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Space Shuttle Columbia disaster

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: Engineering; Space
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   The Space Shuttle Columbia disaster was the destruction of the Space
   Shuttle Columbia over Texas on February 1, 2003 during reentry into the
   Earth's atmosphere on its 28th mission, STS-107. All seven members of
   the crew were killed.

   The loss of the Columbia was caused by damage sustained during launch
   when foam insulation broke off the main propellant tank under the
   aerodynamic forces of launch. The debris struck the leading edge of the
   orbiter's left wing, damaging the insulating tiles. While the shuttle
   was still in orbit, some engineers suspected damage, but NASA managers
   limited the investigation on the grounds that little could be done even
   if problems were found.

   During reentry, the damage area allowed the hot gases to penetrate and
   destroy the internal wing structure, eventually causing the in-flight
   breakup of the vehicle. A massive ground search in parts of Texas,
   Louisiana and Arkansas recovered crew remains and many vehicle
   fragments.

   The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's recommendations addressed
   both technical and organizational issues. The Space Shuttle program was
   set back over two years by the disaster, a delay comparable only to
   that resulting from the Challenger disaster.

Crew

   The crew of STS-107.
   Enlarge
   The crew of STS-107.
     * Commander: Rick D. Husband, a US Air Force colonel and mechanical
       engineer, who piloted a previous shuttle during the first docking
       with the International Space Station.
     * Pilot: William C. McCool, a US Navy commander
     * Payload Commander: Michael P. Anderson, a US Air Force lieutenant
       colonel and physicist who was in charge of the science mission.
     * Payload Specialist: Ilan Ramon, a colonel in the Israeli Air Force
       and the first Israeli astronaut.
     * Mission Specialist: Kalpana Chawla, an Indian-born aerospace
       engineer on her second space mission.
     * Mission Specialist: David M. Brown, a US Navy captain trained as an
       aviator and flight surgeon. Brown worked on a number of scientific
       experiments.
     * Mission Specialist: Laurel Clark, a US Navy captain and flight
       surgeon. Clark worked on a number of biological experiments.

Debris strike during launch

   Columbia lifting off on its final mission. The light-colored triangle
   visible at the base of the strut is the Left Bipod Foam Ramp. Video
   Enlarge
   Columbia lifting off on its final mission. The light-colored triangle
   visible at the base of the strut is the Left Bipod Foam Ramp. Video

   STS-107 had been delayed 18 times over the course of two years (despite
   its designation as the 107th mission, it was actually the 113th mission
   launched) from its original launch date of 11 January 2001 to its
   actual launch date of 16 January 2003. A well-publicized launch delay
   due to cracks in the shuttle's propellant distribution system occurred
   one month before a 19 July 2002 launch date, but the Columbia Accident
   Investigation Board (CAIB) determined that this delay had nothing to do
   with the catastrophic failure six months later.

   The Left Bipod Foam Ramp is an approximately three-foot (one-meter)
   piece made entirely of foam, as opposed to being a metal ramp that is
   merely coated with foam. As such, the foam, not normally considered to
   be a structural material, is required to bear some aerodynamic loads.
   Because of these special requirements, the casting-in-place and curing
   of the ramps may be performed only by a senior technician. Apparently,
   even the best technical servicing available could not compensate for
   this fatal design flaw.

   Bipod Foam Ramps had fallen off on at least three previous flights,
   with at least one previous strike that caused no serious damage. The
   euphemism used by NASA management to refer to this phenomenon was "foam
   shedding." As with the O-ring erosions that ultimately doomed the
   Challenger, NASA management seemed to grow complacent and accustomed to
   these phenomena when no serious consequences resulted from these
   earlier episodes.

   Video taken during lift-off was routinely reviewed two hours after the
   launch and revealed nothing unusual. The following day,
   higher-resolution film that had been processed overnight revealed that
   a piece of insulation foam fell from the external fuel tank 81.9
   seconds into the launch sequence and appeared to strike the shuttle's
   left wing, potentially damaging the thermal protection on the Space
   Shuttle. The exact location where the foam struck the wing could not be
   determined due to the low resolution of the tracking camera footage.

