk,
   41 aircraft destroyed,
   1,900–4,900 killed
                                Guadalcanal campaign
   Tulagi – Savo I. – Tenaru – Eastern Solomons – Edson's Ridge –
   Cape Esperance – Henderson Field – Santa Cruz Is. – Naval Guadalcanal –
   Tassafaronga – Ke – Rennell I.
                              Solomon Islands campaign
   1st Tulagi – Guadalcanal – Blackett Strait – Cartwheel – Death of
   Yamamoto – New Georgia – Kula Gulf – Kolombangara – Vella Gulf –
   Horaniu – Vella Lavella – Naval Vella Lavella – Treasury Is. – Choiseul
   – Empress Augusta Bay – Cape St. George – Green Is. – 2nd Rabaul –
   Bougainville

   The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, sometimes referred to as the Third
   Battle of Savo Island or, in Japanese sources, as the Third Battle of
   the Solomon Sea (第三次ソロモン海戦), took place November 12–15, 1942, and was
   the decisive battle in a series of naval battles that took place
   between Allied (primarily U.S.) and Japanese forces during the
   months-long Battle of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. The battle
   consisted of a sequence of combined air and sea engagements spread over
   four days, most of them in the vicinity of Guadalcanal. All of the
   engagements were directly related to a single effort by the Japanese to
   reinforce their land forces on Guadalcanal, and are all therefore
   considered to be different parts of the same battle.

   In two extremely destructive nighttime surface warship engagements,
   both adversaries lost numerous ships. Also, U.S. daytime air attacks
   over several days sank or damaged a number of Japanese warships and
   transport ships. The sum of these engagements was that the U.S. was
   successful in turning back Japan's last major attempt to dislodge
   Allied forces from their positions on Guadalcanal and nearby Tulagi.
   Thus, the battle resulted in a significant strategic victory for the
   U.S. and its allies.

Background

   On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on
   Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands.
   The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the
   Japanese as bases to threaten the supply routes between the U.S. and
   Australia and to use them as starting points for a campaign with the
   eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also
   supporting the Allied New Guinea and New Britain campaigns. The
   landings initiated the six-month-long Battle of Guadalcanal.

   Due to the constant threat by Japanese aircraft and warships around the
   Solomon Islands, Allied forces were unable to frequently resupply their
   forces on Guadalcanal, who were often under attack from Japanese land
   and sea forces in the area. In early November, 1942, Allied
   intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese were preparing their
   own offensive to try to retake the islands from the U.S. and its
   allies. Therefore, the U.S. mounted a major resupply and reinforcement
   effort by sending Task Force 67, a large reinforcement and resupply
   convoy commanded by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, to support its
   forces at Guadalcanal on November 11. The supply ships were protected
   by task groups commanded by Rear Admirals Daniel J. Callaghan and
   Norman Scott as well as aircraft from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.
   The Japanese conducted several air attacks on these supply ships at
   Guadalcanal on November 11 and 12, using aircraft based at Buin,
   Bougainville in the Solomon Islands. However, most of the U.S. supply
   ships were unloaded without serious damage and 12 of the Japanese
   aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the U.S. ships or by
   fighter aircraft from Henderson Field.
   Aerial view of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, late August 1942. The
   view looks northwest with the Lunga River and Lunga Point at the top of
   the image.
   Enlarge
   Aerial view of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, late August 1942. The
   view looks northwest with the Lunga River and Lunga Point at the top of
   the image.

   The last major attempt to retake Guadalcanal and Henderson Field by the
   Japanese army had occurred from October 20–26 in the Battle for
   Henderson Field and had been defeated with heavy losses for the
   Japanese. At the same time, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (the commander of
   the Japanese Combined Fleet) had attempted to decisively defeat U.S.
   naval forces in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. In that battle,
   U.S. naval forces were defeated and driven from the area with the loss
   of one aircraft carrier and severe damage to another. However, the
   Japanese carriers themselves were forced to retreat due to crippling
   losses to their carrier aircraft and aircrews. Thereafter, Yamamoto's
   ships returned to their main bases at Truk in Micronesia, where he had
   his headquarters, and Rabaul on New Britain while three of the four
   Japanese carriers returned to Japan for repairs and refitting.

   The Japanese army planned another attack on Guadalcanal, but further
   reinforcements were needed before the operation could proceed. The army
   requested assistance from Yamamoto to deliver the needed reinforcements
   to the island and to support their planned offensive on the Allied
   forces guarding Henderson Field. To support the reinforcement effort,
   Yamamoto provided 11 large transport ships to carry 7,000 army troops,
   their ammunition, food, and heavy equipment to Guadalcanal. He also
   provided a warship support force that included two battleships. The two
   battleships, Hiei and Kirishima, equipped with special fragmentation
   shells, were to bombard Henderson Field and destroy it and/or the
   aircraft stationed there in order to allow the slow, heavy transports
   to reach Guadalcanal safely. The warship force was commanded by
   recently-promoted Vice Admiral Hiroaki Abe from Hiei.