Flight risk management

   In a risk-management scenario similar to the Challenger disaster, NASA
   management failed to recognize the relevance of engineering concerns
   for safety. Two examples of this were failure to honour engineer
   requests for imaging to inspect possible damage, and failure to respond
   to engineer requests about status of astronaut inspection of the left
   wing.
   Close-up of the Left Bipod Foam Ramp that broke off and damaged the
   Shuttle wing.
   Enlarge
   Close-up of the Left Bipod Foam Ramp that broke off and damaged the
   Shuttle wing.

   Engineering made three separate requests for Department of Defense
   (DOD) imaging of the shuttle in orbit to more precisely determine
   damage. While the images were not guaranteed to show the damage, the
   capability existed for imaging of sufficient resolution to provide
   meaningful examination. In fact, the CAIB recommended subsequent
   shuttle flights be imaged while in orbit using ground-based or
   space-based Department of Defense assets. NASA management did not
   honour the requests and in some cases intervened to stop the DOD from
   assisting.

   NASA's chief thermal protection system (TPS) engineer was concerned
   about left wing TPS damage and asked NASA management whether an
   astronaut would visually inspect it. NASA managers never responded.

   Throughout the risk assessment process, senior NASA managers were
   influenced by their belief that nothing could be done even if damage
   was detected, hence this affected their stance on investigation
   urgency, thoroughness and possible contingency actions. They decided to
   conduct a parametric "what-if" scenario study more suited to determine
   risk probabilities of future events, instead of inspecting and
   assessing the actual damage. The investigation report in particular
   singled out NASA manager Linda Ham for exhibiting this attitude.

   Much of the risk assessment hinged on damage predictions to the thermal
   protection system. These fall into two categories: damage to the silica
   tile on the wing lower surface, and damage to the reinforced
   carbon-carbon (RCC) leading-edge panels.

   Damage-prediction software was used to evaluate possible tile and RCC
   damage. The software predicted severe penetration of multiple tiles by
   the impact, but engineers downplayed this, believing that results
   showing that the software overstated damage from small projectiles
   meant that the same would be true of larger foam (SOFI) impacts. The
   program used to predict RCC damage was based on small ice impacts, not
   larger SOFI impacts. Under 1 of 15 predicted SOFI impact paths, the
   software predicted an ice impact would completely penetrate the RCC
   panel. Engineers downplayed this, too, believing that impacts of the
   less dense SOFI material would result in less damage than ice impacts.
   In an e-mail exchange, NASA managers questioned whether the density of
   the SOFI could be used as justification for reducing predicted damage.
   Despite engineering concerns about the energy imparted by the SOFI
   material, NASA managers ultimately accepted the rationale to reduce
   predicted damage of the RCC panels from complete penetration to slight
   damage to the panel's thin coating.

   NASA managers assumed a rescue or repair was impossible, so there was
   no point in trying to inspect the vehicle for damage while on orbit.
   However, the CAIB determined either a rescue mission or on-orbit
   repair, though risky, might have been possible had NASA verified severe
   damage within five days into the mission.

   Ultimately the NASA Mission Management Team felt there was insufficient
   evidence to indicate that the strike was an unsafe situation, so they
   declared the debris strike a "turnaround" issue (not of highest
   importance) and denied the requests for the Department of Defense
   images.

Destruction during re-entry

   The following is a timeline of Columbia's re-entry. The shuttle was
   scheduled to land at 9:16 a.m. EST.
     * 2:30 a.m. EST, Saturday, February 1, 2003 – The Entry Flight
       Control Team began duty in the Mission Control Centre.

                The Flight Control Team had not been working on any issues
                or problems related to the planned de-orbit and re-entry
                of Columbia. In particular, the team had indicated no
                concerns about the debris impact to the left wing during
                ascent, and treated the re-entry like any other. The team
                worked through the de-orbit preparation checklist and
                re-entry checklist procedures. Weather forecasters, with
                the help of pilots in the Shuttle Training Aircraft,
                evaluated landing-site weather conditions at the Kennedy
                Space Centre.

     * 8:00 – Mission Control Centre Entry Flight Director Leroy Cain
       polled the Mission Control room for a GO/NO-GO decision for the
       de-orbit burn.

                All weather observations and forecasts were within
                guidelines set by the flight rules, and all systems were
                normal.