First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13

   The Solomon Islands. "The Slot" runs down the center of the islands,
   from Bougainville and the Shortlands (center) to Guadalcanal (lower
   right).
   Enlarge
   The Solomon Islands. "The Slot" runs down the center of the islands,
   from Bougainville and the Shortlands (centre) to Guadalcanal (lower
   right).

Prelude

   Abe's warship force and the transports assembled near the Shortland
   Islands and proceeded down " The Slot" towards Guadacanal on November
   12 with an estimated arrival time for the warships of early morning,
   November 13, with the slower transport ships travelling some distance
   behind. In addition to the two battleships, the Japanese force included
   the light cruiser Nagara and 11 destroyers: Samidare, Murasame,
   Asagumo, Teruzuki, Amatsukaze, Yukikaze, Ikazuchi, Inazuma, Akatsuki,
   Harusame, and Yudachi. Three destroyers ( Shigure, Shiratsuyu, and
   Yugure) would provide a rear guard in the Russell Islands during Abe's
   foray into " Ironbottom Sound" off the north coast of Guadalcanal. U.S.
   reconnaissance aircraft observed the Japanese ships' approach.

   The U.S. supply ships at Guadalcanal departed by early evening November
   12 but Turner detached all useable combat ships to protect the troops
   ashore from the expected Japanese attack and/or reinforcement effort.
   Callaghan was a few days' senior to the more experienced Scott, and
   therefore was placed in overall command. Callaghan prepared his force
   to meet the Japanese that night in the sound. His force comprised two
   heavy cruisers ( San Francisco and Portland), three light cruisers (
   Helena, Juneau, and Atlanta), and eight destroyers: Cushing, Laffey,
   Sterett, O'Bannon, Aaron Ward, Barton, Monssen, and Fletcher. Admiral
   Callaghan commanded from San Francisco.
   Approximate routes of Japanese force under Abe (red line) and U.S.
   force under Callaghan (black line) as they head towards each other
   early on November 13, 1942 in Ironbottom Sound between Savo Island,
   Cape Esperance, and Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The green area near
   Lunga Point on Guadalcanal marks the location of Henderson Field.
   Enlarge
   Approximate routes of Japanese force under Abe (red line) and U.S.
   force under Callaghan (black line) as they head towards each other
   early on November 13, 1942 in Ironbottom Sound between Savo Island,
   Cape Esperance, and Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The green area near
   Lunga Point on Guadalcanal marks the location of Henderson Field.

   During their approach to Guadalcanal, the Japanese force passed through
   a large and intense rain squall which, along with a complex formation
   plus some confusing orders from Abe, split the formation into several
   groups. The U.S. force steamed in a single column around Ironbottom
   Sound, with destroyers in the lead and rear of the column, and the
   cruisers in the centre. Five ships had the new, superior SG radar, but
   Callaghan's deployment put none of them in the forward part of the
   column, nor did he choose one for his flagship.

Action

   At about 01:25 on November 13, in almost complete pitch darkness due to
   the bad weather and dark moon, the ships of the Japanese force entered
   the sound between Savo Island and Guadalcanal and prepared to bombard
   Henderson Field. Several of the U.S. ships detected the Japanese ships
   on radar, beginning about 01:24, but had trouble communicating the
   information to Callaghan due to problems with their ship's radio
   equipment and lack of discipline with their communications procedures.
   Several minutes later, both forces visually sighted each other about
   the same time but both Abe and Callaghan hesitated ordering their ships
   into action. Abe apparently was surprised by the proximity of the U.S.
   ships and couldn't decide if he should momentarily withdraw to give his
   ships time to change from bombardment ammunition to anti-ship
   ammunition or to continue onward. He decided to continue onward.
   Callaghan, apparently intended to attempt to cross the T of the
   Japanese, as Scott had done at Cape Esperance, but confused by the
   incomplete information he was receiving, plus the fact that the
   Japanese formation consisted of several, scattered groups, he gave
   several confusing orders on ship movements. The U.S. ship formation
   began to fall apart, apparently further delaying Callaghan's order to
   commence firing as he first tried to straighten out his ship's
   locations. Meanwhile, both forces continued to head directly for each
   other.
   Position of Japanese (red arrows) and U.S. (black) ships at 01:45 on
   November 13. Both sides opened fire at 01:48 as the formations of the
   two adversaries intermingled and then quickly disintegrated into a
   confused free-for-all. (Click on map for larger image and full
   description)
   Enlarge
   Position of Japanese (red arrows) and U.S. (black) ships at 01:45 on
   November 13. Both sides opened fire at 01:48 as the formations of the
   two adversaries intermingled and then quickly disintegrated into a
   confused free-for-all. (Click on map for larger image and full
   description)

   At 01:48, the Japanese ships Akatsuki and Hiei turned on large
   searchlights and lit up Atlanta only 3,000 yards away—almost
   point-blank range for large naval artillery. Several of the ships on
   both sides spontaneously opened fire. Realizing that his force was
   almost surrounded by Japanese ships, Callaghan ordered, "Odd ships fire
   to starboard, even ships fire to port." Most of the remaining U.S.
   ships then opened fire, although several had to quickly change their
   targets in order to comply with Callaghan's order. As the ships from
   the two sides intermingled, they battled each other in an utterly
   confused and chaotic melée at close distances. Afterwards, an officer
   on Monssen likened it to "a barroom brawl after the lights had been
   shot out".

   At least six of the U.S. ships, including Laffey, O'Bannon, Atlanta,
   San Francisco, Portland, and Helena, fired at Akatsuki, which drew
   attention to herself with her illuminated searchlight. Akatsuki blew up
   and sank within a few minutes, but not before hitting Atlanta with
   shells and a torpedo. Only eight crewmen (out of a total complement of
   197) survived the sinking of Akatsuki and were later captured by U.S.
   forces.

   Perhaps due to being the lead cruiser in the U.S. formation, Atlanta
   was the target of fire from several Japanese ships, probably including
   Nagara, Inazuma, and Ikazuchi, in addition to Akatsuki. The gunfire
   caused Atlanta heavy damage, and the torpedo hit cut all of her
   engineering power. Atlanta now drifted into the line of fire of San
   Francisco, which accidentally fired on Atlanta, causing even greater
   damage, and killing Admiral Scott and much of the bridge crew. Atlanta,
   without power or able to fire her guns, now drifted out of control and
   out of the battle as the Japanese ships passed her by. The lead U.S.
   destroyer, Cushing, was also caught in a crossfire between several
   Japanese destroyers and perhaps Nagara. She too was hit heavily and
   stopped dead in the water.

   Hiei, with her nine lit searchights, huge size, and course taking her
   directly through the U.S. formation, now became the focus of gunfire
   from many of the U.S. ships. Laffey passed so close to Hiei that they
   missed colliding by 20 feet. Hiei was unable to depress her main or
   secondary batteries low enough to hit Laffey, but Laffey was able to
   rake Hiei’s superstructure with 5-inch shells and machinegun fire,
   causing heavy damage to Hiei’s superstructure and bridge, wounding
   Admiral Abe, and killing his chief of staff. Admiral Abe was thereafter
   limited in his ability to direct his ships for the rest of the battle.
   Sterett and O'Bannon likewise pumped several salvos into Hiei’s
   superstructure from close range, and perhaps one or two torpedoes into
   her hull, causing Hiei further damage, before both destroyers escaped
   into the darkness.
   Japanese battleship Hiei in 1942
   Enlarge
   Japanese battleship Hiei in 1942

   Unable to fire her main or secondary batteries at the three destroyers
   causing her so much trouble, Hiei instead concentrated on San Francisco
   which was passing by only 2,500 yards away. Along with Kirishima,
   Inazuma, and Ikazuchi, the four ships made repeated hits on San
   Francisco, disabling her steering control and killing Admiral
   Callaghan, Captain Cassin Young, and most of the bridge staff. The
   first few salvos from Hiei and Kirishima consisted of the special
   fragmentation bombardment shells, which reduced damage to the interior
   of San Francisco, and may have saved her from being sunk outright. Not
   expecting a ship-to-ship confrontation, it took the crews of the two
   Japanese battleships several minutes to switch to armor-piercing
   ammunition. Nevertheless, San Francisco, now almost helpless to defend
   herself, managed to momentarily sail clear of the melee. However, she
   managed to land at least one shell in the Hiei’s steering gear room
   during the exchange, flooding it with water, shorting out her power
   steering generators, and severely inhibiting Hiei’s steering
   capability. Helena followed San Francisco to try and protect her from
   further harm.

   Two of the U.S. destroyers now met a sudden demise. Either Nagara, or
   Teruzuki, and Yukikaze came upon the drifting Cushing and pounded her
   mercilessly with gunfire, knocking out all of her systems. Unable to
   fight back, Cushing’s crew abandoned ship. Cushing’s hulk sank several
   hours later. Laffey, having escaped from her engagement with Hiei
   suddenly encountered Asagumo, Murasame, Samidare, and, perhaps,
   Teruzuki. The Japanese destroyers pounded the Laffey with gunfire and
   then hit her with a torpedo which broke her keel. A few minutes later
   fires reached her ammunition magazines and she blew up and sank.

   Portland, after helping sink Akatsuki, was hit by a torpedo from
   Inazuma or Ikazuchi, causing heavy damage to her stern and forcing her
   to steer in a circle. After completing her first loop, she was able to
   fire four salvos at Hiei, but otherwise took little further part in the
   battle.