     * 8:10 – The Capsule Communicator notified the crew that they are GO
       for de-orbit burn.
     * 8:15:30 (EI-1719) – Commander Husband and Pilot McCool executed the
       de-orbit burn using Columbia’s two Orbital Maneuvering System
       engines.

                The Orbiter was upside down and tail-first over the Indian
                Ocean at an altitude of 175 statute miles (282 km) when
                the burn was executed. The de-orbit maneuver was performed
                on the 255th orbit, and the 2-minute, 38-second burn
                slowed the Orbiter from 17,500 mph (7.8 km/s) to begin its
                re-entry into the atmosphere. During the de-orbit burn,
                the crew felt about 10% of the effects of gravity. There
                were no problems during the burn, after which Husband
                maneuvered Columbia into a right-side-up, forward-facing
                position, with the Orbiter's nose pitched up.

     * 8:44:09 (EI+000) – Entry Interface (EI), arbitrarily defined as the
       point at which the Orbiter enters the discernible atmosphere at
       400,000 feet (120 km), occurred over the Pacific Ocean.

                As Columbia descended from space into the atmosphere, the
                heat produced by air molecules colliding with the Orbiter
                typically caused wing leading-edge temperatures to rise
                steadily, reaching an estimated 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit
                (1400 °C) during the next six minutes.

     * 8:48:39 (EI+270) – A sensor on the left wing leading edge spar
       showed strains higher than those seen on previous Columbia
       re-entries.

                This was recorded only on the Modular Auxiliary Data
                System, and was not telemetered to ground controllers or
                displayed to the crew.

     * 8:49:32 (EI+323) – Columbia executed a pre-planned roll to the
       right. Speed: Mach 24.5.

                Columbia began a banking turn to manage lift and therefore
                limit the Orbiter's rate of descent and heating.

     * 8:50:53 (EI+404) – Columbia entered a 10-minute period of peak
       heating, during which the thermal stresses were at their maximum.
       Speed: Mach 24.1; altitude: 243,000 feet (74 km).

   Columbia at approximately 0857. Debris is already starting to come off
   from the left wing.
   Enlarge
   Columbia at approximately 0857. Debris is already starting to come off
   from the left wing.
     * 8:52:00 (EI+471) – Columbia was approximately 300 miles (500 km)
       west of the California coastline.

                The wing leading-edge temperatures usually reached 2,650
                degrees Fahrenheit (1450 °C) at this point.

     * 8:53:26 (EI+557) – Columbia crossed the California coast west of
       Sacramento. Speed: Mach 23; altitude: 231,600 feet (70.6 km).

                The Orbiter's wing leading edge typically reached more
                than 2,800 degrees Fahrenheit (1540 °C) at this point.

     * 8:53:46 (EI+597) – Signs of debris being shed were sighted. Speed:
       Mach 22.8; altitude: 230,200 feet (70.2 km).

                The superheated air surrounding the Orbiter suddenly
                brightened, causing a noticeable streak in the Orbiter's
                luminescent trail. Observers witnessed another four
                similar events during the following 23 seconds.

     * 8:54:24 (EI+613) – The Maintenance, Mechanical, and Crew Systems
       (MMACS) officer informed the Flight Director that four hydraulic
       sensors in the left wing were indicating "off-scale low." In
       Mission Control, re-entry had been proceeding normally up to this
       point.

                "Off-scale low" is a reading that falls below the minimum
                capability of the sensor.
                The Entry Team continued to discuss the failed indicators.

     * 08:54:25 (EI+614) – Columbia crossed from California into Nevada
       airspace. Speed: Mach 22.5; altitude: 227,400 feet (69.3 km).

                Witnesses observed a bright flash at this point and 18
                similar events in the next four minutes.

     * 8:55:00 (EI+651) – Nearly 11 minutes after Columbia re-entered the
       atmosphere, wing leading-edge temperatures normally reached nearly
       3,000 degrees Fahrenheit (1650 °C).
     * 8:55:32 (EI+683) – Columbia crossed from Nevada into Utah. Speed:
       Mach 21.8; altitude: 223,400 ft (68 km).
     * 8:55:52 (EI+703) – Columbia crossed from Utah into Arizona.
     * 8:56:30 (EI+741) – Columbia initiated a roll reversal, turning from
       right to left over Arizona.
     * 8:56:45 (EI+756) – Columbia crossed from Arizona to New Mexico.
       Speed: Mach 20.9; altitude: 219,000 feet.
     * 8:57:24 (EI+795) – Columbia crossed just north of Albuquerque.

   Columbia debris (in red, orange, and yellow) detected by National
   Weather Service radar over Texas and Louisiana.
   Enlarge
   Columbia debris (in red, orange, and yellow) detected by National
   Weather Service radar over Texas and Louisiana.
     * 8:58:00 (EI+831) – At this point, wing leading-edge temperatures
       typically decreased to 2,880 degrees Fahrenheit (1580 °C).
     * 8:58:20 (EI+851) – Columbia crossed from New Mexico into Texas.
       Speed: Mach 19.5; altitude: 209,800 feet (64 km).

                At about this time, the Orbiter shed a Thermal Protection
                System tile, the most westerly piece of debris that has
                been recovered. Searchers found the tile in a field in
                Littlefield, Texas, just northwest of Lubbock.

     * 8:59:15 (EI+906) – MMACS informed the Flight Director that pressure
       readings had been lost on both left main landing-gear tires. The
       Flight Director then told the Capsule Communicator (CAPCOM) to let
       the crew know that Mission Control saw the messages and was
       evaluating the indications, and added that the Flight Control Team
       did not understand the crew's last transmission.

   A makeshift memorial at the main entrance to Johnson Space Center
   Enlarge
   A makeshift memorial at the main entrance to Johnson Space Centre
     * 8:59:32 (EI+923) – A broken response from the mission commander was
       recorded: "Roger, uh, bu - [cut off in mid-word] ..." It was the
       last communication from the crew and the last telemetry signal
       received in Mission Control.
     * 9:00:18 (EI+969) – Videos made by observers on the ground revealed
       that the Orbiter was disintegrating. In Mission Control, while the
       loss of signal was a cause for concern, there was no sign of any
       serious problem.
     * 9:05 – Residents of north central Texas reported a loud boom, a
       small concussion wave, smoke trails and debris in the clear skies
       above the counties southeast of Dallas.
     * 9:12:39 (EI+1710) – After hearing of reports of the shuttle being
       seen to break apart, the NASA flight director declared a
       contingency (events leading to loss of the vehicle) and alerted
       search and rescue teams in the debris area. He told the Ground
       Controller to "lock the doors", and two minutes later put Mission
       Control contingency procedures into effect. Nobody was permitted to
       enter or leave the room, and flight controllers had to preserve all
       the mission data for later investigation.

Response from the President

   At 14:04 EST (19:04 UTC), a somber President George W. Bush addressed
   the United States: "This day has brought terrible news and great
   sadness to our country... The Columbia is lost; there are no
   survivors." Despite the disaster, the President assured Americans that
   the space program would continue: "The cause in which they died will
   continue. Our journey into space will go on."

Recovery of debris

   More than 2,000 debris fields, including human remains, were found in
   sparsely populated areas southeast of Dallas from Nacogdoches in East
   Texas, where a high amount of debris fell, to western Louisiana and the
   southwestern counties of Arkansas. NASA issued warnings to the public
   that any debris could contain hazardous chemicals, that it should be
   left untouched, its location reported to local emergency services or
   government authorities, and that anyone in unauthorized possession of
   debris would be prosecuted.

   A group of small (1 mm adult) Caenorhabditis elegans worms, living in
   petri dishes enclosed in aluminium canisters, survived re-entry and
   impact with the ground and were recovered weeks after the disaster.
   They were part of a Biological Research in Canisters (BRIC) experiment
   (led by Catharine A. Conley of NASA Ames Research Centre) designed to
   study the effect of weightlessness on physiology. The researchers were
   able to recover some usable data.

   Debris Search Pilot Jules F. Mier Jr. and Debris Search Aviation
   Specialist Charles Krenek died in a helicopter crash that injured three
   others while contributing to the ground search effort.