   Yudachi and Amatsukaze now independently charged the rear five ships of
   the U.S. formation. Two torpedoes from Amatsukaze hit Barton,
   immediately sinking her with heavy loss of life. Yudachi planted a
   torpedo in Juneau, stopping Juneau dead in the water, breaking her
   keel, and knocking out most of her systems. Juneau then turned east and
   slowly crept out of the battle area.

   Monssen avoided the wreck of Barton and motored onward looking for
   targets. She was suddenly accosted by Asagumo, Murasame, and Samidare
   who had just finished blasting Laffey. They proceeded to smother
   Monssen with gunfire, damaging her severely and forcing the crew to
   abandon ship. The hulk sank sometime later.
   Ironbottom Sound. The majority of the warship surface battle of
   November 13 took place in the area between Savo Island (center) and
   Guadalcanal (left).
   Enlarge
   Ironbottom Sound. The majority of the warship surface battle of
   November 13 took place in the area between Savo Island (centre) and
   Guadalcanal (left).

   Amatsukaze now approached the San Francisco with the intention of
   finishing her off. However, while concentrating on San Francisco,
   Amatsukaze didn't notice the approach of Helena which fired several
   full broadsides at Amatsukaze from close range and knocked her out of
   the action. The heavily damaged Amatsukaze escaped under cover of a
   smoke screen and while Helena was distracted by an attack by Asagumo,
   Murasame, and Samidare.

   Aaron Ward and Sterett, independently searching for targets, both
   sighted Yudachi, who appeared unaware of the approach of the two U.S.
   destroyers. Both U.S. ships hit Yudachi simultaneously with gunfire and
   torpedoes, literally blasting her out of the water and forcing her crew
   to abandon ship. However, the ship didn't sink right away. Continuing
   on her way, Sterett was suddenly ambushed by Teruzuki, heavily damaged,
   and forced to withdraw from the battle area to the east. Aaron Ward
   found herself in a one-on-one duel with Kirishima, which Aaron Ward
   lost with heavy damage to herself. She also tried to retire from the
   battle area to the east but soon stopped dead in the water due to
   damage to her engines.

   Robert Leckie, then a Marine private on Guadalcanal, described the
   battle:


   Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

    The star shells rose, terrible and red. Giant tracers flashed across
     the night in orange arches. ... the sea seemed a sheet of polished
     obsidian on which the warships seemed to have been dropped and were
     immobilized, centered amid concentric circles like shock waves that
                     form around a stone dropped in mud.


   Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

   After nearly 40 minutes of brutal, close-quarters fighting, the two
   sides broke contact and ceased fire at 02:26 after Abe and Captain
   Gilbert Hoover (the captain of Helena and senior surviving U.S. officer
   at this point) ordered their respective forces to disengage. Admiral
   Abe appeared to have a decisive victory in his grasp. He had one
   battleship (Kirishima), one light cruiser (Nagara), and four destroyers
   (Asagumo, Teruzuki, Yukikaze, and Harusame) with only light damage that
   could continue fighting (Inazuma, Ikazuchi, Murasame, and Samidare were
   damaged enough that their fighting ability was somewhat impaired). The
   U.S. had only one light cruiser (Helena) and one destroyer (Fletcher)
   that were still capable of effective resistance. The way appeared clear
   for Abe to bombard Henderson Field, and, perhaps, finish off the U.S.
   naval forces in the area, clearing the way for the troops and supplies
   to be landed safely on Guadalcanal.

   However, at this crucial juncture, Abe chose to abandon the mission and
   depart the area. Several reasons are conjectured as to why he made this
   decision. Japanese commanders, from the beginning of the war, were
   constantly and strongly reminded of the crucial need to conserve fuel,
   ammunition, and to not risk ships unnecessarily. Thus, the damage to
   his flagship, Hiei and his other ships plus his expenditures of fuel
   and ammunition during the battle may have heavily concerned Abe. His
   own injuries and the deaths of some of his staff from battle action may
   have affected his thought processes. Perhaps he was also unsure as to
   how many of his or the U.S. ships were still combat-capable due to
   communication problems with the damaged Hiei. Furthermore, his own
   ships were scattered and would have taken some time to reassemble for a
   coordinated resumption of the mission to attack Henderson Field and the
   remnants of the U.S. warship force. For whatever reason, Abe now called
   for a disengagement and general retreat of his warships, although
   Yukikaze and Teruzuki remained behind to assist Hiei. Samidare
   picked-up survivors from Yudachi at 03:00 before joining the other
   Japanese ships in the retreat northwards.