Onboard video

   One item recovered from the debris field was a videotape recording made
   by the astronauts during the start of reentry. This video was later
   made available on NASA's website. The video recording lasts for 13
   minutes and shows the flight crew astronauts conducting routine
   re-entry procedures and joking with each other, none of them giving any
   indication of a problem. At one point one of the astronauts is told she
   has "all the time in the world" to complete her tasks. The video shows
   several astronauts putting on their gloves and passing the video camera
   around in order to take footage of plasma and flames visible outside
   the windows of the orbiter. The video ends approximately 4 minutes
   prior to the start of the shuttle's disintegration; according to the
   online introduction to the recording, the remainder of the tape (the
   recording would have continued to the last moment) was destroyed in the
   break-up, and the final moments of the existing tape show obvious signs
   of recording damage.

Initial investigation

   NASA Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore reported that "The
   first indication was loss of temperature sensors and hydraulic systems
   on the left wing. They were followed seconds and minutes later by
   several other problems, including loss of tire pressure indications on
   the left main gear and then indications of excessive structural
   heating". Analysis of 31 seconds of telemetry data which had initially
   been filtered out because of data corruption within it showed the
   shuttle fighting to maintain its orientation, eventually using maximum
   thrust from its Reaction Control System jets.

   The focus of the investigation centered on the foam strike from the
   very beginning. Incidents of debris strikes from ice and foam causing
   damage during take-off were already well known, and had actually
   damaged orbiters, most noticeably during STS-45, STS-27, and STS-87.
   Tile damage had also been traced to ablative insulating material from
   the solid rocket motors in the past. The composition of the foam
   insulation had been changed in 1997 to exclude the use of freon, a
   chemical that causes ozone depletion; while NASA was exempted from
   legislation phasing out CFCs, the agency chose to change the foam
   nonetheless. This led to many statements linking the foam strike to
   environmental pressures. STS-107 used an older "lightweight tank" where
   the foam was sprayed on to the larger cylindrical surfaces using the
   newer no freon foam. However, the bipods were manufactured from BX-250
   foam which was excluded from the EPA regulations and did use the
   original freon formula. The composition change did not contribute to
   the accident.

Possible emergency procedures

   The CAIB determined that had NASA management acted in time, two
   possible contingency procedures were available: a rescue mission by
   shuttle Atlantis, and an emergency spacewalk to attempt repairs to the
   left wing thermal protection.

Rescue

   The CAIB determined a rescue mission, though risky, might have been
   possible provided NASA management took action soon enough.

   Normally a rescue mission isn't possible, due to the time required to
   prepare a shuttle for launch, and the limited consumables (power,
   water, air) of an orbiting shuttle. However, Atlantis was well along in
   processing for a March 1 launch, and Columbia carried an unusually
   large quantity of consumables due to an Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO)
   package. The CAIB determined that this would have allowed Columbia to
   stay in orbit until flight day 30 (February 15). NASA investigators
   determined that Atlantis processing could have been expedited with no
   skipped safety checks for a February 10 launch. Hence if nothing went
   wrong there was a five day overlap for a possible rescue.

Repair

   NASA investigators determined on-orbit repair by the shuttle astronauts
   was possible but risky, primarily due to the uncertain resiliency of
   the repair using available materials.

   Columbia did not carry the Canadarm, or Remote Manipulator System,
   which would normally be used for camera inspection or transporting a
   spacewalking astronaut to the wing. Therefore an unusual emergency EVA
   would have been required. While there was no astronaut EVA training for
   maneuvering to the wing, astronauts are always prepared for a similarly
   difficult emergency EVA – to close the external tank umbilical doors
   located on the orbiter underside. During launch these doors are open
   for the propellant feed lines from the external tank to supply the main
   engines in the orbiter tail. If they fail to close after jettisoning
   the external tank, it constitutes a thermal protection breach which
   would destroy the orbiter upon reentry. This requires an emergency EVA
   to close them manually. Similar methods could have reached the shuttle
   left wing for inspection or repair.

   For the repair, the CAIB determined the astronauts would have to use
   tools and small pieces of titanium, or other metal, scavenged from the
   crew cabin. These heavy metals would help protect the wing structure
   and would be held in place during re-entry by a water-filled bag that
   had turned into ice in the cold of space. The ice and metal would help
   restore wing leading edge geometry, preventing a turbulent airflow over
   the wing and therefore keeping heating and burn-through levels low
   enough for the crew to survive re-entry and bail out before landing.
   Because the NASA team could not verify that the repairs would survive
   even a modified re-entry, the rescue option had a considerably higher
   chance of bringing Columbia's crew back alive.