Aftermath

   U.S. B-17s bomb the damaged Japanese battleship Hiei (upper right) from
   high altitude north of Savo Island on November 13, 1942. Hiei appears
   to be trailing oil.
   Enlarge
   U.S. B-17s bomb the damaged Japanese battleship Hiei (upper right) from
   high altitude north of Savo Island on November 13, 1942. Hiei appears
   to be trailing oil.
   Portland undergoing repairs in dry dock in Sydney, Australia a month
   after the battle
   Enlarge
   Portland undergoing repairs in dry dock in Sydney, Australia a month
   after the battle

   At 03:00 on November 13, Admiral Yamamoto postponed the planned
   landings of the transports, which returned to the Shortlands to await
   further orders. Dawn revealed three crippled Japanese (Hiei, Yudachi,
   and Amatsukaze), and three crippled U.S. ships (Portland, Atlanta, and
   Aaron Ward) in the general vicinity of Savo Island. Amatsukaze was
   attacked by dive-bombers but managed to escape to Truk and eventually
   returned to action several months later. The abandoned hulk of Yudachi
   was sunk by Portland, whose guns still worked in spite of the other
   damage to the ship. The tugboat Bobolink motored around Ironbottom
   Sound throughout the day of November 13, assisting the crippled U.S.
   ships, rescuing U.S. survivors from the water, and, reportedly,
   shooting Japanese survivors floating in the water. Hiei was attacked
   repeatedly by Marine TBF Avenger torpedo planes from Henderson Field,
   TBFs and SBD Dauntless dive-bombers from the carrier Enterprise, and
   B-17 bombers of the United States Army Air Forces 11th Heavy
   Bombardment Group from Espiritu Santo. Abe transferred himself and his
   staff to Yukikaze at 08:15. Kirishima was ordered by Abe to take Hiei
   under tow, escorted by Nagara and its destroyers, but the attempt was
   cancelled because of the threat of submarine attack and Hiei's
   increasing unseaworthiness.

   Portland, San Francisco, Aaron Ward, Sterett, and O'Bannon were
   eventually able to make it back to rear-area ports for repairs.
   Atlanta, however, sank near Guadalcanal at 20:00 on November 13.
   Departing from the Solomon Islands area with San Francisco, Helena,
   Sterret, and O'Bannon later that day, Juneau was sunk by Japanese
   submarine I-26. Juneau’s 100+ survivors (out of a total complement of
   650) were left to fend on their own in the open ocean for eight days
   before rescue aircraft belatedly arrived. While awaiting rescue, all
   but 10 of Juneau’s crew died from their injuries, the elements, or
   savage shark attacks. The dead included the five Sullivan brothers

   Due to the confused nature of the battle, the U.S. believed that they
   had sunk as many as seven Japanese ships. This, plus the Japanese
   retreat, caused the U.S. to believe at the time that they had won a
   significant victory. It was only after the war that the U.S. learned
   that they had suffered what most see as a crushing tactical defeat.

   Nevertheless, most historians appear to agree that Abe's decision to
   retreat turned his tactical victory into a strategic defeat. Henderson
   Field remained operational with attack aircraft ready to deter the slow
   Japanese transports from approaching Gualdacanal with their precious
   cargoes. Plus, the Japanese had lost an opportunity to eliminate the
   U.S. naval forces in the area, a result which would have taken even the
   comparatively resource-rich U.S. some time to recover from. A
   reportedly furious Admiral Yamamoto relieved Abe of command and later
   directed his forced retirement from the military. However, it appears
   that Yamamoto may have been more angry over the loss of one of his
   battleships (Hiei) than he was over the abandonment of the supply
   mission and failure to completely destroy the U.S. force. Shortly
   before noon, Yamamoto ordered Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo, commanding
   the Second Fleet, to form a new bombardment unit around Kirishima with
   fresh ships and attack Henderson Field on the night of November 14-15.

   Including the sinking of Juneau, total U.S. losses in the battle were
   1,439 dead. The Japanese suffered between 550 to 800 dead. Analyzing
   the impact of this engagement, historian Richard B. Frank states,


   Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

   This action stands without peer for furious, close-range, and confused
        fighting during the war. But the result was not decisive. The
      self-sacrifice of Callaghan and his task force had purchased one
   night's respite for Henderson Field. It had postponed, not stopped, the
    landing of major Japanese reinforcements, nor had the greater portion
           of the (Japanese) Combined Fleet yet been heard from."


   Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

Other actions, November 13–14

   U.S. Navy recognition drawing for Japanese Aoba-class heavy cruisers
   which included Kinugasa.
   Enlarge
   U.S. Navy recognition drawing for Japanese Aoba-class heavy cruisers
   which included Kinugasa.