Columbia Accident Investigation Board

   Grid on the floor of the Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Hangar where
   workers in the field bring in pieces of Columbia's debris. The Columbia
   Reconstruction Project Team attempted to reconstruct the bottom of the
   orbiter as part of the investigation into the accident.
   Enlarge
   Grid on the floor of the Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Hangar where
   workers in the field bring in pieces of Columbia's debris. The Columbia
   Reconstruction Project Team attempted to reconstruct the bottom of the
   orbiter as part of the investigation into the accident.

   Following protocols established after the loss of Challenger, an
   independent investigating board was created immediately following the
   accident. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, or CAIB, consisted
   of expert military and civilian analysts who investigated the accident
   in great detail.

   Columbia's flight data recorder was found near Hemphill, Texas on March
   20, 2003. Unlike commercial jet aircraft, the space shuttles do not
   have flight data recorders intended for after crash analysis. Rather
   the vehicle data is transmitted in real time to the ground via
   telemetry. However since Columbia was the first shuttle, it had a
   special flight data OEX (Orbiter EXperiments) recorder, designed to
   help engineers better understand vehicle performance during the first
   test flights. Even after these were completed, the recorder was never
   removed from Columbia, and was still functioning. It records many
   hundreds of different parameters and contained very extensive logs of
   structural and other data which allowed the CAIB to reconstruct many of
   the events during the process leading to breakup. Investigators could
   often use the loss of signals from sensors on the wing to track how the
   damage progressed. This was correlated with analysis of debris and
   tests to obtain a final conclusion about the probable events.

   On July 7, 2003 foam impact tests were performed by Southwest Research
   Institute, which used a foam block of similar size, mass and speed to
   that which struck Columbia, and it created a hole 41 cm by 42.5 cm
   (16.1 inches by 16.7 inches) in the protective RCC panel. The tests
   clearly demonstrated that a foam impact of the type Columbia sustained
   could seriously breach the protective RCC panels on the wing leading
   edge.

   On August 26, the CAIB issued its report on the accident. The report
   confirmed the immediate cause of the accident was a breach in the
   leading edge of the left wing, caused by insulating foam shed during
   launch. The report also delved deeply into the underlying
   organizational and cultural issues that led to the accident. The report
   was highly critical of NASA's decision-making and risk-assessment
   processes. It concluded the organizational structure and processes were
   sufficiently flawed that compromise of safety was expected no matter
   who was in the key decision-making positions. An example was the
   position of Shuttle Program Manager, where one individual was
   responsible for achieving safety, timely launches and acceptable costs,
   which are often conflicting goals. The CAIB report found that NASA had
   accepted deviations from design criteria as normal when they happened
   on several flights and did not lead to fatal consequences. One of those
   was the conflict between a design specification stating the thermal
   protection system was not designed to withstand significant impact
   damage and the common occurrence of impact damage to it during flight.
   The board made recommendations for significant changes in processes and
   culture.

Memorials

   On February 4, 2003, President George Bush and his wife Laura led a
   memorial service for the astronauts' families at the Lyndon B. Johnson
   Space Centre. Two days later, Vice President Dick Cheney and his wife
   Lynne led official Washington in paying tribute at a similar service at
   Washington National Cathedral. During that service, singer Patti
   LaBelle sang "Way up There".
   Columbia Memorial on Mars
   Enlarge
   Columbia Memorial on Mars

   On March 26 the United States House of Representatives' Science
   Committee approved funds for the construction of a memorial at
   Arlington National Cemetery for the STS-107 crew. A similar memorial
   was built at the cemetery for the last crew of Space Shuttle
   Challenger. On October 28, 2003, the names of the astronauts were added
   to the Astronaut Memorial at the Kennedy Space Centre Visitor Complex.

   The Houston Astros honored the crew by having seven simultaneous first
   pitches thrown by family and friends of the Columbia crew. For the
   National Anthem, 107 members of the NASA family, including flight
   controllers and others involved in Columbia’s final mission, carried a
   U.S. flag onto the field. In addition, the Astros wore the mission
   patch on their sleeves for the entire season.