   Although the reinforcement effort to Guadalcanal was delayed, the
   Japanese didn't give up trying to complete the original mission, albeit
   a day later than originally planned. In the afternoon of November 13,
   the 11 transports resumed their journey towards Guadalcanal. A Japanese
   force of cruisers and destroyers, originally assigned to cover the
   unloading of the transports on the evening of November 13, was now
   given the mission that Abe's force had failed to carry out—the
   bombardment of Henderson Field. The battleship Kirishima, after
   abandonning its rescue effort of Hiei on the morning of the 13th,
   steamed north between Santa Isabel and Malaita Islands to form the new
   bombardment unit. After sustaining more damage from air attacks, Hiei
   sank northwest of Savo Island, perhaps after being scuttled by her
   remaining crew, in the late evening of November 13.

   The cruiser force, consisting of Eighth Fleet units under its
   commander, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, included the heavy cruisers
   Chōkai, Kinugasa, Maya, and Suzuya, light cruisers Isuzu and Tenryū,
   and six destroyers. Mikawa's force was able to slip into the
   Guadalcanal area uncontested due to the withdrawal of the battered U.S.
   naval forces. Suzuya and Maya bombarded Henderson Field while the rest
   of Mikawa's force cruised around Savo Island guarding against any U.S.
   surface attack (which didn't occur). The 35-minute bombardment caused
   some damage to various aircraft and facilities at the airfield, but
   didn't put it out of operation. The cruiser force ended the bombardment
   around 02:30 on November 14 and cleared the area to head towards Rabaul
   via the Shortlands.

   At daybreak, aircraft from Henderson Field, Espiritu Santo, and
   Enterprise (stationed 200 miles south of Guadalcanal), began their
   attacks, first on Mikawa's force that was heading away from
   Guadalcanal, and then on the transport force heading towards
   Guadalcanal. The attacks on Mikawa's force sank the heavy cruiser
   Kinugasa, killing 511 of her crew, and damaged Maya, forcing her to go
   to Japan for repairs. Repeated air attacks on the transport force sank
   six of the transports and forced one more to turn back with heavy
   damage. Survivors from the transports were rescued by the convoy's
   escorting destroyers. A total of 450 army troops were reported to have
   perished. The remaining four transports and undamaged destroyers
   continued towards Guadalcanal after nightfall of November 14 but
   stopped west of Guadalcanal to await the finish of the warship surface
   action (below) before continuing.

   Kondo's ad hoc force rendezvoused at Ontong Java on the evening of
   November 13, then reversed course and refueled out of range of
   Henderson Field's bombers on the morning of November 14. The U.S.
   submarine Trout stalked but was unable to attack the Kirishima during
   refueling. The bombardment force continued south and came under air
   attack late in the afternoon of November 14, during which they were
   intercepted by the U.S. submarine Flying Fish which launched five
   torpedos but scored no hits, then reported its contact by radio.

Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 14–15

Prelude

   To cover the unloading of the transports at Guadalcanal, the Japanese
   fleet made its third attempt to neutralize Henderson Field, sending the
   force of warships under Admiral Kondo through Indispensible Strait to
   bombard Guadalcanal on the night of November 14- 15. The force included
   Kirishima, heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, light cruisers Nagara and
   Sendai, and nine destroyers, some of the destroyers being survivors
   (along with Kirishima and Nagara) of the first night engagement two
   days prior. Kondo flew his flag in the cruiser Atago. The force
   approached Guadalcanal around midnight and a quarter moon provided
   moderate visibility.
   First phase of the engagement, 23:17 - 23:30, November 14. Red lines
   are Japanese warship forces and black line is U.S. warship force.
   (Click on map for larger image and full description.)
   Enlarge
   First phase of the engagement, 23:17 - 23:30, November 14. Red lines
   are Japanese warship forces and black line is U.S. warship force.
   (Click on map for larger image and full description.)

   Low on ships, Admiral William Halsey, Jr. detached the new battleships
   Washington and South Dakota, of Enterprise's support group, together
   with four destroyers, as Task Force 64 under Admiral Willis A. Lee to
   defend Guadalcanal. It was a scratch force; the battleships had only
   operated together for a few days, and the destroyers were from four
   different divisions—chosen simply because, of the available destroyers,
   they had the most fuel. The U.S. force arrived in Ironbottom Sound in
   the early evening of November 14 and began patrolling around Savo
   Island. The U.S. warships were in column formation with the four
   destroyers in the lead, followed by Washington, with South Dakota
   bringing up the rear. At 22:55 on November 14, radar on the South
   Dakota and Washington began to detect the ships of the Japanese force
   near Savo Island around 18,000 m range.

Action

   Kondo split his force into several groups, with one group, consisting
   of Sendai and destroyers Shikinami and Uranami ("C" on the maps),
   sweeping along the east side of Savo Island, and destroyer Ayanami ("B"
   on the maps) sweeping counterclockwise around the southwest side of
   Savo Island to check for the presence of Allied ships. The Japanese
   ships spotted Lee's force around 23:00, though Kondo misidentified the
   battleships as cruisers. Kondo ordered the Sendai group of ships, plus
   Nagara and four destroyers ("D" on the maps) to engage and destroy the
   U.S. force before he brought the bombardment force of Kirishima and
   heavy cruisers ("E" on the maps) into Ironbottom Sound. The U.S. ships
   ("A" on the maps) detected the Sendai force on radar, but didn't detect
   the other groups of Japanese ships. Using radar targeting, the two U.S.
   battleships opened fire on the Sendai group at 23:17. Admiral Lee
   ordered a cease fire about five minutes later after the radar returns
   on the northern group appeared to disappear from his ship's radar
   scopes. However, Sendai, Uranami, and Shikinami were undamaged and
   circled out of the danger area.
   Second phase of the engagement, 23:30 - 02:00, November 14-15. Red
   lines are Japanese warship forces and black lines are U.S. warships.
   Numbered yellow dots represent sinking warships. (Click on map for
   larger image and full description.)
   Enlarge
   Second phase of the engagement, 23:30 - 02:00, November 14-15. Red
   lines are Japanese warship forces and black lines are U.S. warships.
   Numbered yellow dots represent sinking warships. (Click on map for
   larger image and full description.)

   Meanwhile, the four U.S. destroyers in the vanguard of the U.S.
   formation began engaging both Ayanami and the Nagara group of ships at
   23:22. Nagara and her escorting destroyers responded effectively with
   accurate gunfire and torpedoes and U.S. destroyers Walke and Preston
   were hit and sunk within 10 minutes with heavy loss of life. The U.S.
   destroyer Benham had part of her bow blown off by a torpedo and had to
   retreat (she sank the next day) and U.S. destroyer Gwin was hit in her
   engine room and put out of the fight. However, the U.S. destroyers had
   completed their mission as screens for the battleships, absorbing the
   initial impact of contact with the enemy, although at great cost. Lee
   ordered the retirement of Benham and Gwin at 23:48.

   Washington passed through the area still occupied by the damaged and
   sinking U.S. destroyers and fired on Ayanami with her secondary
   batteries, setting her afire. Following close behind, South Dakota
   suddenly suffered a series of electrical failures, reportedly during
   repairs when her chief engineer locked down a circuit breaker in
   violation of safety procedures, causing her circuits repeatedly to go
   into series, making her radar and most of her gun batteries inoperable.
   However, she continued to follow Washington towards the western side of
   Savo Island. Receiving reports from Ayanami and others of his ships of
   the destruction of the U.S. destroyers, Kondo now pointed his
   bombardment force towards Guadalcanal, believing that the U.S. warship
   force had been defeated. His force and the two U.S. battleships were
   now heading towards each other.

   Almost blind and unable to effectively fire her main and secondary
   armament, South Dakota was targeted by gunfire and torpedoes by most of
   the ships of the Japanese force, including Kirishima, beginning about
   00:00 on November 15. Although able to score a few hits on Kirishima,
   South Dakota took between 36 and 42 medium and large caliber hits to
   her superstructure, some of which did not explode, that completely
   knocked out her communications and remaining gunfire control
   operations, set portions of her upper decks on fire, and forced her to
   try to steer away from the engagement. (The "Gunfire Damage Report"
   made by the Bureau of Ships showed 26 damaging hits and can be found at
   6th and succeeding photos) All of the Japanese torpedoes missed.
   Admiral Lee later described the cumulative effect of the gunfire damage
   to South Dakota as to, "render one of our new battleships deaf, dumb,
   blind, and impotent." South Dakota's crew casualties were 39 killed and
   59 wounded, and she turned away from the battle at 00:17 without
   informing Admiral Lee, though observed by Kondo's lookouts.
   Washington fires upon Japanese battleship Kirishima during the battle
   on November 14-15, 1942. The low elevation of the gun barrels is due to
   the relatively close range of the two adversaries.
   Enlarge
   Washington fires upon Japanese battleship Kirishima during the battle
   on November 14-15, 1942. The low elevation of the gun barrels is due to
   the relatively close range of the two adversaries.

   The Japanese ships had continued to concentrate their fire on South
   Dakota and none had detected Washington approaching to within 9,000
   yards. From this close range, the Washington suddenly hit Kirishima
   with at least nine main battery shells, causing heavy damage and
   setting her aflame. Kirishima was hit below the waterline and suffered
   a jammed rudder, causing her to circle uncontrollably to port.

   At 00:25 Kondo ordered all of his ships that were able to converge, to
   try to destroy any remaining U.S. ships. However, the Japanese ships
   still didn't know where Washington was located and the other surviving
   U.S. ships had already departed the battle area. Washington steered a
   northwesterly course towards the Russell Islands to draw the Japanese
   force away from Guadalcanal and the presumably damaged South Dakota.
   The Japanese ships finally sighted Washington and launched several
   torpedo attacks but by adroit maneuvering by her captain, Washington
   avoided all of them and also grounding his ship in shallow waters. At
   length, believing that the way was clear for the transport convoy to
   proceed to Guadalcanal (but apparently disregarding the threat of air
   attack in the morning), Kondo ordered his remaining ships to break
   contact and retreat from the area about 01:04, which the Japanese ships
   complied with by 01:30.