   Many places were renamed in honour of Columbia or her crew, some of
   them by NASA. Seven asteroids discovered in July 2001 at the Mount
   Palomar observatory were officially given the names of the seven
   astronauts: 51823 Rickhusband, 51824 Mikeanderson, 51825 Davidbrown,
   51826 Kalpanachawla, 51827 Laurelclark, 51828 Ilanramon, 51829
   Williamccool. The landing site of the Mars rover Spirit was named
   Columbia Memorial Station by NASA, and a complex of hills east of the
   landers was dubbed the Columbia Hills. The Spirit lander included a
   memorial plaque to the Columbia crew mounted on the back of its high
   gain antenna. Back on Earth, NASA's National Scientific Balloon
   Facility was renamed the Columbia Scientific Balloon Facility.

   Other tributes included the decision by Amarillo, Texas to rename its
   airport Rick Husband Amarillo International Airport, after its native
   son and commander of STS-107. A mountain peak near Kit Carson Peak and
   Challenger Point in the Sangre de Cristo Range was renamed Columbia
   Point, and a dedication plaque was placed on the point in August 2003.
   Buildings or classrooms were named in honour of Columbia crewmembers at
   the Florida Institute of Technology, Creighton University, and the
   Columbia Elementary school in the Brevard County School District.

Impact for space programs

   Following the loss of Columbia, the space shuttle program was
   suspended. The further construction of the International Space Station
   was also delayed, as the space shuttles were the only available
   delivery vehicle for station modules. The station was supplied using
   Russian unmanned Progress ships, and crews were exchanged using
   Russian-manned Soyuz spacecraft, and forced to operate on a skeleton
   crew of two.

   In late July 2003, an Associated Press poll revealed that Americans'
   support for the space program remained strong, despite the tragedy.
   Two-thirds believed the space shuttle should continue to fly and nearly
   three-quarters said that the space program was a good investment. On
   the question of sending humans to Mars, 49% thought it was a good idea,
   while 42% opposed it. Support slipped for sending civilians like
   teachers into space with 56% supporting the idea and 38% opposed.

   Less than a year after the accident, President Bush announced the
   Vision for Space Exploration, calling for the retirement of the space
   shuttle fleet following the completion of the International Space
   Station and the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle. NASA
   planned to return the space shuttle to service around September 2004.
   That date was pushed back to July 2005. On July 26, 2005, at 10:39 am
   EST, Space Shuttle Discovery cleared the tower, marking NASA's return
   to space. Overall the STS-114 flight was highly successful, but a
   similar piece of foam from a different portion of the tank was shed,
   although the debris did not strike the Orbiter. Due to this, NASA once
   again grounded the shuttles until the problem was solved. After
   delaying their re-entry by two days due to adverse weather conditions,
   the shuttle safely returned to Earth on August 9, 2005.

   Later that same month, the external tank construction site, Michoud
   Assembly Facility located in New Orleans, Louisiana was damaged by
   Hurricane Katrina, with all work shifts cancelled up to September 26,
   2005. At the time, there was concern that this would set back further
   Shuttle flights by at least two months and possibly more.

   The second "Return to Flight" mission, STS-121, launched on July 4,
   2006, at 2:37:55 PM (EDT), after two previous launches were scrubbed
   because of lingering thunderstorms and high winds around the launch pad
   and the launch took place despite objections from its chief engineer
   and safety head. This mission increased the ISS crew to three. A
   five-inch crack in the foam insulation of the external tank gave cause
   for concern; however, the Mission Management Team gave the go for
   launch. Space Shuttle Discovery touched down successfully on July 17,
   2006 at 9:14:43 AM (EDT) on Runway 15 at the Kennedy Space Centre.

   On August 13, 2006, NASA announced STS-121 had shed more foam than they
   expected. While this did not delay the launch for the next mission,
   STS-115, originally set to lift off on August 27, the weather and other
   technical glitches did, with a lightning strike, Hurricane Ernesto and
   a faulty fuel tank sensor combining to delay the launch until September
   9. On September 19, landing was delayed an extra day to examine
   Atlantis after objects were found floating near the shuttle in the same
   orbit. When no damage was detected, Atlantis landed successfully on
   September 21.
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   with only minor checks and changes (see www.wikipedia.org for details
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