Aftermath

   Both Kirishima and Ayanami were scuttled and sank by 03:25, November
   15. Uranami rescued survivors from Ayanami and destroyers Asagumo,
   Teruzuki, and Samidare rescued the remaining crew from Kirishima. In
   the engagement, 242 U.S. and 249 Japanese sailors died. The engagement
   was one of only two battleship-against-battleship surface battles in
   the entire Pacific campaign of World War II.
   Two Japanese transports beached on Guadalcanal and burning on November
   15, 1942
   Enlarge
   Two Japanese transports beached on Guadalcanal and burning on November
   15, 1942

   The four Japanese transports beached themselves at Tassafaronga on
   Guadalcanal by 04:00, November 15. The transports were attacked,
   beginning at 05:55 by U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field and elsewhere,
   and field artillery from U.S. ground forces on Guadalcanal. Later, U.S.
   destroyer Meade, approached and opened fire on the beached transports
   and surrounding area. These attacks set the transports afire and
   destroyed any equipment on them that the Japanese hadn't managed to
   quickly unload. Only 2,000-3,000 of the troops originally embarked
   actually made it to Guadalcanal and most of their ammunition and food
   supplies were lost. These troops and meager supplies weren't enough to
   have a significant effect on the Japanese defense of Guadalcanal.

   Yamamoto's reaction to Kondo's failure to accomplish his mission of
   neutralizing Henderson Field and ensuring the safe landing of troops
   and supplies was milder than his earlier reaction to Abe's withdrawal,
   perhaps due to Imperial Navy culture and politics. Kondo, who also held
   the position of second in command of the Combined Fleet, was a member
   of the upper staff and battleship "clique" of the Imperial Navy while
   Abe was a career destroyer specialist. Admiral Kondo wasn't reprimanded
   or reassigned, but instead was left in command of one of the large ship
   fleets based at Truk.

Significance

   The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was the last major attempt by the
   Japanese to seize control of the seas around Guadalcanal or to retake
   the island. From then on, Japanese air and naval operations around
   Guadalcanal were defensive in nature, either to provide subsistence
   supplies to the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, or beginning in
   January, 1943, attempts to evacuate and redeploy them elsewhere. In
   contrast, the U.S. Navy was thereafter able to resupply the U.S. forces
   at Guadalcanal at will, including the delivery of two fresh divisions
   by late December, 1942. The inability to neutralize Henderson Field
   doomed the Japanese effort to successfully combat the Allied conquest
   of Guadalcanal. The last resistance in the Battle of Guadalcanal ended
   on February 9, 1943 with the successful evacuation of the surviving
   Japanese troops on the island by the Japanese navy.
   The wreck of one of the four Japanese transports beached and destroyed
   at Guadalcanal on November 15, 1942, photographed one year later.
   Enlarge
   The wreck of one of the four Japanese transports beached and destroyed
   at Guadalcanal on November 15, 1942, photographed one year later.

   The securing of Guadalcanal and surrounding islands by Allied forces
   was the first step in their eventual conquest of the entire Solomon
   Islands chain and the isolation and neutralization of the major
   Japanese base at Rabaul, New Britain. Although the Allies and Japan
   engaged in several more intense and bloody naval battles during the
   Solomon Islands campaign, including some in which the Japanese emerged
   victorious, the Allied advance was never halted or even slowed to any
   appreciable extent. The capture of the Solomon Islands, along with New
   Guinea and New Britain, eventually led to the liberation of the
   Philippines in 1944 and early 1945, and then to invasion of Japan
   itself, at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, and the final defeat of Japan in
   August, 1945. Many historians believe the Battle of Guadalcanal to be
   just as key a turning point in the Pacific War as the Battle of Midway
   was six months earlier. In fact, the Japanese considered the Battle of
   Guadalcanal to be more significant than Midway. Historian Eric Hammel
   sums up the significance of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal this way:


   Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

   On November 12, 1942, the (Japanese) Imperial Navy had the better ships
   and the better tactics. After November 15, 1942, its leaders lost heart
   and it lacked the strategic depth to face the burgeoning U.S. Navy and
   its vastly improving weapons and tactics. The Japanese never got better
   while, after November 1942, the U.S. Navy never stopped getting better.


   Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

   Retrieved from "
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Battle_of_Guadalcanal"
   This reference article is mainly selected from the English Wikipedia
   with only minor checks and changes (see www.wikipedia.org for details
   of authors and sources) and is available under the GNU Free
   Documentation License. See also our Disclaimer.
